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ABSTRACT 
 
 
     The focus of my dissertation is in two areas: the relationship between optimal 
trade policy and demand / cost variances when the timing of investment is 
endogenous, and analysis of robust FDI determinants with endogenous exchange 
rate in the presence of model uncertainty and selection bias. In the ﬁrst stream, I 
seek to explore the relationship by theoretical derivation and simulation. In the 
second stream, I examine the FDI equation by empirical analyses. 
     My second Chapter "Strategic Trade Policy and the Investment Timing under 
Cost Uncertainty" seeks to examine the optimal trade policy under both demand 
uncertainty and cost uncertainties when the timing of investment is endogenous. 
Based on Albaek (1990), this Chapter adds stochastic cost structure into Dewit 
and Leahy (2004)’s model. An interesting result was found that when demand 
variance is small and there is no cost variance to the foreign firm, the home 
government would like to enforce home firm delay before enforcing foreign firm 
delay when the home firm’s cost variance increases.  
     My third Chapter “Strategic Trade Policy and the Investment Timing under 
Cost Uncertainty with Private Information” studies the optimal trade policy and the 
timing of investment under cost uncertainties and private information. It is 
assumed that cost random components are only observed privately by each firm 
and kept unknown to the other when firms decide how much to invest. We found a 
vi 
 
striking result that when there is no correlation among cost shocks, as demand 
uncertainty rises the government may enforce foreign firm commitment when 
home firm’s cost variance is smaller than foreign firm’s cost variance. 
     My fourth Chapter “Robust FDI determinants with endogenous exchange 
rate in the presence of model uncertainty and selection bias” explores the robust 
FDI determinants in a general equilibrium framework with endogenous exchange 
rate. An empirical model of FDI decisions in a general equilibrium framework is set 
up, and HeckitBMA methodology is adopted suggested in Eicher et al. (2012) to 
deal with model uncertainty and selection bias. It is found that a monetary 
expansion in the host country is shown to deter new investments (extensive 
margin) from foreign countries.
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CHAPTER 1    
INTRODUCTION 
 
1. Research Topic 
 
The timing of investment under uncertainty is an interesting topic which has 
been studied for a long time. However, there have been relatively few papers 
which study optimal trade policy when the timing of investment is endogenous. 
Since firms may invest too early or too late based on a social welfare criterion, it 
is important for the government to consider how its policy affect investment timing 
when choosing strategic policy in an uncertain world.  
 
2. Literature Review 
 
2.1 Strategic Trade Policy Study of Oligopolistic Firms 
The literature on strategic trade policy is divided into different categories 
based on different assumptions. The first category is the well-known strategic 
trade theory which assumes imperfect competition in the goods market, and the 
firms are assumed to be immobile. In most cases, government chooses trade 
policies (e.g. an export subsidy) and their levels before firms choose their outputs 
or investments, and the common conclusion is that unilateral trade policies could 
increase the welfare of the subsidizing country if firms compete in imperfectly 
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competitive markets (Brander & Spencer (1985), Dixit (1984) and Spencer & 
Brander (1983)). In international noncooperative competition, export subsidies 
can improve the relative position of the domestic firm compared to foreign firms, 
and allow it to expand market share and earn greater profits. Eaton and 
Grossman (1986) provided an integrative treatment of the welfare effects of trade 
policy under oligopoly, and characterized the form of the optimal policy 
intervention under various assumptions on market structure and conduct. They 
show that for the trade policy of the home country, a subsidy is generally optimal 
under Cournot competition and a tax is optimal under Bertrand competition when 
all output is exported. Brander (1995) did a survey on the strategic trade policy 
literature, where trade policies are studied in two basic models: “third-market” 
model where oligopolistic firms in two exporting nations export the good to a third 
country; and reciprocal-markets model where firms in two countries compete in 
each other’s' markets. 1  The paper points out that slight change in model 
structure may cause much different optimal trade policies, and the main result of 
the survey is that imperfect competition of the oligopoly type almost always 
creates unilateral incentives for intervention.  
However, Karp and Perloff (1995) set up a model where a government 
chooses its export subsidy before two oligopolistic firms produce but after they 
invest in a third market. A conclusion is drawn that strategic policy may decrease 
domestic welfare below the free trade level if the firms can substantially change 
                                                        
1 Strategic export subsidies are studied in the “third-market” model; while strategic rent-shifting tariffs, subsidies and 
other instruments are considered in the reciprocal-markets model. 
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their investments to influence the trade policy.2 On the contrary, Goldberg (1995) 
justified using the time-consistent trade policy by showing that accounting for the 
sunk cost of the capacity installment, the time-consistent optimal subsidy is 
actually positive, though generally lower than the optimal level with 
precommitment. This result is derived from the shift of the reaction curves due to 
the sunk cost of capacity and the capacity constraints for the firms. 
    Neary and Sullivan (1999) compared adversarial with cooperative trade 
policies when a home and foreign firm compete dynamically in R&D investment 
(with spillover effect) and output. They have shown that export subsidy will 
generate higher welfare than cooperation3 if the government can commit to it; 
otherwise, subsidization may yield much lower welfare than cooperation, even 
lower than free trade. 
The second category of the literature on strategic trade policy is tax 
competition theory which assumes firms (or capital) are mobile in response to tax 
differences across countries and the markets are perfectly competitive. Because 
the governments have the same incentive to use export subsidies to shift profits 
from foreign firms to the domestic firms, the result is a wasteful subsidy race. 
Then, the third category assumes both imperfect competition and mobility of 
firms. Janeba (1998) shows that laissez-faire is a perfect equilibrium4 of the 
multi-stage noncooperative game, and each country’s welfare is higher in 
                                                        
2 The key assumption for this conclusion is that the government can not commit to its trade policies; it will attempt to 
revise the policy to be ex post optimal. 
3 Cooperation on R&D means firms cooperate in their choice of R&D so as to maximize the sum of their joint profits. 
4 It means that laissez-faire is the best equilibrium in this game. 
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laissez-faire equilibrium than in the situation when firms are subsidized. Other 
important assumptions the paper makes are: it is impossible for the governments 
to discriminate against the foreign firm and domestic consumption is small;5 
governments maximize net surplus; firms compete in quantities rather than in 
prices; governments set tax policy before firms make their location and output 
decisions. 
Several variations of the strategic trade policy models are also developed. 
For example, Ishikawaa (1999) studied strategic trade policy with an imported 
intermediate product. It is assumed that there is Cournot competition in 
intermediate goods supply, since an export subsidy aimed at shifting rents from 
foreign to domestic final-good producers may also shift rents to foreign suppliers, 
there will be less incentive for the government to use a subsidy. Neary and Leahy 
(2000) developed a general approach to the design of optimal trade policy 
towards dynamic oligopolies. Three distinct motives for intervention are identified 
in the paper. First is the standard profit-shifting motive. Since the firms compete 
in more than one period, there is inter- as well as intra-temporal profit-shifting. 
The second motive is to counteract the strategic behavior of the home firm 
vis-à-vis its rival. The third motive is to counteract the home firm's strategic 
behavior vis-à-vis the government's own future actions. In all, the government 
should use its power of commitment both to shift profits (inter- and 
intratemporally) and to prevent the home firm from making socially wasteful 
                                                        
5 The government would like to subsidize its own firm if the subsidy to the foreign firm could be avoided. 
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commitments. 
This paper uses the same assumptions (imperfect competition and 
immobility of the firms) as the literature of the first category; however, the trade 
policy tool (subsidy) is studied with the firms’ investment timing decisions under 
uncertainty. In particular, the response of the subsidy level to the changes in the 
level of uncertainty are studied in order to explore how government actions affect 
oligopoly firms’ strategic investment decisions in the presence of both demand 
and cost uncertainty.  
 
2.2 Strategic Trade Policy with Endogenous Timing of Decisions 
     The literature about the influence of strategic trade policy on the timing 
decisions of firms (especially the timing decisions on investment) is small; 
however, there is a huge literature on firms’ timing decisions of investment under 
uncertainty (demand or cost uncertainty). 
Based on the irreversibility of the investment,6 Dixit and Pindyck (1994) 
systematically explained the basic theory of irreversible investment under 
uncertainty based on the interaction between three important characteristics of 
investment decisions: irreversibility, uncertainty and choice of timing. Specifically, 
they used the real option approach to describe having an opportunity to invest, 
and they argue that the value of the unit must exceed the purchase and 
installation cost, by an amount equal to the value of keeping the investment 
                                                        
6 This literature includes Arrow (1968), McDonald and Siegel (1986), Bertola (1988), Pindyck (1988, 1991), Dixit 
(1991, 1992) and Dixit and Pindyck (1994). 
6 
 
option alive (opportunity cost). They derived the optimal investment rules from 
methods developed for pricing options in financial markets and the mathematical 
theory of optimal sequential decisions under uncertainty---dynamic programming. 
They find that greater uncertainty increases the value of a firm’s investment 
opportunity, but decreases the amount of actual investing that the firm will do. In 
other words, uncertainty makes waiting more valuable and discourages 
immediate investment. 
The oligopolistic industry case is also discussed in their stochastic dynamic 
setting. Their general point is: on the one hand, uncertainty and irreversibility 
imply an option value of waiting and therefore greater hesitancy in a firm’s 
investment decisions; on the other hand, the fear of preemption by a rival 
suggests the need to act quickly. Which of these considerations is more 
important depends on the parameters of the problem and the current state of the 
underlying shock. 
Based on different sources of uncertainties, they examined the investment 
decisions when there is uncertainty on the payoff (or price of the product) of the 
project and also the cost of the investment. They prove that a mean-preserving 
spread in the distribution for price increases the incentive to wait. However, when 
it comes to cost uncertainty of a project, things become more complicated and 
depend on whether investment provides information about cost (called shadow 
value in the book). If the resolution of uncertainty is independent of the 
investment (uncertainty of input cost and government regulations), it has almost 
7 
 
the same effect as uncertainty over the payoff from investing, and creates an 
incentive to wait. But if the uncertainty can be partially resolved by investing 
(technical uncertainty), the effect will be opposite.7 
On the other hand, Spencer and Brander (1992) found an important factor 
which can alter the attractiveness of capital commitment relative to flexibility in 
the case of an incumbent firm facing a potential entrant firm with cost uncertainty8. 
They obtained a surprising result that an increase in the flexibility-reducing effect9 
of capital investment in the cost function would actually make the strategy of 
commitment more attractive than delaying the investment by the incumbent firm. 
Following the irreversible investment literature, Abel et al (1996) showed 
more generally how the incentive to invest can be decomposed into the returns to 
existing capital and the marginal value of the options to invest and disinvest. 
More importantly, the investment decision is based on the interaction of two 
options: the option to invest (the call option) and the option to disinvest (the put 
option). Because the values of both options increases with uncertainty and the 
two options have opposing effects on investment decision, the net effect of 
uncertainty can not be determined for sure.10 
 
                                                        
7 It is also mentioned that keeping variances of price and cost uncertainty fixed, the increase of the covariance 
between the two uncertainties will increase the incentive to wait. 
8 They have shown that when the variance of the cost uncertainty (of the potential entrant) is sufficiently high, the 
incumbent firm will choose to delay the investment (act as a flexible Cournot firm).  
9 Flexibility-reducing effect happens when the slope of the marginal cost function is increasing in capital investment, 
so more investment means less flexible technologies. 
10 The call option reduces the firm's incentive to invest; while the put option increases the incentive to invest, the 
interaction of these two options is actually the net effect of expandability and reversibility of a firm on the relationship 
of uncertainty and investment. 
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2.3 Trade Policy Study with Oligopoly Firms and Uncertainty 
Various forms of trade policies were compared in the literature on trade 
policy under imperfect competition with uncertainty. Moner-Colonques (1998) 
compared free trade with autarky for countries when oligopolistic firms from two 
countries produce homogenous goods under private cost information. They 
prove that as long as there is a certain degree of firm heterogeneity and a 
sufficient amount of uncertainty, the oligopolistic firms would prefer international 
free trade to autarky. The key element in obtaining the result is the convexity of 
profits as a function of costs. When the variance of costs is large enough, free 
trade gives firms a ‘‘lucky draw’’ (below average costs) to gain more profits within 
a larger market area, while firms with an ‘‘unlucky draw’’ (above average costs) 
are also able to reduce their loss (relative to expected costs) by selling in a larger 
market.  
On the other hand, Cooper and Riezman (1989) compared direct quantity 
control by the governments in each of two countries with subsidy in an uncertain 
world (demand uncertainty) with imperfectly competitive firms in two countries,11 
with the result that the governments in the two countries would choose subsidies 
instead of direct quantity control when uncertainty is sufficiently high. 
As for the timing of the strategic trade policy under demand uncertainty, 
Arvan (1991) studied a tax-subsidy game played between two governments, and 
the resulting equilibrium is that one government sets trade policy before demand 
                                                        
11 The governments select policy mode and levels both before realization of the demand uncertainty and firms 
selecting outputs. 
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uncertainty is resolved and the other delays its commitment until after observing 
the actual demand. Wong and Chow (1997) has a similar conclusion that the 
timing in the strategic trade policy game is determined by the magnitude of the 
demand uncertainty. When demand uncertainty is low, the home government will 
choose its import tariff before the foreign government and before the uncertainty 
is resolved; otherwise, the foreign government would set its export subsidy 
before the home government. 
    Different from other trade policy studies under imperfect competition with 
uncertainty, Dewit and Leahy (2004) studied the influence of the strategic trade 
policy on the timing of the oligopoly firms’ investments (which is endogenous) 
under uncertainty. The specific novelty of their paper is that they combine 
strategic trade policy and investment timing under uncertainty. They set up a 
two-period oligopoly model (large country case) to study optimal trade policy 
when the timing of firms’ investment decisions is endogenous and can be 
manipulated by the home government, and demand is uncertain. In the model, 
there is no asset market and the possibility of international risk sharing is absent. 
There is a trade-off between strategic commitment and flexibility in the firms’ 
investment decisions. They show that the government, which sets its subsidy at 
the beginning of the game before firms decide when and how much to invest, will 
adjust its policy to affect the investment timing decision of firms; in particular, it 
will choose its policy to deter investment commitment by the home or the foreign 
firm. The home government can affect the investment timing decision of firms by 
10 
 
adjusting the level of the export subsidy in stage one. The subsidy increases the 
relative attractiveness of investment (capital commitment) to the home firm since 
it widens the home firm’s price–cost gap, and raises the return to the output 
expansion resulting from capital commitment. On the contrary, the subsidy lowers 
the relative attractiveness of investment to the foreign firm since the subsidy 
narrows their price–cost gap (as home output increases, the price falls), and 
reduces the return to their investment. 
The details of the model in Dewit and Leahy (2004) follow: 
 
2.3.1. Model Setup in Dewit and Leahy (2004) 
Suppose a home and a foreign firm invest in capital and export to the same 
third market, where they compete (Cournot competition) against each other. The 
third market has demand uncertainty. The stochastic demand function is given 
by: 
 
p a Q u                                                      ( 1 ) 
 
where p  is the price in the third market, Q x y   is total output, x  and y  
are outputs of the home and foreign firm. u is the stochastic component, defined 
over the interval [ , ]u u  with mean zero ( 0)Eu   and variance 2 . 
Investment in capital by the home and foreign firm are represented by k  
and k . It is assumed that the firms’ total cost functions ( , )TC TC  are: 
11 
 
                                                     (2 )a  
 
2
0( )
2
k
TC c k y


                                                        ( 2 )b  
 
where 
0c  and 0c
  are constants; 
0c k  and 0c k
   represent the marginal 
cost of production for the home and the foreign firm. The capital cost for each firm 
is represented by the second terms in Eqs. (2 )a  and (2 )b ;   is a constant and 
is assumed to be identical for both firms.12 
     The two-period four-stage game is like this: in the first period (stage 1 to 3), 
players face uncertainty about future demand in the export market. In stage one, 
the home government sets an export subsidy. In stage two, firms decide the 
investment timing and then commit to this decision. In stage three, firms that are 
committed to invest choose their actual capital level. In the second period (stage 
4), uncertainty is resolved, firms choose outputs and capital levels if they have 
not chosen those. This game is depicted in Fig. 1. C  represents commitment, 
while D  represents delay, superscript star means foreign firm decisions.  
 
                                                        
12 As indicated in Dewit and Leahy (2004), this cost specification is commonly used in the process R&D literature. 
2
0( )
2
k
TC c k x

  
12 
 
 
 
Fig. 1.
13
 The sequence of moves in the game
14
 
 
Based on the assumptions of the model, we can derive the profit functions 
for the home and foreign firm as: 
 
( )p s x TC                                                           ( 3 )a  
 
py TC                                                               ( 3 )b  
 
where s  denotes the home government’s export subsidy. 
 
2.3.2. Solving the Four-Stage Model 
Backward induction is used to solve the game. In the last stage, optimal 
outputs for the home and the foreign firm should satisfy the first order conditions 
of the second-period profits given by (3 )a  and (3 )b . 
                                                        
13 Refer to Dewit and Leahy (2004). 
14 Stage 2 and 3 are separated because in stage 2 the firms decide on investment timing based on the comparison of 
the expected profits for all the investment timing combinations, and in stage 3, the a firm actually make capital 
investment if it chooses to commit, otherwise wait till the second period. 
13 
 
(2 2 2 ) /3x A A s k k u                                           ( 4 )a  
 
(2 2 ) /3y A A s k k u                                                 ( 4 )b  
 
Here, 
0A a c  , 0A a c
    and firms’ costs are assumed the same ( )A A . 
Besides, firms that delayed investment also choose investment levels in the last 
stage, which should also satisfy the first order conditions of the second-period 
profits15.  
In stage three, firms which choose investment commitment determine 
optimal investment levels by maximizing expected profits with respect to capital. 
Optimal investment decisions for the different investment timing combinations 
made by the firms are summarized in Table 1. 
 
  
                                                        
15 See (3A) and (3b). 
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Table 1
16
 
Optimal capital levels for the different investment timing combinations
17
 
 
Here   is the common constant related to the capital cost for both firms in Eqs. (2 )a  and 
(2 )b . 
 
In the table, the first superscript on the variables refers to commitment (c) or 
delay (d) by the home firm, and the second superscript denotes commitment (c*) 
or delay (d*) by the foreign firm. From (4a), (4b) and Table 1, we can see that 
compared to commitment, investment delay reinforces the variability (flexibility) 
of the output by adding its own variability. From Table 1, we can also see the 
following capital-output ranking: / / / /cd cd cc cc dc dc dd ddk Ex k Ex k x k x
       
   . 
In stage two, firms will choose the investment timing combination that 
generates the largest expected profits (see Table 2). Firms will prefer delaying 
the investment generally since investment delay increases the variability 
(flexibility) of the output (mentioned above) and more output flexibility will 
increase expected profits18. However, firms may also choose to commit to capital 
when 1st mover advantage gain exceeds the loss caused by foregoing flexibility. 
                                                        
16 Refer to Dewit and Leahy (2004). 
17 Note that capital is a function of the actual demand realization (u) if the firm delays the investment, however, if the 
firm makes a capital commitment, optimal capital investment does not depend on u. 
18 It has been proved that the profit function is convex in output, so the expected profit increases when variance of the 
output increases.  
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Table 2
19
 
Maximized expected profits for the different investment timing combinations 
 
we define: 1 (8/ 9)   , 21 2 [(2 ) /(3 2 )]        and 1 / 2   . 
 
In stage one, the government chooses the subsidy to maximize expected 
welfareEW : 
 
EW E sEx                                                             (5)  
 
There are two reasons why the government wants to use subsidies. One 
basic reason is that the subsidy is a profit-shifting strategic trade policy 
instrument; for each possible investment timing combination, there is an optimal 
rent-shifting subsidy [see Table 3]. More importantly, the government can also 
change the firms’ investment timing by changing the subsidy levels20 in order to 
get the maximum expected welfare. But it will deviate from the optimal 
rent-shifting policy.21 So the subsidy which is used to change the investment 
timing of firms will only be used if it has a higher expected welfare level than the 
                                                        
19 Refer to Dewit and Leahy (2004). 
20 Increasing the subsidy alters the relative advantage of investment flexibility; it increases the relative attractiveness 
of commitment to the home firm, and lowers it to the foreign firm. 
21 It means that it will be different from the optimal rent-shifting subsidy. 
16 
 
optimal rent-shifting policy. 
 
Table 3
22
 
Optimal rent-shifting subsidies for all possible investment timing combinations 
 
Note: 
dcs

 > 
dds

 > 
ccs

 > 
cds

 for A A
 . 
 
2.3.3 Government’s Optimal Trade Policy 
The author studied the home government’s optimal export subsidy 
numerically when both firms’ investment timing choices are endogenous (see Fig. 
2a and 2b). More specifically, the author studied the pattern for the optimal 
subsidy levels the home government chooses when underlying parameters 
change. 
Fig. 2a depicts the optimal subsidy at different 2 levels keeping   
constant. It shows that when uncertainty is very low, both firms have low 
incentive to delay the investment, and the government would choose the optimal 
rent-shifting subsidy ccs

 to maximize the expected welfare. As uncertainty rises 
firms’ relative valuation of commitment falls, the government chooses to deter 
                                                        
22 Refer to Dewit and Leahy (2004). 
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foreign commitment by using subsidy cts

,  which is the lowest possible subsidy 
that deters foreign commitment when the home firm commits. The new subsidy 
starts at point e , where it jumps discretely to a higher level, then it gradually 
decreases as the level of uncertainty rises, until at point f  in Fig. 2a  it equals 
the optimal rent-shifting subsidy cds

. As uncertainty continues to go up, firms’ 
incentive to delay the investment is stronger, and commitment deterrence for 
home firm becomes more attractive to the government. So, when 
( ; , ) ( ; , )td cdEW s D D EW s C D
   , the government will choose tds

. Specifically, in 
Fig. 2a, at point g, the optimal subsidy level drops, to the minimum deviation23 
necessary to enforce flexibility for the home firm. Furthermore, tds

 gradually 
increases as the level of uncertainty rises, until at point h  in Fig. 2a it equals the 
optimal rent-shifting subsidy dds

; when uncertainty level exceeds point  h , the 
government sets dds

 and both firms delay.24 
 
                                                        
23 Deviation means deviation from the optimal rent-shifting subsidy. 
24 Since the main purpose of Dewit and Leahy (2004) is to study strategic trade policy, only output subsidy is studied, 
other subsidy choices such as investment subsidy are omitted. 
18 
 
 
 
Fig. 2.
25
 (a) Optimal subsidization when both firms choose investment timing in 
2( , )s  
( 1A A
  ; 0.03  ). (b) Optimal subsidization when both firms choose investment timing 
in 
2( , )  -space ( 1A A  ). 
 
Fig. 2b expresses the same idea as 2a except it is drawn in a two 
                                                        
25 Cited from Dewit and Leahy (2004). 
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dimensional ( 2 ,  ) space, and it shows which policy is optimal in each domain. 
Area I in Fig. 2b correspond to parameter values such that it is optimal for the 
home government to choose ccs

as policy. Similarly, area II in Fig. 2b 
corresponds to parameter values such that it is optimal for the home government 
to choose cts

as policy and so on. From the outcomes of the numerical study, we 
can see that the government tends to induce both the home and the foreign firm 
to delay investment if possible, but the deviation of the subsidy from the optimal 
rent-shifting level should be as small as possible to accomplish this change in 
timing. In addition, Fig. 2a and 2b also shows that, as uncertainty rises, 
deterrence of foreign commitment occurs before deterrence of home 
commitment. Because the subsidy widens the home firm’s price-cost gap, it 
increases the relative attractiveness of commitment for the home firm and lowers 
it for the foreign firm. Therefore, it is easier for the foreign firm to accept 
investment delay than the home firm.  
 
3. Contribution to this Research Area 
 
While Dewit and Leahy (2004) extended trade policy studies under imperfect 
competition with uncertainty, they ignored the cost or technological uncertainty 
and focused only on demand uncertainty. As with demand, firms may also be 
uncertain about their own and rival’s future costs. And for cost uncertainty, 
asymmetric information is a special issue since generally firms know more about 
20 
 
their own cost than their rival’s. The government may have different incentives to 
encourage or discourage investment commitment by firms after uncertainty is 
added into the firms’ cost structure. With asymmetric information, investment 
could be a signal of one firm’s cost to the other firm, so it also has information 
value. By encouraging investments by both firms welfare may be increased in 
home country. The next Chapter will extend Dewit and Leahy (2004)’s two period 
model and add stochastic components into firm’s cost structure based on Albaek 
(1990). The new cost structure treats all distributional aspects of the random 
components as public information in the first period and the random components 
are realized and observed by both firms in the second period. We explore the 
changes on the way a government with commitment power affects the firms’ 
strategic investment decisions for an export market where both demand and cost 
uncertainties exist in those three scenarios.  
In this revised game, backward induction is still used to solve the two period 
four stage model, except that three assumptions on the stochastic marginal cost 
function will be considered separately, and different equilibrium results and 
optimal trade policy levels will be compared. 
 
References 
 
Abel, A.A., A.K. Dixit, J.C. Eberly and R.S. Pindyck, “Options, the Value of Capital 
and Investment”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 111, pp. 753-777, 1996. 
 
21 
 
Abel, A.B., “Optimal Investment under Uncertainty”, American Economic Review, 
73, pp. 228-233, 1983. 
 
Albaek, Svend, “Stackelberg Leadership as a Natural Solution under Cost 
Uncertainty”, Journal of Industrial Economics 38: 335-47, 1990. 
 
Arrow, K. J., “Optimal Capital Policy with Irreversible Investment” in J.N Wolfe 
(ed.) Value Capital and Growth, Essays in Honour of Sir John Hicks, 
Edinburgh University Press: Edinburgh, 1968. 
 
Arvan, L., “Flexibility versus commitment in strategic trade policy under 
uncertainty”, J. Int. Econ. 31, 341– 355, 1991. 
 
Bertola, Giuseppe, “Adjustment Costs and Dynamic Factor Demands: 
Investment and Employment under Uncertainty”, Ph.D. thesis, Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology, 1988. 
 
Brander, J., “Strategic trade policy”, In: Grossman, G., Rogoff, K. (Eds.). 
Handbook of International Economics, Vol. 3. North-Holland, Amsterdam, 
1395–1455, 1995. 
 
Brander, J. and B. Spencer, “Export subsidies and international market share 
rivalry”, J. Int. Econ., 18, 83–100, 1985. 
 
Cooper, R. and R. Riezman, “Uncertainty and the choice of trade policy in 
oligopolistic industries”, Rev. Econ. Studies 56, 129–140, 1989. 
 
Dewit, Gerda and Dermot Leahy, “Rivalry in uncertain export markets: 
commitment versus flexibility”, Journal of International Economics, 64, 195– 
209, 2004. 
 
Dixit, A. K., “International Trade Policy for Oligopolistic Industries”, The Economic 
Journal, 94, 1-16, 1984. 
 
22 
 
Dixit, A. K., “Irreversible Investment with Price Ceilings”, Journal of Political 
Economy, XCIX, 541-57, 1991. 
 
Dixit, A. K., “Investment and Hysteresis”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, VI, 
107-32, 1992. 
 
Dixit, A. K. and Robert S. Pindyck, “Investment under Uncertainty”, Princeton 
University Press, NJ, 1994. 
 
Eaton, J. and G. Grossman, “Optimal trade and industrial policy under oligopoly”, 
Q. J. Econ, 101, 383– 406, 1986. 
 
Goldberg, P., “Strategic export promotion in the absence of government 
commitment”, Int. Econ. Rev. 36, 407–426, 1995. 
 
Hartman, R., “The Effects of Price and Cost Uncertainty on Investment”, Journal 
of Economic Theory, 5, 258-266, 1972. 
 
Ishikawaa, Jota and Barbara J. Spencer, “Rent-shifting export subsidies with an 
imported intermediate product”, Journal of International Economics 48, 199–
232, 1999. 
 
Janeba, Eckhard, “Tax competition in imperfectly competitive markets”, Journal 
of International Economics 44, 135–153, 1998. 
 
Karp, L.S. and J.M. Perloff, “The failure of strategic industrial policy due to 
manipulation by firms”, Int. Rev. Econ. Finance 4, 1 – 16, 1995. 
 
McDonald, R. and D. Siegel, “The Value of Waiting to Investz”, Quarterly Journal 
of Economics, 101, pp. 707-728. 1986. 
 
Moner-Colonques, Rafael, “Cost uncertainty and trade liberalization in 
international oligopoly”, Journal of International Economics, 45, 369–376, 
1998. 
23 
 
Neary, J. Peter and Dermot Leahy, “Strategic Trade and Industrial Policy towards 
Dynamic Oligopolies”, The Economic Journal, Vol. 110, No. 463, 484-508, 
2000. 
 
Neary, J.P. and P. O’Sullivan, “Beat ‘em or join ‘em?: export subsidies versus 
international research joint ventures in oligopolistic markets”, Scand. J. Econ, 
101, 577– 596, 1999. 
 
Pindyck, Robert S., “Irreversible Investment, Capacity Choice, and the Value of 
the Firm”, American Economic Review, LXXVIII, 969-85, 1988. 
 
Pindyck, Robert S., “Irreversibility, Uncertainty, and Investment”, Journal of 
Economic Literature, XXIX, 1110-52, 1991. 
 
Small, John P., “The Timing and Scale of Investment Under Uncertainty”, 
Department of Economics, University of Victoria in its series Econometrics 
Working Papers No. 9906, 1999. 
 
Spencer, B. and J. Brander, “International R&D rivalry and industrial strategy”, 
Rev. Econ. Studies 50, 707– 722, 1983. 
 
Spencer, B., and J. Brander, “Pre-commitment and flexibility: applications to 
oligopoly theory”, Eur. Econ. Rev. 36, 1601–1626, 1992. 
 
Wong, Kit Pong and Kong Wing Chow, “Endogenous Sequencing in Strategic 
Trade Policy Games Under Uncertainty”, Open economies review 8: 353–369, 
1997. 
24 
 
CHAPTER 2 
STRATEGIC TRADE POLICY AND THE INVESTMENT TIMING UNDER COST 
UNCERTAINTY 
 
1. Relevant Literature on Timing Decision & Cost Uncertainty 
 
The literature on firms’ timing decisions of investment or output under cost 
uncertainty can be divided into five categories.  
The first category focuses on the relationship between uncertainty and the 
current investment and showed that higher uncertainty leads to a higher current 
rate of investment. Hartman (1972) was among the earliest papers to examine 
the effects of uncertainties in output prices, wage rates, and investment costs on 
the quantity of investment undertaken by a risk-neutral competitive firm. Hartman 
showed that with a linearly homogeneous production function, increased 
uncertainty in future output prices and wage rates leads the competitive firm to 
increase its current investment.26 Afterwards, Abel (1983) demonstrated that 
Hartman's results continue to hold in continuous-time model27. Specifically, given 
the current price of output, higher uncertainty leads to a higher current rate of 
investment regardless of the curvature of the marginal adjustment cost function. 
In all, it is called the pure uncertainty effect28.  
The second category represented by Dixit and Pindyck (1994) got different 
                                                        
26 However, he also showed that current investment is invariant to increased uncertainty in future investment costs. 
27 In Pindyck's continuous-time model, the current price is known but the future evolution of prices is stochastic. 
28 By Small (1999). 
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results based on whether investment provides information about cost. Waiting is 
preferred if the resolution of uncertainty is independent of the investment, 
otherwise, commitment is favorable if the uncertainty can be partially resolved by 
investing. 
The third category (represented by Abel et al (1996)) has the result that 
uncertainty has two opposing effects on investment decision (encourage and 
discourage investments) and the net effect can not be determined for sure. 
The fourth category posits that there is no relationship between the 
magnitude of the cost uncertainty and the timing decision of the investment at all. 
Small (1999) decomposed the investment problem into decisions over scale and 
timing with convex adjustment costs. Finally, it was shown that the timing of the 
investment is determined by the expected trajectory of capital prices relative to 
the firm’s discount rate. 
The fifth category investigates firms’ timing decisions of output under cost 
uncertainty. Albaek (1990) analyzed the role choice (leader or follower) by the 
duopolists in a model with cost uncertainty where direct information sharing is 
prohibited. Under certain conditions, the duopolists would prefer a Natural 
Stackelberg Situation (NSS) where the firms agree on the assignment of roles 
and neither prefers the (Bayesian) Nash equilibrium. The firm with the greater 
cost variance will be the leader in NSS. This result comes from the idea that 
duopoly firms may share information by choosing the sequential choice structure 
instead of a simultaneous one in order to allow one firm to condition on the 
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strategic decision of the other. 
 
2. The Setup of the Model 
 
The two-period four-stage game in Dewit and Leahy (2004) is: in the first 
period (stage 1 to 3), players face uncertainty about future demand in the export 
market. In stage one, the home government sets an export subsidy. In stage two, 
firms decide the investment timing and then committed to this decision. In stage 
three, firms that are committed to invest choose their actual capital level. In the 
second period (stage 4), uncertainty is resolved, firms choose outputs and capital 
levels if they have not chosen those.29 The demand function and the original cost 
functions for both firms are: 
 
p a Q u                                                        ( 1 ) 
 
                                                      (2 )a  
 
2
0( )
2
k
TC c k y


                                                        ( 2 )b  
 
Keeping the setup of the model in Dewit and Leahy (2004), our paper adds 
                                                        
29 Refer to figure 1 in the first Chapter. 
2
0( )
2
k
TC c k x

  
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cost uncertainty into their model based on two random cost structures. This cost 
structure is a simple structure where it is assumed that the total cost functions of 
home and foreign firm ( , )TC TC  are: 
 
2
0( )
2
k
TC c k v x

                                                       ( 5 )a  
 
2
0( )
2
k
TC c k v y


                                                      ( 5 )b  
 
where v  and v  are stochastic cost components which have the following 
properties30: 
(i) ( ) 0E v  , ( ) 0E v  ; 
(ii) 
1( )Var v V , 2( )Var v V
  , 1V  & 2V 0; 
(iii) ( , ) 0Cov v v  , ( , ) 0Cov u v  , ( , ) 0Cov u v  ; 
(iv) v R , v R  , R  and R  are bounded intervals. 
    In the first period, both the firms only know the distribution of v  and v , and 
the distribution of the random variables are common knowledge. In the second 
period, v  and v are observed by both firms. 
 
  
                                                        
30 Similar to the assumptions in Albaek (1990). 
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3. The Solution to the New Cost Structure with Uncertainty 
 
Based on the assumptions of the new cost structure discussed above, we 
are going to work out the optimal outputs for both firms, investment levels for both 
firms and government subsidy for each investment timing combination using 
backward induction, as well as the maximized expected profits for both firms and 
the maximized expected welfare for the home country.  
 
3.1 Optimal Output Decisions 
Based on the assumptions of the cost structure discussed above, following 
the same procedure (backward induction) with Dewit and Leahy (2004), we first 
work out the optimal outputs for the home and the foreign firm in the second 
period by maximizing second period profits: 
 
2
0( ) ( )
2
k
Max a x y u s x c k v x

 
         
 
                               (6 )a  
 
2
0( ) ( )
2
k
Max a x y u y c k v y


            
 
                              (6 )b  
 
The first order conditions for x  and y  are: 
 
2 0A x y u s k v                                                   ( 7 )a  
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2 0A y x u k v                                                           ( 7 )b  
 
where still, 
0A a c  , 0A a c
   . It can also be expressed in matrix form as: 
2 1
1 2
x A u s k v
y A u k v  
       
    
      
                                                ( 8 ) 
 
Solve for x  and y  we have:  
 
2 1 2 2 2 21 1
1 23 3 2 2 2
x A u s k v A A s k k u v v
y A u k v A A s k k u v v
  
     
                
       
                
       (9)  
 
From (7a) and (7b) we also find the actual profit functions for both firms can be 
expressed as: 
 
2
2
2
k
x

                                                                  (10 )a  
 
2
2
2
k
y


                                                                  (10 )b  
 
We can see that the only differences of the optimal output between this paper 
and Dewit & Leahy (2004) are the cost random variables of the two oligopoly 
firms. It is obviously seen that the optimal outputs in stage four are affected by 
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both the demand and the cost uncertainties. 
 
3.2 Optimal Investment Decisions 
The next step is to determine the optimal capital levels for different 
investment timing combinations. If delay is chosen, the investment level is 
chosen in the last stage31; otherwise, it is chosen in stage 3 (in period 1) by 
maximizing the expected profits. 
 
A. Delay, Delay Case 
If both firms delay investment into the second period, they maximize their 
second period profits simultaneously by choosing optimal outputs and capital 
choices in the second period, so the first order conditions for choosing 
investment levels are: 
 
0
k
x

                                                                     (1 1 )a  
 
0
k
y


                                                                    (11 )b  
 
Then we can easily solve x , y , k  and k in terms of ( , , , )s u v v  using 
equations (11 )a , (11 )b  and (9) . (see Table 4) 
                                                        
31 By maximizing second period profits. 
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Table 4 
Optimal output and investment choices in delay, delay case under both demand & cost 
uncertainties 
 
 D , D

 
x  (1 ) (2 )( )
(1 )(3 )
dd v u s A v Ax
 
 

       

 
 
y  
(1 ) (2 )( )
(1 )(3 )
dd v u A v s Ay
 
 

       

 
 
k  
[ (1 ) (2 )( ) ]
(1 )(3 )
ddk v u s A v A

 
 
         
 
 
k  
[ (1 ) (2 )( ) ]
(1 )(3 )
ddk v u A v s A

 
 
         
 
 
 
 
In this case, the actual profit functions for both firms are: 
 
2
2 21
2 2
ddkx x



 
    
 
                                                   (1 2 )a  
 
2
2 21
2 2
ddky y





      
 
                                                 (1 2 )b  
 
B. Commitment, Delay Case 
Next, consider the case: commit, defer (home firm invests in the first period, 
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and foreign firm defers investment into the second period).  In period 2, u , v  
and v  are known to both firms, and k (also s ) is exogenous. Thus, we solve 
equation (11 )b  and (9)  at the same time and get: 
 
(1 ) (2 )( )
1
2 2
3 2
[2 2 ]
cd
cd
cd
x v u A s k v A
y A A s k u v v
A A s k u v vk
 





 
 
 
          
   
                     
                        (13)  
 
where the values of x , y and k will depend on s , k , u , v  and v .  Going 
back to stage 3, firm 1 has to decide optimal investment level cdk

by maximizing 
its expected profit in the second period:  
 
 
k
Max E  
2
0( ) ( )
2k
k
E Max a x y u s x c k v x

   
           
   
 
  0cd cdk x k y kE x y  
 
                                 (from F.O.C., 0x  ) 
1
( ) ( ) 0
3 2
k
E x x
 
 
      
 
 
2(2 )
3 2
cd cdk Ex



 
 

                                                      (14)  
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From the result we got in (13), cdEx

 can be calculated as: 
 
 
1
(1 ) (2 )( )
3 2
cdEx E v u A s k v A 

          

 
     
1
[ ( ) (1 ) ( ) (2 ) ( ) (2 )( ) ]
3 2
E v E u E v A s k A  

          

     
2
( )
3 2 3 2
cd AA s k

 


   
 
                                            (1 5 ) 
(expectations of the random variables are zero due to the assumption) 
 
Finally, we can solve cdk

 by equation (14) and (15): 
 
2(2 ) 2 (2 ) 2
[ ( ) ]
3 2 3 2 3 2 3 2
cd cd cd Ak Ex A s k
   

   
  
  
    
   
 
2 2
2 (2 )[(2 )( ) ]
(3 2 ) 2 (2 )
cd A s Ak
  
  

   
 
  
                                        (1 6 ) 
 
In the end, the optimal choices ( cdx

, cdy

and cdk
 ) can be decided in terms of 
s , u , v  and v  when cdk

 is plugged in. (see Table 5) 
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Table 5 
Optimal output and investment choices in commitment, delay case under both demand & 
cost uncertainties 
 
 C , D  
x  2 2
2 2 2 2
1 (2 )(3 2 ) ( ) (3 2 )
[ (1 ) (2 ) ]
3 2 (3 2 ) 2 (2 ) (3 2 ) 2 (2 )
cd A s Ax v u v
  
 
      


          
      
 
y  2
2 2 2 2
1 (3 2 ) ( ) (2 )
[ 2 2(1 ) ]
3 2 (3 2 ) 2 (2 ) (3 2 ) 2 (2 )
cd A sy u v v A
  
      
         
      
 
k  
2 2
2 (2 )[(2 )( ) ]
(3 2 ) 2 (2 )
cd A s Ak
  
  

   

  
 
k  2
2 2 2 2
(3 2 ) ( ) (2 )
[ 2 2(1 ) ]
3 2 (3 2 ) 2 (2 ) (3 2 ) 2 (2 )
cd A sk u v v A
   
      
         
      
 
 
In this case, the actual profit functions for both firms are: 
 
 
2 22 2
2 2 21 2(2 ) 22
2 2 3 2 3 2
cdkx x Ex x Ex
 
  
   
     
         
     
          (1 7 )a 32 
 
2
2 21
2 2
cdky y





      
 
                                                (17 )b  
 
                                                        
32 From this equation, we can also conclude that  
 
 
   
2 2
2
2
3 2 2 (2 )
3 2
E Ex Var x
  


   
  
  
, which can be 
used later in calculating the maximized expected profits for both firms. 
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C. Delay, Commitment Case 
When home firm delays investment to the second period, and foreign firm 
commits investment in the first period, the optimal choices ( dcx

, dcy

, 
dck

 and 
dck
 ) can be decided in terms of s , u , v  and v  by following similar steps as 
in the Commitment, Delay Case. (see Table 6) 
 
Table 6 
Optimal output and investment choices in delay, commitment case under both demand & 
cost uncertainties 
 
 D , C  
x  2
2 2 2 2
1 (2 ) (3 2 )
[ 2 2(1 )( ) ]
3 2 (3 2 ) 2 (2 ) (3 2 ) 2 (2 )
dc Ax u v v A s
  
      


        
      
 
y  2 2
2 2 2 2
1 (3 2 ) ( ) (2 )(3 2 )
[ (1 ) (2 ) ]
3 2 (3 2 ) 2 (2 ) (3 2 ) 2 (2 )
dc A s Ay v u v
  
 
      


          
      
 
k  2
2 2 2 2
(2 ) (3 2 )
[ 2 2(1 )( ) ]
3 2 (3 2 ) 2 (2 ) (3 2 ) 2 (2 )
dc Ak u v v A s
   
      


        
      
 
k
 2 2
2 (2 )[(2 ) ( )]
(3 2 ) 2 (2 )
dc A A sk
  
  


    
  
 
 
In this case, the actual profit functions for both firms are: 
2
2 21
2 2
dckx x



 
    
 
                                                   (1 8 )a  
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 
2 22 2
2 2 21 2(2 ) 22
2 2 3 2 3 2
dc dcky y Ey y Ey
 
  
   
 

               
     
        (1 8 )b  
 
D. Commitment, Commitment Case 
If both firms commit their investments in the first period, in the second period 
they only choose their optimal outputs given the investment level they chose in 
the first period by maximizing their second period profits. (see equation (9)) 
Back in stage 3, firms have to decide optimal investment level ( cck

, cck
 ) by 
maximizing their expected profits in the second period based on their choices of 
optimal outputs:  
 
 
k
Max E  
2
0( ) ( )
2k
k
E Max a x y u s x c k v x

   
           
   
 
  0cc cck x k y kE x y  
 
                                    (from F.O.C., 0x  ) 
1
( ) ( ) ( ) 0
3
k
E x x

 
       
 
 
4
3
cc cck Ex
 
                                                              (19)  
 
k
Max E


 
2
0( ) ( )
2k
k
E Max a x y u y c k v y


   
   
          
   
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  0cc ccx yk k kE x y  
 
  
                                  (from F.O.C., 0y
  ) 
1
( ) ( ) ( ) 0
3
k
E y y

 
       
 
 
4
3
cc cck Ey
                                                              ( 2 0 ) 
 
Plug optimal investment levels ( cck

, cck
 ) into equation (9), and take 
expectations on both sides of the equation, we can get: 
 
4 4
2 2 2 2
1 3 3
4 43
2 2 2
3 3
cc cc
cc
cc
cc cc
A A s Ex Ey Eu Ev Ev
x
E
y A A s Ey Ex Eu Ev Ev
 
 
 


 
 
 
 
         
    
             
 
 
4 4
2 2 2
1 3 3
4 43
2 2
3 3
cc cc
cc
cc
cc cc
A A s Ex Ey
Ex
Ey A A s Ey Ex
 
 
 


 


 
      
     
          
 
 
6(3 2 )( ) 91
(3 4 )(9 4 ) 6(3 2 ) 9( )
cc
cc
Ex A s A
A A sEy

  




     
             
                           ( 2 1) 
 
From (15), (16) and (17) we can easily solve for cck

and cck
 . Then, ccx

 and 
ccy

 will be solved automatically by equation (9) when we plug in cck

and cck
 . 
(see Table 7) 
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Table 7 
Optimal output and investment choices in commitment, commitment case under both 
demand & cost uncertainties 
 
 C , C  
x  6(3 2 )( ) 9 2
(3 4 )(9 4 ) 3
cc A s A u v vx

 

     
 
 
 
y  
6(3 2 ) 9( ) 2
(3 4 )(9 4 ) 3
cc A A s u v vy

 

     
 
 
 
k  4 [2(3 2 )( ) 3 ]
(3 4 )(9 4 )
cc A s Ak
 
 

  

 
 
k  4 [2(3 2 ) 3( )]
(3 4 )(9 4 )
cc A A sk
 
 


   
 
 
 
In this case, the actual profit functions for both firms are: 
 
 
22 2
2 2 21 4 8
2 2 3 9
cc cc cckx x Ex x Ex
 

 
    
       
  
                     ( 2 2 )a 33 
 
 
22 2
2 2 21 4 8
2 2 3 9
cc cc ccky y Ey y Ey
 

 
  

          
  
                     (22 )b  
 
  
                                                        
33  So, the expected value of the profit for the home firm can be expressed as: 
     
28
1
9
cc ccE Ex Var x


  
   
 
. 
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3.3 Optimal Expected Profits  
 
Going backward to stage two, firms will choose the investment timing which 
yields the higher expected profit. So we take the expectations of the profits for 
both firms using the optimal choices above for each investment timing 
combination. 
For Commitment, Commitment Case, the expected profit for the home firm 
is:  
 
2
0
( )
( ) ( )
2
cc
cc cc cc cc cc cc kE E a x y u s x c k v x


       
         
  
 
2( )
( )
2
cc
cc cc cc cc kE A x y u s k v x


     
        
  
 
2
2 ( )( )
2
cc
cc kE x


  
  
  
            (From F.O.C. of the optimal outputs)      ( 2 3 ) 
2
2 ( )var ( )
2
cc
cc cc kx Ex


 
                                              
 
It is easily seen from Table 7 that: 
 
6(3 2 )( ) 9 2 6(3 2 )( ) 9
(3 4 )(9 4 ) 3 (3 4 )(9 4 )
cc A s A u v v A s AEx E
 
   

          
   
    
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6(3 2 )( ) 9 2
var var
(3 4 )(9 4 ) 3
cc A s A u v vx

 

      
  
  
 
       
2
1 24var 4var var
9 9
V Vu v v    
   
So, the expected profit can be calculated as: 
 
2
2
21 24 6(3 2 )( ) 9 1 4 [2(3 2 )( ) 3 ][ ]
9 (3 4 )(9 4 ) 2 (3 4 )(9 4 )
cc V V A s A A s AE
   

    

         
    
    
 
2
2
1 242(3 2 )( ) 3(9 8 )
(3 4 )(9 4 ) 9
V VA s A 

 
     
   
  
 
 
Similarly, the expected profit for the foreign firm is derived as: 
 
2
2 ( )( )
2
cc
cc cc kE E y


 


  
  
  
                                                 ( 2 4 ) 
2
2
2 142(3 2 ) 3( )(9 8 )
(3 4 )(9 4 ) 9
V VA A s 

 
     
   
  
 
 
Table 8 gives the maximized expected profits for all different investment 
timing combinations under demand and cost uncertainties. 
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Table 8 
Maximized expected profits for the different investment timing combinations under demand & 
cost uncertainties 
 
 E  
C , C  
2
2
1 242(3 2 )( ) 3(9 8 )
(3 4 )(9 4 ) 9
V VA s A 

 
     
  
  
 
C , D  
2 2 22
1 2
2 2 2
(1 ) (2 )[(2 )( ) ]
(3 2 ) 2 (2 ) (3 2 )
V VA s A   
   
      

   
 
D , C  2
2
1 22 2 2
1
2(1 )(3 )( ) (3 2 ) 2(1 ) ( 4 )
2 (3 2 ) 2 (2 ) (3 2 )
A s A
V V

   

   
      
    
    
 
D , D

 2 2
2 2
12 2 2
1
(2 )( ) (2 )2(1 ) ( )
2 (1 )(3 ) (3 ) (1 ) (1 )
VA s A
V

  

    
     
    
     
 
 
Table 8 (cont’d) 
 
 
 E   
C , C  
2
2
2 142(3 2 ) 3( )(9 8 )
(3 4 )(9 4 ) 9
V VA A s 

 
     
  
  
 
C , D  2
2
2 12 2 2
1
2(1 )(3 ) (3 2 )( ) 2(1 ) ( 4 )
2 (3 2 ) 2 (2 ) (3 2 )
A A s
V V

   

   
      
    
    
 
D , C  
2 2 22
2 1
2 2 2
(1 ) (2 )[(2 ) ( )]
(3 2 ) 2 (2 ) (3 2 )
V VA A s   
   
      

   
 
D , D

 2 2
2 1
22 2 2
1
(2 ) ( ) (2 )2(1 ) ( )
2 (1 )(3 ) (3 ) (1 ) (1 )
VA A s
V

  

    
     
    
     
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Compared with the case where only demand uncertainty is concerned, the 
existence of the cost uncertainties increases the expected profits of both firms for 
all the investment timing combinations. 
In order to look at the impact of the cost uncertainty on the possible 
equilibrium choices the firms will make, we will look at how the cost uncertainty 
affects each of: , ,d c c cE E 
 
 ; , ,d d c dE E 
 
 ; , ,c d c cE E 
   and 
, ,d d d cE E 
   , since those differences determines each firm’s best response 
given the strategy of the other firm. 
 
2 2
, ,
2 2
2(1 )(3 )( ) (3 2 ) 2(3 2 )( ) 3
(1 ) (9 8 )
2 (3 2 ) 2 (2 ) (3 4 )(9 4 )
d c c c A s A A s AE E
    
  
    
 
           
       
       
 
               
2
1 22
1
12 ( 4 )
(3 2 ) 9
V V



 
 
    
 
 
                                (25)  
 
Given the foreign firm choosing commitment, when 
2
1
12 0
(3 2 ) 9



 

 (or 
15
8
  ), 
for the home firm the relative advantage of delay to commitment is increasing as 
demand or cost variances ( 2 , 
1V , 2V ) go up. Furthermore, the difference of the 
expected profits is more responsive to 
1V  than 2V . 
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2
2
, ,
2 2
(2 )( ) [(2 )( ) ]
(1 )
2 (1 )(3 ) (3 2 ) 2 (2 )
d d c d A s A A s AE E
  
 
    
 
       
    
     
         
2
2 2
2
1 22 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
1 (1 )(2 ) (1 )
(1 ) (2 ) 12 2 2
(3 ) (3 2 ) (3 ) (1 ) (3 2 ) (3 ) (1 ) (3 2 )
V V
  

 

       
     
         
          
            
     
 
   (26)  
 
Given the foreign firm choosing delay, for the home firm the change of the relative 
advantage of choosing delay over commitment depends upon the individual 
coefficients for the variances ( 2 , 
1V , 2V ). It changes in the same direction with 
the variances with positive coefficients and in the opposite direction with the 
variances with negative coefficients. 
 
2 2
, ,
2 2
2(1 )(3 ) (3 2 )( ) 2(3 2 ) 3( )
(1 ) (9 8 )
2 (3 2 ) 2 (2 ) (3 4 )(9 4 )
c d c c A A s A A sE E
    
  
    
 
 
                   
       
 
              
2
2 12
1
12 ( 4 )
(3 2 ) 9
V V



 
 
    
 
 
                                 (27)  
 
Given the home firm choosing commitment, when 
2
1
12 0
(3 2 ) 9



 

 (or 
15
8
  ), 
for the foreign firm the relative advantage of delay to commitment is increasing as 
demand or cost variances ( 2 , 
1V , 2V ) go up. Furthermore, the difference of the 
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expected profits is more responsive to 
2V  than 1V . 
 
2
2
, ,
2 2
(2 ) ( ) [(2 ) ( )]
(1 )
2 (1 )(3 ) (3 2 ) 2 (2 )
d d d c A A s A A sE E
  
 
    
 
 
            
     
 
2
2 2
2
2 12 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
1 (1 )(2 ) (1 )
(1 ) (2 ) 12 2 2
(3 ) (3 2 ) (3 ) (1 ) (3 2 ) (3 ) (1 ) (3 2 )
V V
  

 

       
     
         
          
            
     
 
   (28)  
 
Given the home firm choosing delay, for the foreign firm the change of the relative 
advantage of choosing delay to commitment also depends upon the individual 
coefficients for the variances ( 2 , 
1V , 2V ). It changes in the same direction with 
the variances with positive coefficients and in the opposite direction with the 
variances with negative coefficients. 
In the end, the four rent-shifting subsidies for all the investment timing 
combination can be decided in the first stage by the government by maximizing 
the expected welfare of the home country:  
 
{ } { }Max EW Max E sEx   
 
The optimal rent-shifting subsidy given a particular investment timing 
combination is calculated by maximizing the expected welfare of the home 
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country for that particular investment timing combination.34 In this cost structure, 
the optimal rent-shifting subsidies for all possible investment timing combinations 
are summarized in Table 9. The optimal rent-shifting subsidies are predicated 
upon the equilibrium of the game (once the investment timing is decided, so is 
the rent-shifting subsidy), however, the equilibrium of the game (investment 
timing decisions for both firms) are affected by the subsidy.35 
 
Table 9 
Optimal rent-shifting subsidies for all possible investment timing combinations 
ccs

 2(3 2 )[3(3 4 )(9 4 ) 4(9 8 )(3 2 )] 3[3(3 4 )(9 4 ) 4(9 8 )(3 2 )]
4(3 2 )[2(9 8 )(3 2 ) 3(3 4 )(9 4 )]
A A        
    
           
     
 
cds

 
(2 ) (7 4 )
2(2 )(1 )
A A 
 
  
 
 
dcs

 
2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2 2 2
2[(3 2 ) 2 (2 ) ][(3 2 ) 2 (2 ) (2 )]
1
4(1 ) (2 )(3 ) (3 2 ) 4[(3 2 ) 2 (2 ) ][(3 2 ) 2 (2 ) (2 )]
A
       
           
        
 
             
 
 2 2 2
2 2 2 2 2 2
(3 2 ) 2(1 )(2 )(3 ) (3 2 ) 2 (2 )
4(1 ) (2 )(3 ) (3 2 ) 4[(3 2 ) 2 (2 ) ][(3 2 ) 2 (2 ) (2 )]
A      
           
       

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dds

 
3
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A A   
   
     
    
 
 
                                                        
34  For example, the rent-shifting subsidy for “Commitment, Commitment” case (
ccs

) is calculated by 
, ,{ }c c c c
s
Max E sEx
 
 . 
35 The change in the level of the subsidy may change the relative attractiveness of commitment and delay, which may 
change firms’ investment timing decisions.  
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3.4 Optimal Trade Policy Analysis 
 
The purpose of the optimal trade policy analysis is to investigate the 
equilibrium strategy (optimal subsidy) for the government when the variance of 
one uncertainty changes while the variances of the other uncertainties are fixed 
at some level. Here, both the variances of the uncertainties and the choice of 
optimal subsidy can affect the equilibrium investment timing decisions of the firms, 
because the expected profits for different investment timing combinations are not 
only affected by the variances of the uncertainties (Table 8), but the change of the 
subsidy (especially deviation from the rent-shifting subsidy level) may also affect 
the relative attractiveness of commitment and delay. 
In order to ease the exposition of the timing manipulation by the policy maker 
of the home country, we use similar diagrams to those used in Dewit and Leahy 
(2004)36. In most of the figures, A  and A  are still normalized at unity, and   
37is still set to be 0.03. The figures of optimal subsidization when both firms 
choose investment timing are depicted in 2( , )s , 1( , )V s  or 2( , )V s , and the figure 
of corresponding optimal investment timing choice in each diagram is depicted in 
2( , )t , 1( , )V t  or 2( , )V t  where 1 represents “Commitment, Commitment” (both 
home firm and foreign firm Commit their investments) ; 2 represents “Delay, 
Commitment” (home firm delays and foreign firm commits); 3 represents 
                                                        
36 Shown in Fig. 2(a) in Chapter One. 
37 As proved in Dewit and Leahy (2004), varying the levels of   does not change the qualitative relationship 
between uncertainty and the export subsidy. 
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“Commitment, Delay” (home firm commits and foreign firm delays) and 4 
represents “Delay, Delay” (both home firm and foreign firm delay). 
The Matlab codes used for the graphs are in the Appendix. The basic idea is 
that given a specific value of the variance, the home government will try to find a 
subsidy level which can maximize the expected welfare of the home country. But 
we know that it is not simply the rent-shifting subsidies which matter, since the 
equilibrium investment timing choices by the firms are not given beforehand38; 
actually, the firms’ investment timing choices are affected by the level of the 
subsidy the home government chooses in the first stage. Therefore, given the 
government subsidy and the variances of the uncertainties, firms compare the 
expected profits under each timing choice, and a Nash Equilibrium arises, so that 
neither firm has an incentive to depart from the equilibrium. Then the expected 
welfare of the home country will be decided depending on the equilibrium 
investment timing decision, which determines the expected profit and expected 
output of the home firm. But the government can change the subsidy level which 
may lead to another Nash Equilibrium, and the new equilibrium determines a new 
expected welfare for the home country. In the end, the maximum expected 
welfare the home country can get and the corresponding optimal subsidy will be 
found after we try different subsidy levels in a reasonable range39. Because 
                                                        
38 The rent-shifting subsidies are calculated given the investment timing choices by the firms. 
39 According to Dewit and Leahy (2004), although changing the equilibrium investment timing choice can have 
benefit on the expected welfare for the home country, deviating from the optimal rent-shifting subsidies would incur a 
welfare cost, and it increases as the deviation increases, eventually, the benefit by manipulating the timing choices will 
be dominated by the lost rent-shifting welfare. Therefore, the optimal subsidy choices would be in a range around the 
optimal rent-shifting subsidies. 
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different values of the variance cause different values of the expected profits for 
both firms in each investment timing combination, it may change the firms’ 
investment timing preferences; therefore, the maximized expected welfare and 
the optimal subsidy could be changed. What’s more, the optimal subsidy 
depends not only on variances ( 2 , 
1V  and 2V ), but all the other parameters in 
Table 8 ( A , A  and  ), since the expected profits for both firms in each 
investment timing combination will change, hence change the firms’ investment 
timing preferences. 
 
3.4.1 Optimal Subsidy and the Demand Variance 
We study the changes in the optimal subsidy as the variance of the demand 
shock changes, for different assumptions about the variances of the cost shocks 
of the two firms. Case one assumes that the variances of the cost shocks of the 
two firms are equal; as the cost variance increases, we study the change in the 
optimal subsidy. Case two assumes unequal cost variance, and we study the 
impact of increasing the difference between the cost variances of the two firms on 
the optimal subsidy. Both situations of 
1 2V V  and 1 2V V  are studied. 
 
A. Case One: 
1 2V V  
When the cost variances are very small: 3
1 2 10V V
  ,40 we get very similar 
                                                        
40 The numerical values chosen for the cost variances are decided by gradually increasing the cost variance level from 
zero (usually by a factor of 10) and record the level when the pattern for the optimal subsidy has a big change. The 
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figures as in Dewit and Leahy (2004); which means tiny cost variances will not 
change the optimal subsidy and investment timing decisions very much. (see 
figure 3) 
When the demand variance is very low, the government chooses 
rent-shifting subsidy ccs

 and both firms choose to commit their investments. As 
the variance increases to the level near 0.04, the government increases its 
optimal subsidy (we call it cts

) enough to induce the foreign firm to delay its 
investment. This regime switch occurs at the point where 
( ; , ) ( ; , )ct ccEW s C D EW s C C
   41 . The increase of the subsidy increases the 
relative attractiveness of commitment by the home firm, and lowers it for the 
foreign firm. The reason is that: for the home firm, the return to the output 
expansion which results from capital commitment increases since the increase of 
the subsidy widens the output price and cost gap; for the foreign firm, the subsidy 
decreases the price–cost gap, therefore reducing the return to investment 
commitment. So when the subsidy increases enough, the benefit of delay 
outweighs commitment for the foreign firm, and hence induces it to delay. As the 
variance increases, the lowest subsidy which can induce the foreign firm to delay 
decreases, since the flexibility benefit is increasing with the increase of the 
                                                                                                                                                                   
specific values chosen for the cost variance does not affect the conclusion on the analysis for the changing pattern of 
the optimal subsidy. 
41 This means that the government is indifferent in choosing 
cts

and 
ccs

, but the firms are not indifferent in 
choosing ( , )C C  or ( , )C D (The horizontal segment in the timing graph does not mean that the firms are indifferent 
in choosing either ( , )C C  or ( , )C D ).  The firms’ decisions depend upon which subsidy the government choose, if 
the government chooses 
ccs

, the firms will choose ( , )C C , otherwise, ( , )C D  will be chosen. 
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variance. Finally, it reaches the rent-shifting subsidy cds

. The same thing 
happens when the variance reaches the point just below 0.14. The sudden 
decrease of the subsidy (we call it tds

) increases the relative attractiveness of 
delay to the home firm, and lowers it to the foreign firm; hence the decrease of 
the subsidy induces the home firm to delay. This regime switch occurs at the 
point where ( ; , ) ( ; , )cd tdEW s C D EW s D D
   . As the variance increases further, 
the highest subsidy which can induce the home firm to delay increases, and 
finally merges into the rent-shifting subsidy dds

. From the analysis above, we 
can see that there are two equilibria at each variance level where the optimal 
subsidy has a break. 
 
  
Fig. 3. Optimal subsidization and investment timing choice when both firms choose 
investment timing when 
3
1 2 10V V
  . ( 1A A  ; 0.03  ) 
     
When the cost variances increase by a factor of ten, the firms are more 
willing to delay their investments and they will not choose to commit at the same 
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time, no matter how big the variance of the demand shock is, which means the 
“Commitment, Commitment” interval vanishes. Therefore, the government will 
not choose ccs

 and it does not need to use cts   to induce the foreign firm to 
delay investment. (see figure 4) 
 
 
Fig. 4. Optimal subsidization and investment timing choice when both firms choose 
investment timing when 
2
1 2 10V V
  . ( 1A A  ; 0.03  ) 
 
    When the cost variances increase by another factor of 10, the firms will only 
choose “Delay, Delay” and neither firm would like to commit its investment even if 
there is no uncertainty on the demand side. Accordingly, the government will 
keep its subsidy level at the rent-shifting subsidy dds

. (see figure 5) 
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Fig. 5. Optimal subsidization and investment timing choice when both firms choose 
investment timing when 
1
1 2 10V V
  . ( 1A A  ; 0.03  ) 
 
In fact, as the cost variances increase, the firms and the home government 
are more willing to delay the investments of both firms. It seems like the original 
graph in Dewit and Leahy (2004) (when cost variances are zero) gradually moves 
downwards to the horizontal axis. However, the government still wants to delay 
the investment of the foreign firm first. 
If we allow cost asymmetry ( A A  or 
0 0c c
 ), and the home firm has a cost 
advantage ( A A  or 
0 0c c
 ), it is easier for the government to enforce foreign 
firm delay and it is harder for the government to enforce home firm delay. For 
example, in the case where 3
1 2 10V V
  , if we set 1.01A   and 0.99A  , the 
graphs become: 
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Fig. 6. Optimal subsidization and investment timing choice when both firms choose 
investment timing when 
3
1 2 10V V
  , 1.01A   and 0.99A  . ( 0.03  ) 
 
Comparing with figure 3, we can see the point where the government enforce the 
foreign firm delay drops and the point where it enforces home firm delay 
increases. 
However, the result is opposite when the home firm has a cost advantage 
( A A  or 
0 0c c
 ), it is harder for the government to enforce foreign firm delay 
and easier for the government to enforce home firm delay. For the case where 
3
1 2 10V V
  , we set 0.99A   and 1.01A  , and the graphs become: 
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Fig. 7. Optimal subsidization and investment timing choice when both firms choose 
investment timing when 
3
1 2 10V V
  , 0.99A   and 1.01A  . ( 0.03  ) 
 
This time, the point where the government enforce the foreign firm delay 
increases and the point where it enforces home firm delay drops. 
 
B. Case Two: 
1 2V V  
    In order to better understand the impact of increasing the difference of the 
cost variances of the two firms on the changing pattern of the optimal subsidy, we 
increase the difference of their cost variance at each level of the variances as 
used in the case when the variances were equal. Then, we will compare the 
graph after we increase the difference of their cost variance with the one which 
keeps the difference zero. 
If the cost variance of the home firm is bigger than the foreign firm (
1 2V V ), 
where we pick 3
1 5 10V
   and 42 5 10V
  , the graphs become figure 8. 
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Fig. 8. Optimal subsidization and investment timing choice when both firms choose 
investment timing when 
3
1 5 10V
   and 42 5 10V
  . ( 1A A  ; 0.03  ) 
 
Compared with figure 3, the whole graph of the optimal subsidization moves 
down. In particular, the demand variance at which the government starts to 
induce home commitment deterrence and foreign commitment deterrence occurs 
at a lower level of. However, the point where the government starts to make the 
home commitment deterrence drops more rapidly than the point where the 
government starts to make the foreign commitment deterrence. This means that 
although the increase of the difference of the cost variance gives both firms more 
incentives to delay their investment, it is easier for the government to enforce 
home firm flexibility when 
1 2V V  because when the home firm has a relatively 
high cost variance than the foreign firm, the home firm has a lower commitment 
value than the foreign firm. 
When we increase the difference of their cost variance on the level of 210  
and set 2
1 5 10V
   and 32 5 10V
  , the results are shown in figure 9. 
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Fig. 9. Optimal subsidization and investment timing choice when both firms choose 
investment timing when 
2
1 5 10V
   and 32 5 10V
  . ( 1A A  ; 0.03  ) 
 
Compared with figure 4, the increase of the difference of the cost variances 
between the firms makes delay the only choice for the home firm, and the 
government only needs to set subsidy dds

. 
    Considering the case when the cost variance of the home firm is smaller 
than the foreign firm (
1 2V V ), we first study the chance when 
4
1 5 10V
   and 
3
2 5 10V
  . In this case, the graphs become: 
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Fig. 10. Optimal subsidization and investment timing choice when both firms choose 
investment timing when 
4
1 5 10V
   and 32 5 10V
  . ( 1A A  ; 0.03  ) 
     
     As in the situation where the cost variance of the home firm is bigger than 
the foreign firm (
1 2V V ), the increase of the difference of the cost variances 
makes the whole graph (figure 3) of the optimal subsidization moves down. 
However, in this situation where 
1 2V V , the point where the government starts to 
induce the foreign commitment deterrence drops more than the point where the 
government starts to induce the home commitment deterrence. This means that, 
although the increase of the difference of the cost variance gives both firms more 
incentives to delay, it is easier for the government to enforce foreign firm flexibility 
when 
1 2V V .  
Next, we increase the difference of their cost variance to the level of 210  
and set 3
1 5 10V
   and 22 5 10V
  . The results are shown in figure 11. 
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Fig. 11. Optimal subsidization and investment timing choice when both firms choose 
investment timing when 
3
1 5 10V
   and 22 5 10V
  . ( 1A A  ; 0.03  ) 
 
Compared with figure 4, the increase of the difference of the cost variances 
between the firms moves down the point where the government starts to make 
the home commitment deterrence, which means that it is easier for the 
government to force the home firm to delay its investment. 
As earlier, the increase in the cost variances makes firms more willing to 
delay their investments, and it is easier for the government to induce the 
“commitment deterrence” to both firms. Likewise, the increase in the difference of 
the cost variances gives both firms more incentives to delay, no matter which firm 
has larger variance. However, it is easier for the government to enforce flexibility 
for the firm which has the higher cost variance; as the commitment has a lower 
value for the firm which has a larger variance. 
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3.4.2 Optimal Subsidy and the Cost Variances 
The changes of the optimal subsidization as the variance of the cost shock 
changes will be analyzed separately for the cost variance of the home firm (
1V ) 
and the cost variance of the foreign firm (
2V ). 
A. Optimal Subsidy and 
1V  
First, assuming there is no cost variance for the foreign firm (
2 0V  ), we will 
analyze the change in the optimal subsidy as we increase the level of demand 
variance from 0 to 0.1. (See Figures 12-15) 
 
  
Fig. 12. Optimal subsidization and investment timing choice when both firms choose 
investment timing when 
2 0V   and 
2 0  . ( 1A A  ; 0.03  ) 
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Fig. 13. Optimal subsidization and investment timing choice when both firms choose 
investment timing when 
2 0V   and 
2 0.001  . ( 1A A  ; 0.03  ) 
 
  
Fig. 14. Optimal subsidization and investment timing choice when both firms choose 
investment timing when 
2 0V   and 
2 0.01  . ( 1A A  ; 0.03  ) 
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Fig. 15. Optimal subsidization and investment timing choice when both firms choose 
investment timing when 
2 0V   and 
2 0.1  . ( 1A A  ; 0.03  ) 
      
     The figures above reveal an interesting result: when demand variance ( 2 ) 
is very low (near zero)42, a new equilibrium ( ,D C) appears (instead of ( ,C D )) 
between ( ,C C) and ( ,D D ), and it does not exist when we study the change of 
the optimal subsidy with the change of the demand variance. The new 
equilibrium implies that when demand variance is small and there is no cost 
variance for the foreign firm, the home government would like to enforce home 
firm delay before enforcing foreign firm delay as the home firm’s cost variance 
increases. However, when demand variance is relatively large, the home 
government would still want to enforce foreign firm delay first. We can also 
conclude from the figures above that the point (the level of the demand variance) 
where the home government starts to enforce delay to at least one firm 
decreases as the demand variance increases. 
                                                        
42 See Figure 12 and Figure 13. 
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What is more, Figure 16 shows the changes of all the important variables 
affected by the subsidy as 
1V  changes, when 2 0V   and 
2 0  : 
 
 
Fig. 16. Optimal subsidization, expected welfare for the home country, expected profit for the 
foreign and home firm when both firms choose investment timing. (
2 0V   and 
2 0  ; 
1A A  ; 0.03  ) 
 
As 
1V  increases, the expected profit for the foreign firm has an increasing trend, 
even though the foreign government does not subsidize. Similarly, the expected 
profit for the home firm has an increasing trend, with a larger slope than for the 
foreign firm. Expected welfare for the home country is steadily increasing with the 
increase of home firm’s cost variance. So, basically, both firms and the home 
government benefit from the increase of the home firm’s cost uncertainty. 
However, when 
1V  approaches to the point near 0.04, the best way for the home 
government to maximize the welfare of its country is to decrease the subsidy. The 
subsidy drop reduces the expected profit of the home firm and at the same time 
0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.07
0.08
S, EW, Epi
f
, Epi
h
V
1
S
EW
Epi
f
Epi
h
63 
 
increases the expected profit of the foreign firm, because the home firm loses its 
advantage relative to the foreign firm. Therefore, the subsidy shifts “rent” from the 
home firm to the foreign firm. However, as 
1V  continues to increase from that 
point, the home government will raise the subsidy level which increases the 
expected profit of the home firm and cuts down the expected profit of the foreign 
firm. Here, the subsidy shifts “rent” from the foreign firm to the home firm. (Graphs 
for the changes of the important variables including the subsidy as 
1V  changes 
are shown in Appendix)  
Secondly, assuming there is no demand uncertainty ( 2 0  ), we look at the 
change in the pattern of the optimal subsidy as we increase the level of the 
foreign firm’s cost variance (
2V ) from 0.001 to 0.1. (See Figures 17-19) 
 
  
Fig. 17. Optimal subsidization and investment timing choice when both firms choose 
investment timing when 
2 0   and 2 0.001V  . ( 1A A
  ; 0.03  ) 
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Fig. 18. Optimal subsidization and investment timing choice when both firms choose 
investment timing when 
2 0   and 
2 0.01V  . ( 1A A
  ; 0.03  ) 
 
  
Fig. 19. Optimal subsidization and investment timing choice when both firms choose 
investment timing when 
2 0   and 
2 0.1V  . ( 1A A
  ; 0.03  ) 
 
As expected, the increase of the cost variance for the foreign firm makes it easier 
for the home government to enforce at least one firm delay. 
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B. Optimal Subsidy and 
2V  
The analysis on the optimal subsidy and foreign firm’s cost variance (
2V ) is 
similar to part A above. First, suppose there is no cost variance for the home firm 
(
1 0V  ), we analyze the change in the pattern of the optimal subsidy as we 
increase the level of demand variance from 0 to 0.1. Next, suppose there is no 
demand uncertainty ( 2 0  ), we look at the change in the changing pattern of 
the optimal subsidy as we increase the level of the home firm’s cost variance (
1V ) 
from 0.001 to 0.1. (See Appendix for the graphs) 
The changing pattern of the optimal subsidy as foreign firm’s cost variance 
varies is similar to the changing pattern of the optimal subsidy as demand 
variance varies. The home government still wants to enforce foreign firm delay 
before enforcing home firm delay. Furthermore, keeping other things unchanged, 
the increase of either demand variance or home firm’s variance would make it 
easier for the home government to enforce delay to at least one firm. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
From the analysis of the optimal subsidy and the demand variance, we learn 
that both the increase of the level and the difference of the cost variances makes 
the firms more willing to delay, and it is easier for the government to induce 
“commitment deterrence” for both firms. Also, it is easier for the government to 
induce flexibility to the firm with higher cost variance. 
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From the analysis of the optimal subsidy and the home firm’s cost variance, 
we found that under small demand variance and zero cost variance for the 
foreign firm, when the home firm’s cost variance increases the home government 
would like to enforce home firm delay before enforcing foreign firm delay. As the 
demand variance increases, it is easier for the home government to enforce 
delay to at least one firm. The increase of the foreign firm’s cost variance makes 
it easier for the home government to enforce at least one firm delay. 
Finally, the changing pattern of the optimal subsidy as foreign firm’s cost 
variance varies is similar to the changing pattern of the optimal subsidy as 
demand variance varies. Besides, the increase of either demand variance or 
home firm’s variance would make it easier for the home government to enforce at 
least one firm delay. 
There are several limitations of this paper. First, for simplicity this paper 
ignores covariance among the shocks. Since cost shocks depend upon the price 
of tradable raw materials, the covariance of these shocks is worth studying 
further. What’s more, this paper does not consider time consistency problem. The 
government may have an incentive to change the subsidy after the uncertainties 
are realized, a capital policy rather than just an output policy should also be 
considered. In addition, the cost structure in the paper does not contain private 
information, which is important since the firms always know less about their rivals’ 
cost than their own. This problem will be addressed in the next Chapter. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
1. Graphs for optimal subsidy and foreign firm’s cost variance (
2V ) when 1V  or 
2  
is changed: 
  
Fig. 1. Optimal subsidization and investment timing choice when both firms choose 
investment timing when 
1 0V   and 
2 0  . ( 1A A  ; 0.03  ) 
  
Fig. 2. Optimal subsidization and investment timing choice when both firms choose 
investment timing when 
1 0V   and 
2 0.001  . ( 1A A  ; 0.03  ) 
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Fig. 3. Optimal subsidization and investment timing choice when both firms choose 
investment timing when 
1 0V   and 
2 0.01  . ( 1A A  ; 0.03  ) 
 
  
Fig. 4. Optimal subsidization and investment timing choice when both firms choose 
investment timing when 
1 0V   and 
2 0.1  . ( 1A A  ; 0.03  ) 
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Fig. 5. Optimal subsidization and investment timing choice when both firms choose 
investment timing when 
2 0   and 
1 0.001V  . ( 1A A
  ; 0.03  ) 
 
  
Fig. 6. Optimal subsidization and investment timing choice when both firms choose 
investment timing when 
2 0   and 
1 0.01V  . ( 1A A
  ; 0.03  ) 
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Fig. 7. Optimal subsidization and investment timing choice when both firms choose 
investment timing when 
2 0   and 
1 0.1V  . ( 1A A
  ; 0.03  ) 
 
2. Graphs for the changes of some important variables including the subsidy as 
1V  
changes: 
 
 
Fig. 8. Changes of some important variables including the subsidy as 
1V  changes when 
2 0V   and 
2 0.001  . ( 1A A  ; 0.03  ) 
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Fig. 9. Changes of some important variables including the subsidy as 
1V  changes when 
2 0V   and 
2 0.01  . ( 1A A  ; 0.03  ) 
 
 
Fig. 10. Changes of some important variables including the subsidy as 
1V  changes when 
2 0V   and 
2 0.1  . ( 1A A  ; 0.03  ) 
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Fig. 11. Changes of some important variables including the subsidy as 
1V  changes when 
2 0   and 
2 0.001V  . ( 1A A
  ; 0.03  ) 
 
 
Fig. 12. Changes of some important variables including the subsidy as 
1V  changes when 
2 0   and 
2 0.01V  . ( 1A A
  ; 0.03  ) 
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Fig. 13. Changes of some important variables including the subsidy as 
1V  changes when 
2 0   and 
2 0.1V  . ( 1A A
  ; 0.03  ) 
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CHAPTER 3     
STRATEGIC TRADE POLICY AND THE INVESTMENT TIMING UNDER COST 
UNCERTAINTY WITH PRIVATE INFORMATION 
 
In this Chapter, we assume in the first period, home government sets a 
subsidy in stage 1, then in stage 2 both firms decide their investment timing 
choices based only on the public distributional information of the demand 
uncertainty and firms’ cost uncertainties. Private cost information is introduced in 
stage 3 when the cost random components are only observed privately by each 
firm and kept unknown to the other. This assumption is based on the fact that 
oligopoly firms may know less about their rival’s costs than their own (asymmetric 
information) and they are not allowed to share information with each other about 
their costs. What is more, covariance among the shocks will also be studied in 
this structure since cost shocks of the two firms depend upon the price of 
tradable raw materials. In the last stage (period two), firms learn all the 
uncertainties. With private information revealed in stage 3, a firm may have more 
incentive to commit as its cost uncertainty increases since the information value 
for the firm is higher with higher cost variances. 
 
1. The Setup of the Model 
 
The two-period four-stage game with this cost structure is: in stage one and 
two, home government and both firms face uncertainties on both future demand 
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in the export market and firms’ costs (however, the players know all the 
distributional aspects of u , v  and v , which are common knowledge to all the 
players). In stage one the home government sets an export subsidy knowing the 
demand function of the third country and both firms’ cost functions. In stage two, 
firms make decisions on their investment timing and then committed to this 
decision knowing only the distribution of the demand and cost uncertainties. In 
stage three, v  and v  are observed by each firm privately, but each firm still 
only knows the distributional aspects of v  or v  for the other firm as well as 
their correlation. Firms that have committed to investing choose their actual 
capital level. In the second period (stage 4), all the uncertainties are resolved and 
observed by both firms, that is, firms observe both u  and the cost realization for 
the other firm. In this period, firms choose outputs and capital levels if they have 
not previously chosen those.  
This two-period four-stage game could be summarized as:  
    In Period 1: 
    Stage 1: Home government sets subsidy s. 
Stage 2: Firms decide on investment timing knowing the distribution of the 
demand and the distribution, but not the actual values, of their own and the rival’s 
cost. 
Stage 3:  Based on their investment timing decisions in Stage 2, Firms that 
have been committed to investing choose their actual capital level, knowing their 
own cost random components privately and not sharing their cost information. 
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    In Period 2 (Stage 4): Firms choose outputs and capital levels if they have 
not chosen those observing the realization of all the random components. 
It is assumed that the total cost functions of home and foreign firm ( , )TC TC  
are: 
 
2
0( )
2
k
TC c k v x

                                                       (1 )a  
 
2
0( )
2
k
TC c k v y


                                                       (1 )b  
 
where v  and v  are stochastic cost components which have the following 
properties43: 
(i) ( ) 0E v  , ( ) 0E v  ; 
(ii) 
1( )Var v V , 2( )Var v V
  , 1V  & 2V 0; 
(iii) ( , ) cCov v v V
  44, ( , ) 0Cov u v  , ( , ) 0Cov u v  , 0cV  ; 
(iv) v  and v  are jointly normally distributed: ( , ) ( , )Tv v    , where 
0
0

 
  
 
, 
and 
1
2
c
c
V V
V V
 
   
 
, which is symmetric and positive-definite. 
                                                        
43 Similar to the assumptions in Albaek (1990). 
44 We define correlation coefficient 
1 2
cV
V V
  . 
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(v) v R , v R  . 
 
2. The Solution to the Second Cost Structure with Uncertainty 
 
Based on the assumptions of the second cost structure, we solve for the 
optimal outputs, investment levels for the firms and the optimal government 
subsidy for each investment timing combination using backward induction, as 
well as the maximized expected profits for both firms and the maximized 
expected welfare for the home country.  
 
2.1 Optimal Output Decisions 
In stage 4, the information of costs and demand are the same as for the full 
information structure in previous Chapter, so firms have same solution in this 
stage: 
 
2
0( ) ( )
2
k
Max a x y u s x c k v x

 
         
 
                               (2 )a  
 
2
0( ) ( )
2
k
Max a x y u y c k v y


            
 
                              (2 )b  
 
Then, the optimal outputs for the home and the foreign firm can be expressed as: 
 
78 
 
2 2 2 21
3 2 2 2
x A A s k k u v v
y A A s k k u v v
  
  
        
   
         
                                    ( 3 ) 
 
Here, 
0A a c  , 0A a c
   . Also, the actual profit functions for both firms can be 
expressed as: 
 
2
2
2
k
x

                                                                   (4 )a  
 
2
2
2
k
y


                                                                   ( 4 )b  
 
2.2 Optimal Investment Level Decisions 
The next step for the firms is to decide the optimal capital levels (either in 
period two or stage three) given their decision on the investment timing 
combination in stage two. What is important and different in this cost structure is 
the private information: each firm observes the realization of its own cost 
uncertainty in stage three, which is unknown to the other firm. However, 
conditional on the realization of its own cost uncertainty, each firm can update its 
information on the distribution of the cost uncertainty for the other firm since v  
and v  are assumed to be correlated and jointly normally distributed.    
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A. Delay, Delay Case 
If both firms delay their investments into the second period, the FOCs for 
choosing the investment levels are the same as in the previous chapter, when 
there is complete information about costs: 
 
0
k
x

                                                                      (5 )a  
 
0
k
y


                                                                     ( 5 )b  
 
The optimal choices for x , y , k  and k in terms of ( , , , )s u v v  are the same 
as in Table 1 for the case of delay-delay.  
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Table 1 
Optimal output and investment choices in delay, delay case under both demand & cost 
uncertainties with private information 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Also, the actual profit functions for both firms are: 
 
2
2 21
2 2
ddkx x



 
    
 
                                                    ( 6 )a  
 
2
2 21
2 2
ddky y





      
 
                                                  ( 6 )b  
 
B. Commitment, Delay Case 
Suppose, in stage two, the home firm commits itself to invest, while the 
 D , D

 
x  (1 ) (2 )( )
(1 )(3 )
dd v u s A v Ax
 
 
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(1 )(3 )
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foreign firm decides to defer its investment into the second period (4th stage). In 
period 2, the optimal choices for x , y and k are the same as the first cost 
structure, and are found by solving equations (5 )b  and (3)  simultaneously: 
 
(1 ) (2 )( )
1
2 2
3 2
[2 2 ]
cd
cd
cd
x v u A s k v A
y A A s k u v v
A A s k u v vk
 





 
 
 
          
   
                     
                        ( 7 ) 
 
In (7), the values of x , y and k  depend on s , k , u , v  and v .  In stage 3, 
the firms will know the rules given by (7) and each firm will know its own cost 
realization.  Given this information, and its updated beliefs about the costs of 
firm 2, firm 1 has to decide its optimal investment level cdk

by maximizing its 
expected profit45 in the second period:  
 ( )
k
Max E v  
2
0( ) ( )
2k
k
E Max a x y u s x c k v x v

   
            
   
 
  0cd cdk x k y kE x y v                                     
1
( ) ( ) 0
3 2
k
E x x v
 
 
      
 
                                                    
(From F.O.C., 0x  ) 
                                                        
45 It is a conditional expectation of the profit because of the private information in stage three in this cost structure. 
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2(2 )
( )
3 2
cd cdk E x v



 
 

                                                   ( 8 ) 
 
From the result we got in (7), ( )
cdE x v

 can be calculated as: 
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Finally, we can solve for cdk

 using equation (8) and (9): 
1
2(2 ) 2 (2 ) 2
( ) [( 2 ) ( ) ]
3 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 2
cd cd cdcV v Ak E x v A s k
V
   
 
    
  
  
       
    
 
1
2 2
2 (2 )[( 2 ) (2 )( ) ]
(3 2 ) 2 (2 )
c
cd
V
v A s A
V
k
   
  

      
 
  
                           (10)  
                                                        
46 According to the assumptions, v  and v

 are jointly normally distributed: 1
2
0
,
0
c
c
V Vv
N
V Vv
     
     
      
:  , 
therefore, the conditional distribution of v given v  should be : 2 2( ), (1 )v vv v
v
v v N v

    


 
     
 
: , 
which can be expressed as: 
2
2
1 1
,c c
V V
v v N v V
V V
   
 
: . 
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Then, the optimal choices ( cdx

, cdy

and cdk
 ) can be decided in terms of s , u , 
v  v  as well as variance variables ( 1V  and cV ) when 
cdk

 is plugged in. (see 
Table 2) 
 
Table 2 
Optimal output and investment choices in commitment, delay case under both demand & 
cost uncertainties with private information 
 
 
Compared with the situation where only public information is available, the 
home firm’s capital decision also depends on its own cost realization when 
private cost information is also available. If the cost covariance is small (and 
positive) or negative relative to the home firm’s cost variance, a larger cost 
 C , D  
x  2
2 2
1
2 2 2 2 2 2
(2 )[(3 2 ) 2 (2 ) ]
1 (2 )(3 2 ) ( ) (3 2 )
[ (1 ) ]
3 2 (3 2 ) 2 (2 ) (3 2 ) 2 (2 ) (3 2 ) 2 (2 )
c
cd
V
v
V A s A
x v u
   
  

         



   
   
     
         
 
y  
2
2
1
2 2 2 2 2 2
[(3 2 ) 2 (2 ) ]
1 (3 2 ) ( ) (2 )
[ 2 2(1 ) ]
3 2 (3 2 ) 2 (2 ) (3 2 ) 2 (2 ) (3 2 ) 2 (2 )
          
c
cd
V
v
V A s
y u v A
  
  
         
  
  
  
     
         
 
k  
1
2 2
2 (2 )[( 2 ) (2 )( ) ]
(3 2 ) 2 (2 )
c
cd
V
v A s A
V
k
   
  

      

  
 
k  2
2
1
2 2 2 2 2 2
[(3 2 ) 2 (2 ) ]
(3 2 ) ( ) (2 )
[ 2 2(1 ) ] 
3 2 (3 2 ) 2 (2 ) (3 2 ) 2 (2 ) (3 2 ) 2 (2 )
c
cd
V
v
V A s
k u v A
  
   
         
  
  
  
     
         
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realization to the home firm leads to a smaller capital investment by itself. 
Intuitively, higher cost results in less willingness to invest. Otherwise, if the cost 
covariance is high enough47 , higher cost realization increases home firm’s 
optimal capital investment. In all, the private cost information (including both 
variance and covariance) greatly affects firms’ optimal decisions on the level of 
the investment. 
In this case, the actual profit functions for both firms are: 
 
22
2 2 1 2(2 ) ( )
2 2 3 2
cdkx x E x v

 
  
  
     
  
 
    
2
2
2 22 ( )
3 2
cd cdx E x v



  
   
 
                                        (11 )a 48 
 
2
2 21
2 2
cdky y





      
 
                                                 (11 )b  
 
C. Delay, Commitment Case 
When the home firm delays investment to the second period, and the foreign 
firm commits investment in the first period, the optimal choices ( dcx

, dcy

, 
dck

 
and dck
 ) can be decided in terms of s , u , v  and v  as well as variance 
                                                        
47 So that 
1
( 2 )c
V
V
   is positive. 
48
 The difference between home firm’s actual and expected output is: 
  
1
1 1
( ) (1 ) (1 ) [ (1 ) ]
3 2 3 2
cd cd cVx E x v v u E v u v v v u
V
  
 
              
 
. 
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variables (
2V  and cV ) by following a similar procedure as for the Commitment, 
Delay Case49. (See Table 3) 
 
Table 3 
Optimal output and investment choices in delay, commitment case under both demand & 
cost uncertainties with private information 
 
 
In this case, the actual profit functions for both firms are: 
2
2 21
2 2
dckx x



 
    
 
                                                   (1 2 )a  
 
                                                        
49 See Appendix 1. 
 D , C  
x  2
2
2
2 2 2 2 2 2
[(3 2 ) 2 (2 ) ]
1 (2 ) (3 2 )
[ 2 2(1 )( ) ]
3 2 (3 2 ) 2 (2 ) (3 2 ) 2 (2 ) (3 2 ) 2 (2 )
c
dc
V
v
VA
x u v A s
  
  
         



  
 
      
         
 
y  
2
2 2
2
2 2 2 2 2 2
(2 )[(3 2 ) 2 (2 ) ]
1 (3 2 ) ( ) (2 )(3 2 )
[ (1 ) ]
3 2 (3 2 ) 2 (2 ) (3 2 ) 2 (2 ) (3 2 ) 2 (2 )
c
dc
V
v
V A s A
y v u
   
  

         



   
   
     
         
 
k  2
2
2
2 2 2 2 2 2
[(3 2 ) 2 (2 ) ]
(2 ) (3 2 )
[ 2 2(1 )( ) ]
3 2 (3 2 ) 2 (2 ) (3 2 ) 2 (2 ) (3 2 ) 2 (2 )
c
dc
V
v
VA
k u v A s
  
   
         



  
 
      
         
 
k
 2
2 2
2 (2 )[( 2 ) (2 ) ]
(3 2 ) 2 (2 )
c
dc
V
v A A s
V
k
   
  

 

      

  
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22
2 2 1 2(2 ) ( )
2 2 3 2
dcky y E y v

 
  


        
  
 
       
2
2
2 22 ( )
3 2
dc dcy E y v



      
 
                                     (12 )b  
 
D. Commitment, Commitment Case 
If both firms commit to invest in the second stage, they both have to choose 
their optimal outputs in the second period given the investment level they chose 
in stage three by maximizing their second period profits. (See equation (3)) 
Going back to stage 3, firms have to simultaneously decide optimal 
investment level ( cck

, cck
 ), given the rules governing second period outputs 
(equation 3) and their beliefs about the cost structure and investment level of the 
other firm. What is important here is that each firm only knows its own cost 
realization, which can be used to update their information on the distribution of 
the cost uncertainty and investment level for the other firm.  
 
 ( )
k
Max E v  
2
0( ) ( )
2k
k
E Max a x y u s x c k v x v

   
            
   
 
  0cc cck x k y kE x y v                                     
1
( ) ( ) ( ) 0
3
k
E x x v

 
       
 
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(From F.O.C., 0x  ) 
4
( )
3
cc cck E x v
 
                                                           (13)  
 
 
k
Max E v

 
 
2
0( ) ( )
2k
k
E Max a x y u y c k v y v


    
   
           
   
 
  0cc ccx yk k kE x y v  
 
  
                                                                
1
( ) ( ) ( ) 0
3
k
E y y

 
       
 
                                                         
(From F.O.C., 0y
  ) 
4
( )
3
cc cck E y v
                                                           (14)  
 
Because for the home firm, v  is not known when k  is chosen, the optimal 
capital investment must be of form k v   , in a similar way, the optimal 
investment for the foreign firm should be of form * * * *k v   .  Then, from (3) 
and the form we assumed for k : 
 
1
( ) (2 2 2 2 )
3
ccE x v E A A s k k u v v v
            
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* * *1[2 2 2 ( ) ( ) 2 ( ) ( )]
3
A A s k E v v E u v E v v E v v            
*
*
1
(1 )1
2 2 2 2
3
cVA A s k v
V


   
        
   
                                 (15)  
1
( ) (2 2 2 )
3
ccE y v E A A s k k u v v v
              
         
1
= [2 2 ( ) ( ) 2 ( ) ( )]
3
A A s k E v v E u v E v v E v v                
           
2
(1 )1
2 2 2
3
cVA A s k v
V

  
   
        
   
                      (16)  
 
Substitute (15) and (16) into (13) and (14), then solve them simultaneously 
together with the assumptions k v    and * * * *k v    to get the solution 
for k  and k . Then, ccx

 and ccy

 will be solved automatically by equation (3) 
when we plug in cck

and cck
 . (See Table 4) 
 
  
89 
 
Table 4 
Optimal output and investment choices in commitment, commitment case under both 
demand & cost uncertainties with private information 
    
With 
1 2
cV
V V
   and 1
2
V
V
  . 
 
In this case, the actual profit functions for both firms are: 
 
 
22 2
2 2 21 4 8( ) ( )
2 2 3 9
cc cc cckx x E x v x E x v
 

 
    
       
  
                (17 )a  
 
 
22 2
2 2 21 4 8( ) ( )
2 2 3 9
cc cc ccky y E y v y E y v
 

 
  

           
  
            (1 7 )b  
 
 C , C  
x  1
2 2 2
6(3 2 )( ) 9 6[4 (9 8 )] 3[4 (9 8 )]
(3 4 )(9 4 ) 3 (9 8 ) 16
cc A s A u v vx
    
    

         
  
   
 
y  1
2 2 2
6(3 2 ) 9( ) 6[4 (9 8 )] 3[4 (9 8 )]
(3 4 )(9 4 ) 3 (9 8 ) 16
cc A A s u v vy
    
    

         
  
   
 
k  1 2
2 2 2
4 [2(3 2 )( ) 3 ] 4 [9 4 2(9 8 )]
(3 4 )(9 4 ) (9 8 ) 16
cc A s Ak v
     
    

      
 
   
 
k  2
2 2 2
4 [2(3 2 ) 3( )] 4 [9 4 2(9 8 )]
(3 4 )(9 4 ) (9 8 ) 16
cc A A sk v
     
    


       
   
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2.3 Optimal Expected Profits  
 
In stage two, knowing only the distributional aspects of the cost uncertainties, 
the firms will decide simultaneously on the optimal investment timing which yields 
the highest expected profit, given their beliefs about the behavior of the other firm. 
So we take the unconditional expectations of the profits for both firms using the 
optimal choices above for each investment timing combination. 
In Commitment, Commitment Case, the expected profit for the home firm is:  
 
2
2 ( )( )
2
cc
cc cc kE E x


   
  
  
                        
2 21var ( ) [var ( ) ]
2
cc cc cc ccx Ex k Ek

   
                                 ( 1 8 )50 
 
From Table 4 we can see: 
 
6(3 2 )( ) 9
(3 4 )(9 4 )
cc A s AEx

 

  

 
                                               (1 9 )51                                     
 
2 2 2 22
1 2 1 1 2 2
2 2 2 2
1 2
36 [4 (9 8 ) ] 9 [4 (9 8 ) ]
9 [(9 8 ) 16 ]
cc c c
c
VV V V V V V V
Varx
VV V
   
 
     
 
 
 
                                                        
50 Refer to (4a). 
51 According to the assumptions, the unconditional mean of all the random variables are zero. 
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                  1 2 1 2
2 2 2 2
1 2
36 [4 (9 8 ) ][4 (9 8 ) ]
[(9 8 ) 16 ]
c c c
c
VV V V V V V
VV V
   
 
   

 
               ( 2 0 ) 
 
4 [2(3 2 )( ) 3 ]
(3 4 )(9 4 )
cc A s AEk
 
 

  

 
                                             ( 2 1) 
 
2 2 2
1 2 1 2
2 2 2 2
1 2
16 [9 4 2(9 8 ) ]
[(9 8 ) 16 ]
cc c c
c
V VV V VV
Vark
VV V
  
 
   

 
                                 ( 2 2 ) 
 
So, the expected profit can be calculated from the five equations above: 
 
2
22(3 2 )( ) 3
(9 8 )
(3 4 )(9 4 ) 9
cc A s AE
 
 
 

   
   
  
   
2 2 2 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
2 2 2 2
1 2
36 [4 (9 8 ) ] 9 [4 (9 8 ) ]
[(9 8 ) 16 ]
c c
c
VV V V V V V V
VV V
   
 
    

 
 
2 2
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
2 2 2 2
1 2
36 [4 (9 8 ) ][4 (9 8 ) ] 8 [9 4 2(9 8 ) ]
[(9 8 ) 16 ]
c c c c c
c
VVV V V V V V VV V VV
VV V
      
 
       

 
     
                                                                                                                                                    
(23)  
 
Similarly, the expected profit for the foreign firm is derived as: 
 
2
2 2 2( ) 1( ) var ( ) [var ( ) ]
2 2
cc
cc cc cc cc cc cckE E y y Ey k Ek
 

     

  
  
      
  
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2
22(3 2 ) 3( )
(9 8 )
(3 4 )(9 4 ) 9
A A s 

 
   
   
  
 
2 2 2 2
1 2 2 1 2 1
2 2 2 2
1 2
36 [4 (9 8 ) ] 9 [4 (9 8 ) ]
[(9 8 ) 16 ]
c c
c
V V V V VV V V
VV V
   
 
    

 
       
2 2
1 2 2 1 2 1 1 2
2 2 2 2
1 2
36 [4 (9 8 ) ][4 (9 8 ) ] 8 [9 4 2(9 8 ) ]
[(9 8 ) 16 ]
c c c c c
c
VVV V V V V V VV V VV
VV V
      
 
       

 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
(24)  
 
Table 5 gives the maximized expected profits for all different investment 
timing combinations under demand and cost uncertainties with private 
information and correlation among cost shocks. 
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Table 5 
Maximized expected profits for the different investment timing combinations under demand & 
cost uncertainties with private information and correlation among cost shocks 
 
 E  
C , C  
2
22(3 2 )( ) 3
(9 8 )
(3 4 )(9 4 ) 9
A s A 

 
   
  
  
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Table 5 (cont’d) 
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Compared with the situation in which the cost uncertainties are uncorrelated and 
only public information is available, under the assumption of private information 
and cost correlation the comparison of the maximized expected profits for both 
firms is more complicated because the profits are also affected by the correlation 
among the cost shocks.  
In the first stage, for each given investment timing combination, a 
rent-shifting subsidy (set by the home government) is decided by maximizing the 
expected welfare of the home country:  
 
{ } { }Max EW Max E sEx   
 
The optimal rent-shifting subsidies for all possible investment timing 
combinations are the same as the first cost structure (See Table 9 in Chapter 
Two). Although the corresponding rent-shifting subsidy is the best choice for each 
investment timing combination, it is not always the best choice for the 
government since the home country may gain more by changing the subsidy so 
that the equilibrium investment timing combination is changed. 
 
3. Optimal Trade Policy Analysis 
 
The optimal trade policy study in private information setting is similar to that 
in the scenario where only public information exists, that is, we explore the 
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equilibrium strategy for the government (and the optimal timing choices for the 
firms) by focusing on changing the variance (or covariance) of one uncertainty (or 
two uncertainties) at a time while fixing all the other variances (or covariance) at a 
certain level. Then, we compare different results and analyze the changes when 
the other variances (or covariance) are given different values. However, what is 
different in analyzing the optimal trade policy in this cost structure is that the 
covariance (or correlation) of the cost shocks are allowed to change, and the 
relationship of the correlation and the subsidy will be studied separately. 52 
Similar diagrams will be drawn as in Chapter One and the specification of 
the parameters is unchanged53. The figure of optimal subsidization and single 
variances is depicted in 2( , )s , 1( , )V s  and 2( , )V s , besides, the figure of optimal 
subsidy and the correlation of the cost shocks of the two firms is depicted in 
( , )s 54. The figure of corresponding optimal investment timing choice by both 
firms is depicted in 2( , )t , 1( , )V t , 2( , )V t  and ( , )t  where 1 represents 
“Commitment, Commitment” (both home firm and foreign firm Commit their 
investments) ; 2 represents “Delay, Commitment” (home firm delays and foreign 
firm commits); 3 represents “Commitment, Delay” (home firm commits and 
foreign firm delays) and 4 represents “Delay, Delay” (both home firm and foreign 
                                                        
52 Here, not only the variances of the uncertainties but also the covariance of the cost shocks and the choice of optimal 
subsidy will affect the equilibrium investment timing decisions of the firms. 
53 We are still going to use 1A A   and 0.03   in this simulation study on optimal trade policy.  
54 The reason we use correlation instead of covariance is that the correlation is a normalized coefficient, which 
completely characterizes the dependence structure in a multivariate normal distribution (that we use), although 
generally the information given by a correlation coefficient is not enough to define the dependence structure between 
random variables.  
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firm delay). 
 
3.1 Optimal Subsidy and the Demand Variance 
The optimal subsidy and the demand variance will be studied in the following 
sequence: Case one: 
1 2V V . First, we suppose there is no correlation of the cost 
shocks ( 0  ). We then increase the level of the common cost variance to see 
the changing pattern of the optimal subsidy as the variance of the demand shock 
changes. Also, we compare the result in this information structure with that 
studied in the previous Chapter. Next, in each cost variance level, we increase 
the correlation between the cost uncertainties (positively and negatively) to see 
the change it made to both the optimal subsidy and firm’s investment timing 
choices. In addition, cost asymmetry will also be studied in this case. Case two: 
1 2V V . We first study the impact of the differences in cost variability under the 
assumption that cost shocks are not correlated ( 0  ), where both situations of 
1 2V V  and 1 2V V  will be studied. The result will also be compared with the first 
cost structure. Second, the correlation is raised in each case where variance 
levels are different, and then the change will be explored before and after the 
correlation rises. 
 
A. Case One: 
1 2V V  
First, assuming the variances of firms’ cost shocks are equal and the 
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correlation between the two cost shocks is zero; we then increase the level of the 
cost variances from 310 , 210  to 110 , to study the impact on the optimal 
subsidy and firms’ behaviors, These results are shown in fig. 1. As the level of the 
cost variances increases, both firms are more willing to delay, as is seen from the 
graph: the subsidy line and the investment timing line are both shifting down with 
the increasing common cost variances. The results look similar to those in the 
previous information structure; however, compared with the previous Chapter, for 
each level of cost variances, the demand variance levels where the government 
enforces foreign and home firm delay rise, and it seems like the graphs in the first 
cost structure moves upwards against the horizontal axis. It means the firms are 
more willing to commit and it is harder for the home government to enforce both 
firms delay. With private information revealed in stage 3, firms know more 
information about the cost uncertainties 55 , less uncertainties leads to less 
willingness to delay.  
  
                                                        
55 Firms at least learn their own cost shocks if 0   in stage 3, besides, firms can also update their information on 
their rival’s cost shock if 0  under our assumptions. 
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Fig. 1. Optimal subsidization and investment timing choice as 
2 changes when 
1V  and 2V  
increase from 310 , 210  to 110 . ( 0  ; 1A A  ; 0.03  ) 
     
     Next, in each cost variance level 3
1 2 10V V
  , 21 2 10V V
   and 
1
1 2 10V V
  , we increase the correlation between the cost uncertainties   
positively from 0, 0.5 to 156,  the optimal subsidy and firms’ investment timing 
choices are shown in figure 2. 
  
                                                        
56 The conclusion will be the same if we increase   negatively from 0, -0.5 to -1. The only difference is that in 
negative case, there will be larger changes in optimal subsidy and firms’ investment timing decisions than in the 
positive situation. 
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(c) 
  
 
Fig. 2. (a) Optimal subsidization and investment timing choice as 
2 changes when 
increases from 0, 0.5 to 1. ( 3
1 2 10V V
  ; 1A A  ; 0.03  ) (b) Optimal subsidization 
and investment timing choice as 
2 changes when  increases from 0, 0.5 to 1. 
(
2
1 2 10V V
  ; 1A A  ; 0.03  ) (c) Optimal subsidization and investment timing 
choice as 
2 changes when  increases from 0, 0.5 to 1. ( 1
1 2 10V V
  ; 1A A  ; 
0.03  ) 
 
It can be seen from the graph above that at each cost variance level, the 
increase of the correlation between the cost shocks makes firms more willing to 
commit their investments.57 For instance, in figure 2 (c), when 0  , as 2  
increases from zero, the government starts to use cds

 and the firms choose 
“Commitment, Delay” in equilibrium. When 2  approaches to 0.07, the 
government suddenly decreases its subsidy to a lower level which forces home 
                                                        
57 The result can be seen more and more obviously from (a) to (c). 
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firm to delay. In the end, as 2  continues to increase the government gradually 
increases its subsidy to dds

 and both firms delay their investments. When   
increases by 0.5, the point where the government enforce home firm delay 
increases to 0.08, which means that the government is more willing to have 
home firm commit rather than delay. If the two cost shocks are fully correlated, 
equilibrium “Commitment, Commitment” emerges, where the foreign firm wants 
to commit in some range of demand variance; besides, the variance level where 
the government enforce home firm delay rise much further from the “no 
correlation” situation.   
If there is cost asymmetry ( A A  or 
0 0c c
 ), and the home firm has a cost 
advantage ( A A  or 
0 0c c
 ), it is easier for the government to enforce foreign 
firm delay and harder for the government to enforce home firm delay. For 
instance, in the case where 2
1 2 10V V
   ( 0  ), if we set 1.01A   and 
0.99A  , the equilibrium subsidy and investment timing choices before and after 
the changes of A and A  is shown in figure 3. Compared with the case where 
1A A   , the variance level where the government enforce the foreign firm 
delay drops and the point where it enforces home firm delay increases. 
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Fig. 3. Optimal subsidization and investment timing choice as 
2 changes when 1.01A   
and 0.99A  . ( 2
1 2 10V V
   ; 0  ; 0.03  ) 
 
The result is opposite when the home firm has a cost disadvantage ( A A  
or 
0 0c c
 ), it is harder for the government to enforce foreign firm delay and 
easier to enforce home firm delay. Again, if 1.01A   and 0.99A   ( 2
1 2 10V V
  ; 
0  ), the equilibrium subsidy and investment timing choices before and after 
the changes of A and A  is shown in figure 4. Compared with the case where 
1A A   , the variance level where the government enforce the foreign firm 
delay rises and the point where it enforces home firm delay decreases. 
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Fig. 4. Optimal subsidization and investment timing choice as 
2 changes when 0.99A   
and 1.01A  . ( 2
1 2 10V V
   ; 0  ; 0.03  ) 
 
B. Case Two: 
1 2V V  
Assuming the cost variances of the firms are different, first consider the case 
where the cost variance of the home firm is larger than that of the foreign firm 
(
1 2V V ). Assuming 0  , we increase the difference of the cost variances of the 
two firms in steps ( 310 , 210 and 110 ), and the results are shown in figure 5. 
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Fig. 5. Optimal subsidization and investment timing choice as 
2 changes in three cost 
variance levels: 
3
1 5 10V
  , 42 5 10V
  ; 21 5 10V
  , 32 5 10V
  and 11 5 10V
  , 
2
2 5 10V
  . ( 0  ; 1A A  ; 0.03  ) 
 
Compared with figure 1, in each cost variance level the increase of the 
difference of the firms’ cost variances makes changes to the investment timing for 
both firms: the foreign firm starts to choose delay at a lower demand variance 
level and the home firm begins to delay at a higher variance level. It means that 
the government is more willing to enforce foreign firm delay and less willing to 
enforce home firm delay. This result is opposite to the first cost structure, which 
argues that it is easier for the government to enforce home firm flexibility if 
1 2V V  since the commitment has a lower value for the home firm than it has for 
the foreign firm. The reason for the difference is that in this cost structure, the 
cost shocks are revealed privately to each firm in stage 3, which provides (with 
each firm) information on its own cost shock and the updated (more accurate) 
distributional information on its rival’s cost shock. This information helps firms 
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make better decisions on how much to invest than in the first cost structure, so 
there is information value to both firms in this cost structure. If 
1 2V V ,  the 
information value to the home firm will be higher than to the foreign firm since 
home firm will benefit more from knowing its cost shock because of higher cost 
variance. Therefore, the home firm would be more willing to commit its 
investment so that it can get more information on the cost shocks of itself and the 
foreign firm.  
Second, the result is opposite if the cost variance of the home firm is smaller 
than the foreign firm (
1 2V V )
58, this can be seen in Fig. 6, which depicts the 
optimal subsidization and investment timing choice as 2 changes when cost 
variance difference increases at three cost variance levels ( 310 , 210 and 110 ) if 
1 2V V . Compared to Fig. 1, the government will be more willing to enforce home 
firm delay and less willing to enforce foreign firm delay. What is more, we actually 
see a “delay deterrence” 59  by the home government in the case when 
2
1 5 10V
  , 12 5 10V
  . When the demand variance is less than about 0.13, the 
firms choose ( D , C ) and government uses rent-shifting subsidy dcs

. As 
demand variance continues to rise to the range above 0.13 and less than 0.14, it 
is optimal for the foreign firm to choose delay since the benefit of retaining 
flexibility for the future demand outweighs the benefit of making strategic 
                                                        
58 Here still suppose 0  . 
59 It means that the government would like to enforce commitment (delay deterrence) to at least one firm in certain 
range of 2 . 
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investment commitment. However, the home government would like the foreign 
firm to commit its investment for the welfare of the home country. The only way 
for the government to induce the foreign firm to maintain commitment is by 
setting a lower subsidy. However, the cost of deviating from the optimal 
rent-shifting subsidy for (D ,C ) goes up as demand variance increases. In the 
end, the government has to give up delay deterrence subsidy and chooses dds

, 
and the equilibrium investment timing ends up to (D ,D ). 
 
 
Fig. 6. Optimal subsidization and investment timing choice as 
2 changes when cost 
variance difference increases at three cost variance levels: 
4
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  , 32 5 10V
  ; 
3
1 5 10V
  , 22 5 10V
  and 21 5 10V
  , 12 5 10V
  . ( 0  ; 1A A  ; 0.03  ) 
 
Dewit and Leahy (2004) concludes that as uncertainty rises whenever the 
government wishes to manipulate investment timing, it always chooses its policy 
to deter investment commitment by the home or the foreign firm. However, after 
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cost uncertainties and private information are added in, this conclusion is not 
always true. In this experiment we found that as demand uncertainty rises the 
government may choose its policy to induce investment commitment by the 
foreign firm when home firm’s cost variance is smaller than foreign firm’s cost 
variance. 
Next, we allow the correlation coefficient   to be changed in addition to the 
change of the cost variance difference. Specifically, if 
1 2V V , we increase   
from 0 to 1 in each level of cost difference shown in figure 5, what we got is in 
figure 7. 
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(b) 
 
(c) 
 
Fig. 7. (a) Optimal subsidization and investment timing choice as 
2 changes when 
increases from 0, 0.5 to 1. ( 3
1 5 10V
  , 42 5 10V
  ; 1A A  ; 0.03  ) (b) Optimal 
subsidization and investment timing choice as 
2 changes when  increases from 0, 0.5 to 
1. (
2
1 5 10V
  , 32 5 10V
  ; 1A A  ; 0.03  ) (c) Optimal subsidization and 
investment timing choice as 
2 changes when  increases from 0, 0.5 to 1. ( 1
1 5 10V
  , 
2
2 5 10V
  ; 1A A  ; 0.03  )  
 
From the graphs above, we can see that when 
1 2V V , the foreign firm 
would like to commit more as the cost correlation increases, but there is little 
impact on the timing choice of the home firm. This can be seen easily from figure 
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7 (b) where as correlation increases the point where the foreign firm starts to 
delay rises from zero to 0.04, but there is almost no change on the variance level 
where the home firm starts to delay. Based on the assumptions we made 
previously, both the variances and covariance of the cost shocks are useful for 
the firm to infer its rival’s cost information after the realization of its own cost 
shock. Specifically, for the home firm, the magnitude of the conditional mean of 
the foreign firm’s cost is positively correlated with the covariance of the two cost 
shocks and negatively correlated to the home firm’s own cost variance. 60 
Furthermore, the conditional variance of the foreign firm’s cost is positively 
correlated to the variances of the cost shocks for both firms and negatively 
correlated with the absolute value of the covariance of the two cost shocks. 
Therefore, the increase of the cost correlation given cost variances of both firms 
would increase the absolute value of the conditional mean of the foreign firm’s 
cost and lower its conditional variance. It means that the higher the covariance, 
the more accurate the inference for foreign firm’s conditional mean is. This is also 
true for the foreign firm, so as the cost correlation increases generally both firms 
would like to commit more in order to get more accurate cost information for the 
other firm. However, when 
1 2V V , comparing to the foreign firm, the impact of 
the correlation on home firm’s inference of the conditional mean and variance of 
foreign firm’s cost shock is weakened by home firm’s higher cost variance 
1V . 
Hence, the impact of correlation increase on the foreign firm is larger than on the 
                                                        
60 And vice versa. 
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home firm. 
On the other hand, if 
1 2V V , Fig. 8 depicts the optimal subsidy and 
investment timing choices when   is increased from 0 to 1 in each cost 
difference level. In contrast to the case where 
1 2V V , it is easily seen that the 
home firm is more willing to make investment commitment as the cost correlation 
increases, whereas the impact of the correlation increase on the foreign firm is 
very small. Although the increase of the cost correlation generally leads to more 
investment commitments by both firms lower 
1V  magnifies the impact of the 
correlation increase on the home firm than on the foreign firm, so the home firm is 
more reactive to the change of the cost correlation than its rival. 61 
 
(a) 
 
  
                                                        
61 Generally the increase of the cost correlation leads to more investment commitments by both firms, but it is not 
always true since the investment timing decisions also depend on other variances. Exceptions may exist for certain 
values of other cost or demand variances. Fig. 8 (c) is an example, as the correlation increases from 0 to .5, the foreign 
firm is actually more willing to delay rather than commit.  
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(b) 
 
(c) 
 
Fig. 8. (a) Optimal subsidization and investment timing choice as 
2 changes when 
increases from 0, 0.5 to 1. ( 4
1 5 10V
  , 32 5 10V
  ; 1A A  ; 0.03  ) (b) Optimal 
subsidization and investment timing choice as 
2 changes when  increases from 0, 0.5 to 
1. (
3
1 5 10V
  , 22 5 10V
  ; 1A A  ; 0.03  ) (c) Optimal subsidization and 
investment timing choice as 
2 changes when  increases from 0, 0.5 to 1. ( 2
1 5 10V
  , 
1
2 5 10V
  ; 1A A  ; 0.03  )  
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3.2 Optimal Subsidy and the Cost Variance of the Home Firm (
1V ) 
To explore the relationship between the optimal subsidy (and investment 
timing choices) and 
1V , first of all, we study this relationship by setting different 
values for the demand variance from zero to 0.2 assuming 0   and 2V  is very 
small; second, assuming 0   and 2 =0  , 2V  varies from 
-310  to -110 ; at last, 
  is changed from 0 to 1 given 2 =0   and small 
2V . 
Fig. 9 shows the relationship between subsidy (or investment timing) and 
1V  
when demand variance changes. If demand variance is relatively small, as 
1V  
increases the government will only enforce foreign firm delay by increasing the 
subsidy and never enforce home firm delay. Since the benefit of learning the 
realization of its own cost shock (by making commitment) increases, the home 
firm has more and more incentive to make investment commitment as 
1V  goes 
up. As 2  rises, both firms are more and more willing to delay.  
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Fig. 9. Optimal subsidization and investment timing choice as 
1V  changes when 
2  
increases from 0 , -210 , -110  to -12 10 . ( 3
2 10V
 ; 0  ; 1A A  ; 0.03  )  
 
The relationship between subsidy (or investment timing) and 
1V  when 2V  is 
changing is shown in Fig. 10. It is easily seen that as 
2V  increases, the foreign 
firm is more and more willing to commit instead of delay because getting its cost 
information (by making investment commitment) is more valuable when its cost 
variance is higher. This result is different from the result in the first cost structure 
where both firms would like to delay as 
2V  increases since there is information 
value in this cost structure, by making commitments the firms have opportunities 
to learn their real cost shocks and adjust the level of their investments.   
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Fig. 10. Optimal subsidization and investment timing choice as 
1V  changes when 2V  
increases from -310 , -210  to -110 . ( 2 =0  ; 0  ; 1A A  ; 0.03  )  
 
Fig. 11 depicts the relationship between subsidy (or investment timing) and 
1V  when   is increasing
62 assuming 2 =0   and 3
2 10V
 . Similar to the case 
where 
1 2V V , the increase of the cost correlation leads to more commitments by 
the foreign firm, since the foreign firm can get more accurate cost information 
about the home firm. But the correlation increase has no effect on home firm’s 
timing choice, since the increase of the correlation further reinforce home firm’s 
willingness to make commitments.  
 
                                                        
62 Here   is only increased positively from 0 to 1, actually, the figure is very similar when   is increased 
negatively from 0 to -1. 
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Fig. 11. Optimal subsidization and investment timing choice as 
1V  changes when   
increases from 0, 0.5 to 1. (
2 =0  ; 3
2 10V
 ; 1A A  ; 0.03  )  
 
3.3 Optimal Subsidy and the Cost Variance of the Foreign Firm (
2V ) 
The procedure of studying the relationship between the optimal subsidy (or 
investment timing) and 
2V  is the same as in the previous section. First, we study 
this relationship by varying demand variance from zero to 0.2, assuming 0   
and 
1V  is small. Next, assuming 0   and 
2 0  , 
1V  is increased from 
-310  
to -110 . Lastly, we study the impact of raising   from 0 to 1 given 2 0   and a 
small 
1V . 
The relationship between the subsidy (and investment timing) and 
2V  when 
demand variance changes is shown in Fig. 12. Given a small 
1V , if demand 
variance is relatively low (for example: 0  and -210  in Fig. 12), as 
2V  increases 
the equilibrium timing choices of the firms go from (C ,C ) to (D ,C ). Although 
the benefit of retaining flexibility outweigh the strategic investment for the home 
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firm when 
2V  is high, the foreign firm would keep making commitment since it 
could benefit more by learning its real cost information (through making 
commitment). When demand variance is relatively high (set to be -110  in Fig. 12), 
the investment timing line has an interesting backward shape: it goes from “4” to 
“2 ” (from (D ,D ) to (D ,C )) when 
2V  rises to around 0.22. Below this level, the 
timing line has the regular shape: it goes from “3” to “4” as 
2V  increases; 
however, it goes back to “2” when 
2V  is higher than this level. When 2V  is very 
small, it is best for the home firm to commit and for the foreign firm to delay 
because the subsidy gives home firm an advantageous position to make 
investment commitment even if the demand variance is high, whereas the foreign 
firm have to choose delay due to the high demand variance. As 
2V  increased to 
about 0.04, the home government reduces the subsidy to a lower level, which 
enforces home firm delay, then the subsidy is increased gradually to dds

. The 
benefit of flexibility dominates any strategic investment until 
2V  reaches a little 
over 0.2, where it is optimal for the foreign firm to choose commitment at dds

, 
since the benefit of learning when 
2V  is high enough is more than the benefit of 
retaining flexibility for the high demand variance. But the home government 
would like the foreign firm to delay its investment so that it will not behave 
strategically. So the government gradually increases the subsidy (so called 
commitment deterrence subsidy) which forces the foreign firm to maintain delay. 
As 
2V  continues to rise the attraction of commitment for the foreign firm 
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increases due to greater benefit of learning by making commitment. However, 
commitment deterrence has to depart more from the optimal rent-shifting subsidy 
for (D ,D ) and will be increasingly costly. Finally, when 
2V  rises to 0.22 the 
government gives up commitment deterrence and accommodates the firms’ 
investment timing choice using dcs

, and the equilibrium investment timing 
become (D , C ). When 
2V  is above 0.22, the home firm will continue to choose 
delay because of the high demand and cost variance of the foreign firm, but it is 
optimal for the foreign firm to make commitment as the loss of flexibility is 
dominated by the benefit of strategic investing and learning its own cost shock. 
Different from Dewit and Leahy (2004)63, although the government always wants 
to deter investment commitment by the home or the foreign firm, when the 
foreign firm’s cost uncertainty is high enough (given a relatively high demand 
variance and a small cost variance for the home firm) the foreign firm may 
change its investment timing strategy from delay to commitment. If demand 
variance continues to rise, the government would only choose dds

 and both 
firms choose delay.  
  
                                                        
63 In Dewit and Leahy (2004), as demand variance increases the firms always change their investment timing 
strategies from commitment to delay and the government always wants to deter investment commitment by the home 
or the foreign firm. 
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Fig. 12. Optimal subsidization and investment timing choice as 
2V  changes when 
2  
increases from 0 , -210 , -110  to -12 10 . ( 3
1 10V
 ; 0  ; 1A A  ; 0.03  )  
 
Fig. 13 shows the relationship between subsidy (and investment timing) and 
2V  when home firm’s cost variance changes, assuming no correlation between 
the cost shocks and zero demand variance. It looks similar to Fig. 12 in the way 
in which the optimal investment timing choices are changing. For example, when 
1
1 10V
  the firms’ investment timing choices move from (C ,D ), to (D ,D ), and 
then to (D , C ) as 
2V  increases. The change for optimal subsidy looks similar 
to Fig. 12 too. When 
2V  is very small, firms’ equilibrium investment timing choice 
is (C ,D ), as 
2V  continues to rise to about 0.16, the home government sets a 
lower subsidy to enforce home firm delay. The maximum subsidy which can be 
used to enforce home firm delay increases until it reaches dds

 which 
accommodates firms’ timing choices for flexibility. Just as in Fig. 12, when 
2V  
increases to just over 0.2, the home government forces the foreign firm to 
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maintain delay by setting a higher commitment deterrence subsidy. The 
equilibrium investment timing ends up to (D ,C ) when 
2V  is above 0.25. 
 
 
Fig. 13. Optimal subsidization and investment timing choice as 
2V  changes when 1V  
increases from -310 , -210  to -110 . ( 2 =0 ; 0  ; 1A A  ; 0.03  )  
 
This result is another example which shows that as cost variance increases, 
the firms do not always change their investment timing strategies from 
commitment to delay in the presence of cost uncertainties and private information. 
When the home firm’s cost variance is relatively high and demand variance is 
small, the foreign firm may change its investment timing strategy from delay to 
commitment as its cost variance increases, even though the government wants 
to deter investment commitment by both firms. 
Next, we allow the correlation to increase from 0 to 1 given 2 0   and a 
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small 
1V .
64  Fig. 14 shows the relationship among the optimal subsidy, 
investment timing and 
2V  as the correlation changes. If the correlation between 
the cost shocks is relatively small (less than 0.5), the equilibrium investment 
timing choice changes from (C ,C ) to (D ,C ) as foreign firm’s cost variance 
increases. But if the cost shocks are fully correlated, both firms would only 
choose commitment. Therefore, as correlation increases the home firm is more 
and more willing to make commitment, although the foreign firm would always 
choose to commit. Thus, the increase of the correlation gives both firms more 
incentive to commit. Furthermore, with a small 
1V , the benefit of the increased 
correlation on home firm’s inference about the foreign firm’s cost is greater than 
on the foreign firm. Hence the increase in the correlation has greater effect of 
encouraging home firm to make investment commitment.  
 
  
Fig. 14. Optimal subsidization and investment timing choice as 
2V  changes when   
increases from 0, 0.5 to 1. ( 2 =0 ; 3
1 10V
 ; 1A A  ; 0.03  )  
                                                        
64 The results are quantitively the same if the correlation is negatively increased from 0 to -1. 
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3.4 Optimal Subsidy and the Correlation of the Cost Shocks (  ) 
Finally, we study the relationship between the correlation and the subsidy (or 
the investment timing) assuming all the other variances are fixed at a certain 
level. At first, suppose 
1 2V V , we study the impact of the correlation at three 
different levels of the cost variances: 310  to 110 . The results are shown in Fig. 
15. When cost variances are relatively low ( 310  or 210  in the figure), the firms 
only choose (C ,C ); but when the cost variances increases to 110 , as the 
correlation increases, the optimal timing choice goes from (C ,D ) to (C ,C ). 
Meanwhile, the optimal subsidy starts at cds

, when the correlation rises to about 
0.65, the foreign firm would like to commit to take advantage of the better 
learning opportunity due to larger correlation. The home government can only 
prevent this by setting a higher subsidy, which maintains foreign firm delay. 
However, as the correlation increases, it becomes more and more costly to 
manipulate the subsidy. Finally the government abandons commitment 
deterrence by choosing ccs

 when the correlation reaches a little over 0.7, and 
the equilibrium investment timing goes back to (C ,C ).  
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Fig. 15. Optimal subsidization and investment timing choice as   changes when the cost 
variances (
1 2V V ) increase from 
310  to 110 . ( 2 =0 ; 1A A  ; 0.03  )  
 
The increase in the difference between the two cost variances at each level 
does not change the relationship between the cost correlation and the subsidy 
(timing choices): the higher the cost correlation, the more willingness to commit 
by the firms. However, the increase in the difference of the cost variances makes 
at least one firm more willing to delay. 
Next, suppose 
1V  and 2V  are very small, demand variance is set to 
different levels from 0  to 110 , the change of the optimal subsidy and 
investment timing choices are shown in Fig. 16. When demand variance is 
relatively small, the government chooses rent-shifting subsidy ccs

 and both 
firms commit, because with small variances the benefit of taking first-mover 
advantage in order to strategically manipulate their rival excels the benefit of any 
other investment strategy no matter how correlated the cost shocks are. When 
demand variance is relatively high, the foreign firm chooses delay in order to 
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adjust their capital appropriately for the higher future uncertainty. But the demand 
variance is still not high enough for the home firm to abandon commitment. 
What’s more, the change of the correlation between the cost shocks has little 
influence on the firms’ timing choices.  
 
  
Fig. 16. Optimal subsidization and investment timing choice as   changes when 2  
increases from 0  to 110 . ( 3
1 2 10V V
  ; 1A A  ; 0.03  )  
 
4. Conclusion 
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demand variance we conclude the following: First of all, under zero correlation on 
the cost shocks, if 
1 2V V , the increase of the level of the cost variances leads to 
more willingness to delay by both firms; but the increase of the correlation 
between the cost shocks makes firms more willing to commit their investments. In 
case there is cost asymmetry and the home firm has a cost advantage, it is 
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easier for the government to enforce foreign firm delay and harder to enforce 
home firm delay. The result is opposite if the foreign firm has a cost advantage. 
Second, if 
1 2V V , the increase of the difference of the firms’ cost variances 
makes the government more willing to enforce foreign firm delay and less willing 
to enforce home firm delay, this is due to the higher information value to the home 
firm than to the foreign firm in this structure. This result is different from the first 
cost structure, which argues that it is easier for the government to enforce home 
firm flexibility under 
1 2V V .  
On the contrary, if 
1 2V V , the increase of the difference of the firms’ cost 
variances makes the government more willing to enforce home firm delay and 
less willing to enforce foreign firm delay. A more interesting and important thing 
we  found here is that when there is no correlation among cost shocks, as 
demand uncertainty rises the government may enforce foreign firm commitment 
by using “delay deterrence” subsidy when home firm’s cost variance is smaller 
than foreign firm’s cost variance. Dewit and Leahy (2004) argues that as demand 
uncertainty rises the government always wants to deter investment commitment 
by the home or the foreign firm; however, after cost uncertainties are added and 
assuming private information, this conclusion is not always true: under certain 
conditions on firms’ cost uncertainty structures, the government may also deter 
investment delay by the foreign firm. 
 Next, we consider the effects of changing the correlation in the unequal 
cost shocks. When 
1 2V V  the foreign firm would like to commit more as the cost 
126 
 
correlation increases, but there is little impact on the timing choice of the home 
firm, because the impact of the correlation on home firm’s inference of the 
conditional mean and variance of foreign firm’s cost shock is weakened by home 
firm’s higher cost variance 
1V . The result is opposite if 1 2V V  
because of 
symmetry.  
 To explore the relationship between the optimal subsidy (and investment 
timing choices) and the cost variance of the home firm, first, we increases the 
demand variance assuming small   and 
2V . It is found that under small 
demand variance, as 
1V  increases the government will only enforce foreign firm 
delay and never enforce home firm delay. As 
1V  increases the home firm 
benefits more from learning the realization of its own cost shock through making 
commitment. However, as 2  rises, both firms are more and more willing to 
delay. Next, 
2V  is increased assuming no correlation and demand variance. As 
2V  increases, the foreign firm is more and more willing to commit because 
getting its cost information (by making investment commitment) is more valuable 
when its cost variance is higher. In the end, the cost correlation is increased with 
the result of more commitments for the foreign firm but no effect on home firm’s 
timing choice. 
The analysis of the relationship between the optimal subsidy (or investment 
timing) and 
2V  is made in three aspects. Firstly, demand variance is set at 
different levels assuming 0   and a small 
1V , and it is interestingly found that 
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different from Dewit and Leahy (2004), when foreign firm’s cost uncertainty is 
high enough (given a relatively high demand variance) the foreign firm may 
change its investment timing from delay to commitment although the government 
always wants to deter investment commitment by both firms. Secondly, we 
change home firm’s cost variance assuming no cost correlation and zero demand 
variance. It is found that the foreign firm may also change its investment timing 
strategy from delay to commitment as 
2V  rises if the home firm’s cost variance is 
relatively high and demand variance is small. At last, the increase of the 
correlation between the cost shocks makes the home firm more willing to commit, 
whereas it has little impact on foreign firm’s timing choice.  
Finally, we investigate the relationship of the correlation and the subsidy (or 
the investment timing). At first, suppose 
1 2V V , as expected, the increase of the 
correlation makes at least one firm more willing to commit; the increase of the 
level of the cost variances leads to more willingness to delay by at least one firm; 
when cost variances are relatively high, as the correlation increases, the foreign 
firm may change its investment timing from delay to commitment. Next, the 
increase of the difference of the two cost variances does not change the 
relationship between the cost correlation and the subsidy (or timing choices): the 
higher the cost correlation, the more willingness to commit by the firms. However, 
the increase of the difference of the cost variances makes at least one firm more 
willing to delay. In the end, the increase of the demand variance gives foreign firm 
more incentive to delay. 
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In this paper, time consistency problem is ignored; what is more, to make 
things simple, there is no signaling in this four stage game. These problems may 
need further study.  
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APPENDIX B 
 
1. Decision on the optimal investment level by the foreign firm in Delay, 
Commitment Case 
 
In Delay, Commitment Case, in period 2, u , v  and v  are known to both 
firms, and k  (also s ) is exogenous. Thus, we solve equation (5 )a  and (3)  at 
the same time and got: 
 
2 2 2
1
(1 ) (2 )( )
3 2
[2 2 2 ]
dc
dc
dc
x A A s k u v v
y v u A k v A s
A A s k u v vk
 





  
  
  
        
   
                       
                        (25) 
 
where the values of x , y and k will depend on s , k , u , v  and v .  Going 
back to stage 3, observing v  firm 2 has to decide optimal investment level dck

by maximizing its expected profit in the second period:  
 
 ( )
k
Max E v

   
2
0( ) ( )
2k
k
E Max a x y u y c k v y v


    
   
           
   
 
  0dc dcx yk k kE x y v  
 
  
                                     
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1
( ) ( ) 0
3 2
k
E y y v
 
       
 
                                                 
(From F.O.C., 0y
  ) 
2(2 )
( )
3 2
dc dck E y v



   

                                                 (26) 
 
From the result we got in (25), ( )dcE y v
 
 can be calculated as: 
 
 1( ) (1 ) (2 )( )
3 2
dcE y v E v u A k v A s v 

             

 
     
1
[ ( ) (1 ) ( ) (2 ) ( ) (2 )( ) ]
3 2
E v v E u v E v v A k A s  

              

   
     
2
1
[ (2 ) (2 )( ) ]
3 2
cV v v A k A s
V
 

          

65
           ( cov( , ) 0u v  ) 
     
2
2
( 2 ) ( )
3 2 3 2 3 2
dccV v A sA k
V


  


       
  
                            (27) 
 
Finally, we can solve dck
  by equation (26) and (27): 
 
                                                        
65 Since v  and v  are jointly normally distributed: 1
2
0
,
0
c
c
V Vv
N
V Vv
     
     
      
: , the conditional distribution of 
v  given v

should be : 2 2( ), (1 )vv vv
v
v v N v

    



 
 
   
 
 
: , which can be expressed as: 
2
1
2 2
,c c
V V
v v N v V
V V
   
 
: .  
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2
2(2 ) 2 (2 ) 2
( ) [( 2 ) ( ) ]
3 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 2
dc dc dccV v A sk E y v A k
V
   
 
    
  

            
    
 
2
2 2
2 (2 )[( 2 ) (2 ) ]
(3 2 ) 2 (2 )
c
dc
V
v A A s
V
k
   
  

 

      
 
  
                            (28) 
 
Then, the optimal choices ( dcx

, dcy

and dck

) can be decided in terms of s , u , 
v , v
  as well as variance variables (
2V  and cV ) when 
dck

 is plugged in.  
 
2. Maximized expected profits for both firms in Delay, Delay Case 
 
       In Delay, Delay Case, the maximized expected profit for the home firm 
can be calculated as: 
2
2 2 2( ) 1( ) var ( ) [var ( ) ]
2 2
dd
dd dd dd dd dd ddkE E x x Ex k Ek
 

       
      
  
         (29) 
 
Where according to Table 1: 
 
(2 )( )
(1 )(3 )
dd A s AEx

 

  

 
 
2 2 2
1 2
2 2
(1 ) (2 ) 2(2 )
var
(1 ) (3 )
dd cV V Vx
   
 
      

 
 
[(2 )( ) ]
(1 )(3 )
dd A s AEk
 
 

  

 
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2 2 2 2
1 2
2 2
[(1 ) (2 ) 2(2 ) ]
var
(1 ) (3 )
dd cV V Vk
    
 
      

 
 
 
Therefore, it is easily seen that: 
 
 2 2 2 21 22 2
(1 )
2 (1 ) (2 ) 2(2 ) [(2 )( ) ]
(1 ) (3 )
dd
cE V V V A s A

     
 
 

          
 
                                                                                                                         
(30) 
 
Similarly, the maximized expected profit for the foreign firm is: 
 
 2 2 2 21 22 2
(1 )
2 (1 ) (2 ) 2(2 ) [(2 ) ( )]
(1 ) (3 )
dd
cE V V V A A s

     
 
 

          
 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
(31) 
 
3. Maximized expected profits for both firms in Commitment, Delay Case 
 
      In Commitment, Delay Case, the maximized expected profit for the home 
firm is also: 
 
2
2 2 2( ) 1( ) var ( ) [var ( ) ]
2 2
cd
cd cd cd cd cd cdkE E x x Ex k Ek
 

       
      
  
          (32) 
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Where from table 2: 
 
2 2
(2 )( )
(3 2 )[ ]
(3 2 ) 2 (2 )
cd A s AEx


  

  
 
  
 
2 2 2
1
2 2 1
22 2 2 2
(2 ) [(3 2 ) 2 (2 ) ]
1
var [(1 )
(3 2 ) [(3 2 ) 2 (2 ) ]
c
cd
V
V
V
x V
   
 
   

   
   
   
 
                   
2
1
2 2
2(2 )[(3 2 ) 2 (2 ) ]
]
(3 2 ) 2 (2 )
c
c
V
V
V
   
  
   

  
 
2 2
2 (2 )[(2 )( ) ]
(3 2 ) 2 (2 )
cd A s AEk
  
  

   

  
 
2 2 2
1
1
2 2 2
4 (2 ) ( 2 )
var
[(3 2 ) 2 (2 ) ]
c
cd
V
V
V
k
  
  

  

  
 
 
Then, the maximized expected profit for the home firm should be: 
 
2
2 2
22 2 2
[(2 )( ) ] 1
[(1 )
(3 2 ) 2 (2 ) (3 2 )
cd A s AE V

  
   

  
   
   
 
               
2 2 2 2 2
1
1 1
2 2 2
(2 ) [(3 2 ) 2 (2 ) ] 2 (3 2 ) ( 2 )
[(3 2 ) 2 (2 ) ]
c cV V V
V V
      
  
 
        
 
  
 
               
2
1
2 2
2(2 )[(3 2 ) 2 (2 ) ]
]
(3 2 ) 2 (2 )
c
c
V
V
V
   
  
   

  
                           (33) 
 
134 
 
Similarly, the maximized expected profit for the foreign firm is: 
 
2
2 2 2( ) 1( ) var ( ) [var ( ) ]
2 2
cd
cd cd cd cd cd cdkE E y y Ey k Ek
 

     

  
  
      
  
       (34) 
 
From Table 2: 
 
2
2 2 2 2
1 (2 ) (3 2 ) ( )
[2(1 ) ]
3 2 (3 2 ) 2 (2 ) (3 2 ) 2 (2 )
cd A sEy A
  
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     
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2 2 2
1
2 1 1
22 2 2 2 2 2
[(3 2 ) 2 (2 ) ] 4[(3 2 ) 2 (2 ) ]
1
var [ 4 ]
(3 2 ) [(3 2 ) 2 (2 ) ] (3 2 ) 2 (2 )
c c
c
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V V
V V
V V
y V
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
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(2 ) (3 2 ) ( )
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3 2 (3 2 ) 2 (2 ) (3 2 ) 2 (2 )
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2 2 2
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2 1 1
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[(3 2 ) 2 (2 ) ] 4[(3 2 ) 2 (2 ) ]
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c c
c
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V V
V V
V V
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
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
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      
 
 
Therefore: 
 
2
2
2 2 2 2 2
1
(2 ) (3 2 ) ( )2 [2(1 ) ]
(3 2 ) (3 2 ) 2 (2 ) (3 2 ) 2 (2 )
cd A sE A
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  
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  
  
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2 2 2
1
2 1 1
22 2 2 2 2 2
[(3 2 ) 2 (2 ) ] 4[(3 2 ) 2 (2 ) ]1
2 [ 4 ]
(3 2 ) [(3 2 ) 2 (2 ) ] (3 2 ) 2 (2 )
c c
c
V V
V V
V V
V
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
      
     
   
      
  (35) 
 
135 
 
4. Maximized expected profits for both firms in Delay, Commitment Case 
 
    Due to the symmetry, the maximized expected profits for the firms in Delay, 
Commitment Case could be derived easily from the results in Commitment, 
Delay Case. 
 
2
2
2 2 2 2 2
1
(2 ) (3 2 )2 [2(1 )( ) ]
(3 2 ) (3 2 ) 2 (2 ) (3 2 ) 2 (2 )
dc AE A s
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2 2 2
2
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c c
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   
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  (36) 
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CHAPTER 4   
ROBUST FDI DETERMINANTS WITH ENDOGENOUS EXCHANGE RATE IN 
THE PRESENCE OF MODEL UNCERTAINTY AND SELECTION BIAS 
 
1. Relevance of the Topic 
 
      As an increasingly important source of cross-border capital reallocation 
over the past two decades, foreign direct investment (FDI) has become more 
important than trade and presently constitutes the single largest source of capital 
flows66 (Abbott and De Vita, 2011). From 1990 to 2011, the ratio of global FDI 
inflows to GDP increased 135 percent and sales of foreign affiliates of 
multinational firms jumped from $76,258 million to $242,027 million in real terms 
(UNCTAD World Investment Report, 2012). FDI flows to developing countries 
rose from an annual average of $17 billion over 1980–85 to an annual average of 
$242 billion over 2000–05, reaching $621 billion in 2008 (Abbott et al., 2012). 
Since 1995, developing countries continued to account for nearly half of global 
FDI as their inflows reached a new record high of $684 billion in 2011 (UNCTAD 
World Investment Report, 2012). The FDI outflow of the largest developed 
countries (G-20) ran up to more than $1 trillion in 2011 and more than a third of 
that amount was from the United States (Jeanneret, 2013). 
 
                                                        
66 Financial flow is defined as any and all of the transactions in the financial (capital) account of the balance of 
payments, most importantly international borrowing and lending and acquisition across borders of financial and real 
assets (Deardorffs' Glossary of International Economics). Capital account is composed of foreign direct investment, 
portfolio investment, other investment and reserve account. So, FDI flows are part of the financial flows. 
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1.1 Debates on the Relationship between FDI and the Exchange Rate67 
      Over the past two decades, the growth in FDI has stimulated significant 
attempts at developing theories that explain the determinants of FDI. Bergstrand 
and Egger (2007) suggest a formal N-country theoretical rationale for estimating 
gravity equations of FDI flows and foreign affiliate sales. The standard gravity 
variables include “mass” variables (the source and host population sizes) and 
“distance” variable (the physical distance between the source and host countries). 
Along with the typical gravity variables, common border, colony relationship and 
common language are often added into the gravity equation to capture the impact 
of geographic and historical conditions on bilateral FDI decisions. Real gross 
domestic product per capita, which is a measure of capital abundance, is put 
forward by the factor endowment argument of FDI. It is found that 
Capital-abundant economies (with a high capital-labor ratio) conduct more 
outward FDI than labor-abundant countries (Egger and Pfaffermayr, 2004). GDP 
growth rate, which signals higher returns, is shown to be positively related to the 
presence of foreign firms (Lim, 2001). However, real GDP per capita and GDP 
growth rate are excluded in this paper because of their well suspected 
endogeneity (Russ, 2007). Another hypothesis between FDI and trade protection 
was proposed by trade economists: higher trade protection make firms more 
likely to substitute foreign affiliate production for exports to avoid the costs of 
                                                        
67 Here the debates focus on theories investigating the effects of the volatility and the level of the exchange rate on 
FDI. However, it is worth notice that the impact of exchange rate regime combinations (under different policy 
frameworks) upon bilateral foreign direct investment flows has been investigated in recent literature (Abbott et al., 
2011, 2012), and the FDI-inducing properties of the various exchange rate regimes have been found. 
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trade production. This so called tariff-jumping FDI is not considered in this paper 
since the support for tariff-jumping FDI is mixed, besides, FDI and trade 
protection may be endogenous (Blonigen, 2005). Other important FDI 
determinants included in this paper such as education difference, market 
potential, productivity, corporate tax, tax treaty, RTAs, economic risk, financial 
risk and political risk are explained in section three.  
     Another branch of the literature is concerned with the relationship between 
the exchange rate and FDI. However, there is no consensus about the nature of 
the relationship in theoretical and empirical models treating exchange rate 
fluctuations as exogenous. Those models that are based on partial equilibrium 
analysis are divided as to whether exchange rate uncertainty promotes or 
depresses FDI. There are numerous theoretical models which show that 
exchange rate uncertainty promotes FDI. First, the arguments based on the 
risk-taking characteristics of producers, which assert that if there is risk aversion 
among producers, exchange rate volatility may expand the share of investment 
activity located on foreign soil, and the FDI share increases as the correlation 
between exchange rate and real demand shocks rises. This result holds because 
by increasing the share of foreign FDI, the producers minimize the variance of 
expected profits and increase expected utility (Goldberg and Kolstad, 1995). 
Second, there is the production flexibility approach, which shows that 
exchange-rate volatility increases the value of having plants in both countries, so 
that the multinational firm could decide at any time whether it is better to export 
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from home or to produce in its foreign facility, depending on where the value of 
the local currency makes input costs cheapest (Sung and Lapan, 2000). Third, 
the financial flexibility argument developed by Itagaki (1981), which posits that an 
increase in exchange-rate uncertainty could cause a firm to invest abroad as a 
way of hedging against a short position in its balance sheet. Specifically, if a 
firm’s home currency depreciates, the value of its domestic assets decreases 
relative to its foreign liabilities. However, investing abroad could offset the loss 
due to the increased value of the firm’s foreign assets and revenues. 
      Other theoretical models predict that exchange-rate uncertainty would 
discourage FDI. One line of research originates in the real option approach of 
FDI (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994), declaring that exchange rate fluctuations raise the 
option value of waiting due to the increased uncertainties on the payoff abroad 
and the cost of the investment. This theory is based on an important 
characteristic of investment decisions: irreversibility due to the sunk cost68. The 
other line of research assumes firms are risk averse. These papers demonstrate 
that exchange-rate uncertainty may reduce the certainty-equivalence value of 
expected profits from foreign production, if the loss of the repatriated profits due 
to host country depreciation is not offset by the increase in host country demand 
or reduction in host country input costs (Goldberg and Kolstad, 1995).  
      In contrast with the theoretical predictions obtained from existing real 
options models, Jeanneret (2013) highlights the key role of firm heterogeneity in 
                                                        
68 Dixit and Pindyck (1994) assume the uncertain output price P (or a demand shift variable, here we refer to 
exchange rate) for a firm follows the geometric Brownian motion: 
𝑑𝑃
𝑃
= 𝛼𝑃𝑑𝑡 + 𝜎𝑃𝑑𝑧𝑃 where 𝐸[𝑑𝑧𝑝
2] = 𝑑𝑡. 
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a U-shaped relationship between exchange rate uncertainty and aggregate 
investment. This non-monotonicity emerges because firms are heterogeneous in 
productivity and have different incentives to invest under different time and 
conditions: the least productive firms prefer to invest overseas when exchange 
rate volatility is low and otherwise export, whereas the most productive firms 
choose to invest overseas when volatility is high. Eventually, the aggregation 
over heterogeneous firms produces a U-shaped relationship between uncertainty 
and aggregate investment69.  
      Empirical models treating exchange rate fluctuations as exogenous also 
generate conflicts on the relationship between exchange rates and FDI. 
Udomkerdmongkol, Morrissey, and Görg (2009) employ annual panel data and 
the fixed effects model with first-order autocorrelation disturbances estimation to 
explore the effect of exchange rates on US foreign direct investment in 16 
emerging market countries from 1990 to 2002. The result reveals three distinct 
effects: local currency devaluation promotes inward FDI; expectations of local 
currency depreciation (appreciation) postpones (brings forward) FDI; and 
                                                        
69 Jeanneret (2013) explained the intuition behind the U-shaped relations. For the firms with low levels of productivity, 
investing abroad is more likely to be profitable since they could build more efficient production lines abroad. What is 
more, when exchange rate volatility is low, there is no incentive for them to wait as the payoff of the foreign project 
will not change much in the future. However, greater exchange rate volatility increases the value to waiting because 
the opportunity cost for the investment is higher. Firms need to wait for a more favorable exchange rate which lowers 
the cost of a new investment. Hence, for those firms, the probability of investing abroad (expected level of FDI) 
decreases with uncertainty. On the contrary, the firms with high levels of productivity find it more profitable to export 
their cost-efficient products than to invest abroad under low exchange rate uncertainty. As exchange rate volatility 
rises, the level of the exchange rate could be such that relocating production may foster these firms’ profits through 
enhanced productivity. Therefore, for high-productivity firms, the probability of investing abroad increases with 
exchange rate uncertainty. Since the effect of exchange rate volatility on FDI is mostly driven by low-productivity 
firms when exchange rate volatility is low and by high-productivity firms when exchange rate volatility is high, the 
aggregation of firms with heterogeneous levels of productivity finally creates a U-shaped relationship between 
exchange rate volatility and FDI.  
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exchange rate volatility discourages FDI inflows. Cavallaria and d’Addona (2013) 
also find a strong negative relationship between exchange rate volatility and 
bilateral FDI flows among 24 OECD countries over the period 1985–2007.70 
However, the exchange rate volatility matters in particular for the decision 
whether to invest in a foreign country. Meanwhile, there are papers that find 
opposite results; Goldberg and Kolstad (1995) find that exchange rate volatility 
stimulates the share of U.S. investment capacity to Canada, Japan and the 
United Kingdom in accord with the early horizontal FDI theory. But they find no 
statistical evidence of the relationship between the level of the exchange rate and 
FDI71. Zhang (2004) supports their results, finding a positive and significant 
relationship between exchange rate volatility and FDI flowing into the European 
Union (EU) from both inside and outside the EU. Using data of Japanese 
industry-level foreign direct investment to five Asian countries, Dennis et al. 
(2008) find evidence that the impact of exchange rates on FDI reflects 
heterogeneity across different types of FDI, which addresses the major conflicts 
in the previous literature on exchange rates and FDI72. 
     Buch and Kleinert (2008) argue that exchange rates could affect FDI 
decisions for two main reasons. On the one hand, frictions on capital markets can 
                                                        
70 Cavallaria and d’Addona (2013) point out that the rise in exchange rate volatility strongly deters foreign 
investments only when selection bias is properly accounted for.  
71 If purchasing power parity (PPP) always holds, there should be no relationship between FDI and exchange rates, 
because the changes of the exchange rates offset differences in relative inflation, keeping earnings, as measured in the 
home currency, constant (Dewenter, 1995). 
72 Taylor (2008) assessed the changes in FDI flows between the major economies in the first five years of economic 
and monetary union (EMU) of the European Union, and found that the euro was only a subsidiary cause for the 
massive but short-lived wave of FDI to the Eurozone after EMU. Intra-zone FDI turns out to be weaker after EMU, 
both in relation to previous trends and as a share of major economies’ global FDI flows. On this evidence, intra-zone 
investment did not respond to the elimination of exchange-rate uncertainty. However, the euro appears to attract 
modest inflows from outside the zone. 
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affect FDI through a wealth effect, specifically, FDI of sectors (or firms) that face 
greater credit market restrictions responds more to exchange rate changes. On 
the other hand, goods market frictions can be another source of the effects of 
exchange rate changes on FDI. A home currency appreciation increases the 
profits generated from the home market in terms of the foreign currency, which 
enables a home firm to bid a higher price (increase FDI) for firm-specific assets 
on international markets. The impact of the home appreciation is greater if home 
firms sell higher share of their outputs on the home market and use lower share 
of the domestic inputs. However, their results suggest that the effect of exchange 
rate changes on FDI will be weakened as the integration of goods markets 
develops. 
 
1.2 Endogenous Exchange Rate and FDI in General Equilibrium Model   
     The conflicting results generated from the previous studies of exchange 
rate variability and multinational firms are based on partial equilibrium models 
that treat the exchange rate as exogenous. Those studies make partial 
equilibrium predictions of FDI by modeling firm-level decisions and examine how 
exogenous factors, such as taxes and exchange rates, affect these firm-level 
decisions (Blonigen, 2005). The chief objection to the previous literature based 
on partial equilibrium and firm-level decisions is its ignorance of the connections 
of FDI behavior with the underlying fundamental macroeconomic variables and 
trade flows. A recent body of literature has begun to model FDI decisions in a 
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general equilibrium framework and to analyze how fundamental country-level 
factors affect aggregate country-level FDI behavior. 
     Russ (2007) points out that when the exchange rate and consumer demand 
in the host country are jointly determined by underlying macroeconomic variables 
(such as money supply and interest rate), regressions of FDI flows on both 
exchange rate levels and volatility are subject to bias. The reasoning behind this 
is: because of the rigidity of prices73 monetary shocks not only affect realizations 
of the exchange rate but also the demand for consumption goods in the host 
country. Furthermore, the exchange rate covaries negatively with the demand for 
goods when monetary shocks happen 74 . A two-country open-economy 
macroeconomic model is set up to connect both demand and the exchange rate 
to fluctuations in a common underlying variable: money. It is shown that the 
relative difficulty that foreign-owned firms face when entering the Home market 
would be determined by the uncertainties of money-supply growth rate and the 
relative sunk cost:  
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= [(
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,                        (1) 
 
                                                        
73 Russ (2007) depicts the sticky-price mechanism in its firm's maximization problem: At period t-1, a particular firm, 
Given its knowledge of a permanent idiosyncratic productivity index and its expectations of economic conditions in 
the next period, decide whether it will produce domestically or abroad in the following period and set the price for its 
unique good in period t if it chooses to invest. On that basis, the general equilibrium price a firm will set depends on 
the firm’s productivity index and the expectation of the money supply in period t. So the rigidity of prices comes from 
the fact that the pricing rule does not depend on the real monetary shocks.  
74 Due to the sticky-price mechanism a positive shock to the home money supply weakens the value of the home 
currency but simultaneously increases home country’s real income, and therefore boosts sales by both domestically 
owned firms and multinationals operating in the home market. 
144 
 
In (1) 𝛾 is defined as the ratio of the productivity levels of the least productive 
Foreign and Home firms. The ?̂?𝐹(𝑡) is the foreign firms’ threshold productivity 
level, which means that only the foreign firms with higher productivity levels than 
the threshold productivity level can cover their fixed costs and enter the home 
market. Likewise, ?̂?𝐻(𝑡) is the threshold productivity level for the home firms. 
The 𝑓𝑀𝑁𝐸 and 𝑓 are fixed overhead costs or sunk costs to invest in the home 
country for multinational enterprises and Home-owned firms, respectively; 𝜎𝑚∗
2  
and 𝜎𝑚
2  are the variances of the growth rates of the foreign and home money 
supplies, respectively. It is assumed that the growth rate of the home money 
supply (the same for foreign money supply) has a lognormal distribution defined 
by 
      
     
𝑀𝑡
𝑀𝑡−1
= (1 + 𝜓)𝑒𝑣𝑡,                                                (2) 
 
where 𝜓 is a constant and the 𝑣𝑡 ’s are i.i.d. random variables with a normal 
distribution of mean −
1
2
𝜎𝑚
2  and variance 𝜎𝑚
2 . The 𝜇  is the elasticity of 
substitution in the utility function with constant elasticity of substitution (CES). 
     Besides, the change of FDI flows with exchange-rate volatility differs 
depending on whether the volatility comes from a firm's native or host country. 
This model has extremely important contributions in that it is the first to analyze 
FDI in an open-economy macroeconomic model with sunk cost where exchange 
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rates and local demand are jointly determined. Besides, the model assumes 
heterogeneity in productivity across firms to explain why exchange rate 
uncertainty together with the sunk cost deters entry by the lower productivity 
firms into the foreign market. It coincides with the fact that larger firms with higher 
productivities are not easily driven out of the foreign market in uncertain 
macroeconomic conditions (Melitz (2002, 2003)). 
     With the same assumption of nominal rigidity and endogenous entry by 
national and multinational firms as that of Russ (2007), Cavallari (2010) uses a 
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model with both exports and 
foreign direct investments to show that the decision whether to engage in start-up 
investments as well as the choice of whether to invest at home or abroad depend 
on various dimensions of monetary policy and world-wide productivity conditions. 
The equilibrium dynamics of foreign start-up investments in the home country is 
derived as: 
 
𝑛𝑀𝑁𝑡
∗ =
1
(1+𝜌)
[(1 + (1 +
1
2𝜌
) 𝑎1) 𝑎𝑡 − (1 +
1
2𝜌
) [𝑎1𝑎𝑡
∗ + (1 − 𝑎0)(𝑚𝑡 − 𝑚𝑡
∗)]+𝜒𝑀𝑁],                                                                                                                                
                                                                    (3) 
where 𝑛𝑀𝑁𝑡
∗ = 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑁𝑀𝑁𝑡
∗ − 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑁𝑀𝑁𝑡−1
∗  is the log deviation of the total quantity of 
the foreign investments (new foreign investments) in the home country in year t. 
𝑎𝑡 = 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐴𝑡 and 𝑎𝑡
∗ = 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐴𝑡
∗ are the log of the productivity shocks for the home 
and foreign country in year t, respectively. Similarly, 𝑚𝑡 = 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝜇𝑡 and 𝑚𝑡
∗ = 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝜇𝑡
∗ 
are the log of money supplies for home and foreign country in year t, respectively. 
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𝑚𝑡, 𝑚𝑡
∗, 𝑎𝑡 and  𝑎𝑡
∗ are random variables which are assumed jointly normally 
distributed and symmetric across countries with variances 𝜎𝑚
2  and 𝜎𝑎
2. 𝜌 is a 
constant which measures the concavity of the cost function. 𝑎0 and 𝑎1 are 
constants defined as the functions determined by the parameters in the model 
including the discount factor, elasticity of substitution and exchange rate 
pass-through75. At last, 𝜒𝑀𝑁 is a constant entirely determined by uncertainties:  
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where 𝜎𝑎𝑚 and 𝜎𝑎∗𝑚∗  are the covariance of the productivity shocks and the 
monetary shocks in home and foreign country, respectively, 𝜂 is the elasticity of 
exchange rate pass-through, 𝜙 is the elasticity of substitution in consumption. 
𝑎0, 𝑎1 and 𝑎2 are constants. 
     Eq. (3) shows that current monetary policy shocks can affect the 
attractiveness of investing in the home country as compared with overseas. A 
domestic monetary expansion is found to discourage foreign investments when 
exchange rate pass-through is not complete since the depreciation of the home 
                                                        
75 Exchange rate pass-through, taken as given by firms active in foreign markets, is defined in Cavallari (2010) as a 
constant elasticity 𝜂, at which firms let the final prices of their products (in their own currency) vary with the 
exchange rate. 𝜂 = 0 corresponds to local currency pricing, a situation where prices are pre-determined in the 
consumers’ currency and do not respond to movements in the exchange rate, whereas 𝜂 = 1 corresponds to producers’ 
currency pricing. In this setting, exchange rate pass-through is incomplete if 𝜂 ≠ 1. 
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currency reduces the prospective profits of the overseas affiliate more than 
reducing the entry costs in foreign currency. On the contrary, monetary expansion 
originating from the foreign country would boost foreign investment into the home 
country for the same reasoning. Furthermore, Eq. (4) shows that an increase in 
the degree of monetary stabilization improves trend investments in all sectors; 
foreign direct investments might be discouraged by exchange rate fluctuations 
because the value of the multinational firms’ foreign assets is reduced. This is the 
way for foreign firms to minimize the macroeconomic risks related to 
pre-determined prices under a counter-cyclical monetary policy.  
     There are several differences between Cavallari (2010) and Russ (2007). 
For one, Russ (2007) assumes heterogeneous productivity across firms whereas 
Cavallari (2010) assumes firms are homogeneous except that they produce 
different product varieties. In addition, Cavallari (2010) incorporates the export 
sector into the investment model, whereas Russ (2007) assumes no trade in 
goods. Moreover, Russ (2007) shows that FDI responds to monetary volatility 
from the firm’s native or host country, whereas in Cavallari (2010)’s framework, 
current monetary policy shocks can affect nominal marginal costs, which 
influence firms’ investment decisions. This implies that current monetary shocks 
would also play a role in re-directing investments across countries, besides the 
various dimensions of monetary uncertainty.  
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1.3 Model Uncertainty and Selection Bias 
      Theories explaining the incentives of FDI go back as early as horizontal 
FDI, which explains cross-country penetration of multinational corporations as a 
substitute for trade when there are significant trade barriers (such as transport 
costs or tariffs), and vertical FDI, which assumes the investment occurs to take 
advantage of lower factor prices in the host country. These two incentives are 
unified into the knowledge-capital model of FDI. New trade theories are 
developed to provide more patterns for FDI, which includes export platform FDI76 
and vertical interaction FDI. The former suggests that the main purpose for firms 
to invest and produce in the host country is to use the country as an export 
platform and export their goods to neighboring countries. Similarly, the latter is 
undertaken when subsidiaries in host countries do not serve the local market, but 
instead ship intermediate goods back and forth for processing and export 
finished products back to the parent. Unfortunately, those theories of FDI have 
only got mixed supports from the vast majority of empirical studies77. Although 
the literature on the determinants of FDI is quite substantial, the literature based 
on partial equilibrium and firm-level decisions is still too young that there are few 
definitive conclusions. It also has been found that most of the empirical 
determinants of cross-country FDI are fairly fragile78 statistically (Blonigen, 2005). 
Because of the model uncertainty in FDI theories, an individual empirical 
                                                        
76 The theory of export platform FDI addresses the importance of regional trade agreements in driving the FDI. 
77 Bergstrand and Egger (2007) find conditional evidence for effects of RTAs on FDI flows; similarly, Baltagi et al. 
(2007) only finds weak support for export platform FDI and vertical interaction FDI theory. 
78 The fragility of the results comes from the arguably theoretical hypotheses or model uncertainty. 
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approach that contains only limited subsets of the FDI determinants would cause 
ambiguous and often contradictory results. Even, if model uncertainty is not 
taken into account in the estimation process, the statistically significant FDI 
determinants will be doubted79 for their level of significance when alternative 
specifications are considered (Eicher, Helfman and Lenkoski, 2012). Without a 
full account of model uncertainty conventional sensitivity analyses overstates the 
significance levels and confidence intervals in a statistical analysis. The Bayesian 
Model Averaging (BMA) methodology is developed to address the problem of 
model uncertainty in the estimation procedure. Therefore, the BMA methodology 
is used to handle the large set of potential determinants proposed by various FDI 
theories80.  
     It is commonly found that a large number of FDI data are missing81. 
Heckman (1979) puts forward the problem of sample selection bias from using 
nonrandomly selected samples with missing data. A usual procedure for 
computing standard errors for least squares coefficients will understate the true 
standard deviations and overstate the true significance levels. Consequently, a 
two-step consistent estimation method is developed to correct the selection bias, 
which is treated as a specification error. The large amount of missing data in FDI 
flows between country pairs could be explained by three reasons: lack of 
                                                        
79 It means the results will not be robust when alternative specifications are used. 
80 Blonigen and Piger (2011) use Bayesian statistical techniques to deal with model uncertainty on FDI activities in a 
cross section. Bayesian method was used to select the variables (from a large set of candidates) that are most likely to 
be the determinants of FDI. Their results found that many covariates found significant by previous studies are not 
robust. 
81 Razin et al. (2008) finds around 62 percent host-source pairs of FDI flows are not observable in their data. Eicher, 
Helfman and Lenkoski (2012) also find large sections of missing data in their comprehensive global dataset. 
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incentives to invest (even if there were no fixed costs); setup costs, which 
prevent FDI from taking place; and measurement errors 82 . Therefore, the 
Heckman selection method is adopted in the FDI analyses to solve the selection 
bias problem due to the missing data. This method jointly estimates the 
maximum likelihood of the selection equation and the magnitude of the FDI flow 
(flow equation). Furthermore, this estimation method accommodates both 
measurement errors and a possible existence of setup costs (Razin, Rubinstein 
and Sadka, 2004; Razin, Sadka and Tong, 2008). The two equations (selection 
and flow equations) make it possible to analyze the determinants of the intensive 
and extensive margins of FDI (‘‘the volume of investment flows’’ and ‘‘the 
decision whether to invest’’, respectively) separately. Razin, Sadka and Tong 
(2008) address the importance of fixed costs as sizeable threshold barriers to 
FDI and explain two different decision mechanisms behind the two-part 
investment decisions: the standard marginal productivity condition that 
determines how much to invest, and the total profitability condition that decides 
whether to invest.  
     Finally, Eicher et al. (2012) combine the BMA and the Heckman selection 
method and introduce HeckitBMA to address both model uncertainty and 
selection bias problems in FDI analyses. Their FDI flow equation is based on the 
gravity equations for FDI: 
 
                                                        
82 Refer to Eicher, Helfman and Lenkoski (2012). The missing data do not necessarily mean the true entry is absolute 
“zero” since there is also a possibility of measurement errors.  
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          𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗𝑡+𝛽3𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐷𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽4𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡        (5) 
 
where 𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡 represents the log of FDI from source country i to host country j at 
time t, 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 and 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗𝑡 are GDPs for country i and j, respectively, 𝐷𝑖𝑗 is the 
bilateral distance between country i and country j. 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 is a 𝐾 × 1 vector of other 
covariates that represents alternative FDI theories. 𝛼𝑡 is the time fixed effect, 𝛼0 
is the intercept and 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the error term. A large panel including 46 countries 
from 1988 to 2000 and a comprehensive set of FDI determinants (55 regressors 
proposed by previous theories) is constructed in their dataset. It is shown from 
the data that the impact of model uncertainty and selection bias on FDI estimates 
is substantial; therefore applying HeckitBMA methodology to correct both model 
uncertainty and selection bias problems in FDI analysis is necessary.  Their 
results showed mixed support for horizontal or export platform FDI theories. 
Trade agreements and currency unions do not encourage FDI except in specific 
instances (e.g., dollarization and APEC membership). Market potential exerts a 
decisive negative effect on the extensive margin of FDI: a host’s proximity to 
large markets results in less new FDI inflows. This is contrary to the predictions of 
export platform FDI theories. Vertical FDI theories are not strongly supported 
since FDI is also affected by higher levels of development. Contrary to the 
knowledge-capital model they find no evidence that educational differences have 
strong effects on either margin of FDI. However, productivity is found to be a vital 
determinant to the extensive margin of FDI, besides, corporate taxes in source 
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and host countries affect both margins of FDI although bilateral tax treaties did 
not show much impact on FDI. 
 
2. Empirical Methdology 
 
2.1 The Empirical model 
     Inspired by Russ (2007), an empirical model based on FDI decisions in a 
general equilibrium framework with endogenous exchange rate is set up in Eq. 
(6). Built on the theoretical predictions on the dynamics of foreign start-up 
investments in the home country in Cavallari (2010), this model treats country 
productivity levels and money supplies as exogenous variables affecting the 
bilateral FDI flows. In addition, the typical gravity variables and other covariates 
representing alternative FDI theories are added into the regression as in Eicher 
et al. (2012). Besides, HeckitBMA methodology suggested in Eicher et al. (2012) 
is applied to address both model uncertainty and selection bias problems. 
However, Eicher et al. (2012) leaves endogeneity unsolved and includes some 
covariates which have long been suspected to be endogenous. Therefore, 
variables such as exchange rate, real GDP, real per capita GDP and GDP growth 
rate have been excluded in this model.  
            𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐴𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑀𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽8𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡,                                      (6) 
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where the subscripts i and j denote the source and the host country of the FDI, 
and t denotes the year.  
     The dependent variable, 𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡, is the log of FDI
83 from country i to j in year t, 
Ait is labor productivity in country i at year t, Ajt is labor productivity in country j 
at year t84, 𝑀𝑖𝑡 and 𝑀𝑗𝑡 are money supplies for country i and country j at year t, 
respectively, 𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑖𝑡 and 𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑗𝑡 are standard “mass” variables: the source and 
host country population sizes, 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑗  is the physical distance between the 
source and host countries, 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡  is a 𝐾 × 1  vector of other covariates that 
represents alternative FDI theories, 𝛽8 is a 1 × 𝐾 vector of parameters for 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 
whereas 𝛽1, 𝛽2 …, 𝛽7 are scalar parameters. 𝛼0 is the intercept and 𝛼𝑡 is the 
time fixed effect, which is standard to avoid bias caused by aggregate global 
shocks and possible correlations85. 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the error term. 
 
2.2 The HeckitBMA Approach 
     The HeckitBMA methodology developed by Eicher et al. (2012) is a nested 
BMA approach based on the Heckman selection framework: 
     𝑍 = 𝜃′𝑊 + 𝜀, 
     𝑌 = 𝛽′𝑋 + 𝜂 (𝑖𝑓 𝑍 > 0),                                              (7)      
       
                                                        
83 It is routine to use log transformation in FDI analyses and forecasting since the log transformation stabilizes the 
variance of the underlying time series. To deal with the “0” FDI observations, we have to transform the data so that the 
log function could be used, see section 4 for details.  
84 The amount of country i investments in country j might also depend on productivities in other countries; however, 
to simplify the problem, we only focus on the two country model to explain the bilateral FDI.  
85 For example, using US CPI to deflate FDI flows could introduce correlation between FDI flows. 
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where Y is the dependent variable, X is a set of explanatory variables, and Z is an 
unobserved factor indicating whether Y is observed or not. Z depends on some 
variables W, which may share some common variables with X86. The joint 
distribution of the error terms of (7) is  
 
      (
𝜂
𝜀
) ~ 𝑁 ((
0
0
) , (
𝜎𝜀
2 𝜎𝜂𝜀
𝜎𝜂𝜀 𝜎𝜀
2 ))                                       (8) 
 
If 𝜎𝜂𝜀 ≠ 0, selection bias exists, and the usual OLS estimates of 𝛽 in the second 
equation of (7) will be biased. To address this problem, Heckman (1979) 
suggests first fitting a probit regression on Z, and then computing the Inverse 
Mills Ratio, ?̂? = 𝜙[?̃?]/Φ[?̃?], which is the ratio of the probability density function of 
the first-stage fitted value (?̃? = 𝜃′𝑊) over its cumulative distribution function. 
After that, the computed Inverse Mills Ratio is added into the second-stage 
regression as an additional covariate, which generates a consistent estimate of 
𝛽. A statistically significant coefficient on the Inverse Mills Ratio indicates the 
presence of selection bias. 
     HeckitBMA addresses model uncertainty in both stages of the Heckman 
selection framework and applies BMA to form the weighted averaged estimates 
for each stage. Specifically, in stage 1, let 𝑍 = 𝛼 + ∑ 𝜃𝑖𝑊𝑖
∗ + 𝜀𝑝𝑖=1 , where 𝑊1
∗, 
                                                        
86 In FDI studies, the first equation is used as the FDI participation equation which explains the decision to invest and 
the second equation is used as the FDI flow equation which explains the change of the quantity of FDI flows (Razin et 
al., 2008, 2004). 
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𝑊2
∗,..., 𝑊𝑝
∗ is a subset of {𝑊1, 𝑊2,..., 𝑊𝑛}. The suggested underlying models 
that contain the 𝑊∗’s are {𝑀1, … , 𝑀𝑆}. The posterior distribution of 𝜃 (the vector 
parameter with elements 𝜃1, 𝜃2, … , 𝜃𝑝) given data D is the weighted average of 
the posterior distributions under the suggested models. Note that 
 
     𝑝𝑟(𝜃|𝐷) = ∑ 𝑝𝑟(𝜃|𝑀𝑠 , 𝐷)𝜋𝑠
𝑆
𝑠=1 ,                                     (9) 
 
where 𝑝𝑟(𝜃|𝑀𝑠, 𝐷) is the posterior distribution of 𝜃 given model 𝑀𝑠, and 𝜋𝑠 is 
the posterior probability of model 𝑀𝑠  given the data. The posterior model 
probability, 𝜋𝑠, is given by 
 
     𝜋𝑠 = 𝑝𝑟(𝑀𝑠|𝐷) ∝ 𝑝𝑟(𝐷|𝑀𝑠)𝑝𝑟(𝑀𝑠),                                 (10) 
     where 𝑝𝑟(𝐷|𝑀𝑠) = ∫ 𝑝𝑟(𝐷|𝜃𝑠, 𝑀𝑠) 𝑝𝑟(𝜃𝑠|𝑀𝑠)𝑑𝜃𝑠.                     (11) 
 
Here the constant of proportionality in (10) is chosen so that the posterior model 
probabilities add up to one. In equations (10) and (11), 𝑝𝑟(𝑀𝑠) and 𝑝𝑟(𝜃𝑠|𝑀𝑠) 
are prior probabilities of model 𝑀𝑠 and parameter 𝜃𝑠 given 𝑀𝑠, respectively, 
and 𝑝𝑟(𝐷|𝑀𝑠)  is calculated as the integrated likelihood of model 𝑀𝑠  over 
parameter 𝜃𝑠.  
     Based on the posterior distributions of the parameters obtained above, the 
estimated posterior means and variances of the BMA parameters are 
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     𝜃𝐵𝑀𝐴 = ∑ 𝜋𝑠𝜃𝑠
𝑆
𝑠=1                                                 (12) 
     (?̂?𝐵𝑀𝐴)2 = 𝑉𝑎?̂?(𝜃𝐵𝑀𝐴|𝐷) = ?̂?(𝜃𝐵𝑀𝐴|𝐷)2 − [?̂?(𝜃𝐵𝑀𝐴|𝐷)]2 
= ∑ ?̂?(𝜃𝐵𝑀𝐴|𝐷, 𝑀𝑠)
2𝜋𝑠 − [?̂?(𝜃
𝐵𝑀𝐴|𝐷)]2
𝑆
𝑠=1
 
                 = ∑ [𝑉𝑎?̂?(𝜃𝐵𝑀𝐴|𝐷, 𝑀𝑠) + (𝜃𝑠)
2
] 𝜋𝑠 − [?̂?(𝜃
𝐵𝑀𝐴|𝐷)]2𝑆𝑠=1      (13) 
 
     In the end, in order to measure the importance of a variable, the inclusion 
probability of this particular variable is defined as the sum of the posterior 
probabilities of the suggested models that contain this variable. The inclusion 
probability for variable 𝑊𝑘 is written as 
      
     𝜇𝐵𝑀𝐴(𝜃𝑊𝑘) = 𝑝𝑟(𝜃𝑊𝑘 ≠ 0|𝐷) = ∑ 𝜋𝑠𝑠∈𝑈𝑘 ,                            (14) 
 
where 𝑈𝑘 is the set of models that contain variable 𝑊𝑘. The higher the inclusion 
probability is, the more effective the variable. Following Eicher, Helfman and 
Lenkoski (2012), we consider a variable effective if its inclusion probability 
exceeds 50%. 
     First-stage estimation using the BMA approach derives the posterior model 
probability 𝜋𝑠 and the fitted values ?̃?𝑠87 for each model, which could then be 
used to get the weighted average BMA estimate ?̃?𝐵𝑀𝐴   
 
                                                        
87 ?̃?𝑠 is calculated by the fitted first-stage coefficients for model Ms.  
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     ?̃?𝐵𝑀𝐴 = ∑ 𝜋𝑠
𝑆
𝑠=1 ?̃?𝑠.                                               (15) 
 
Therefore, a “BMA version” of the Inverse Mills Ratio could be obtained by: 
?̂?𝐵𝑀𝐴 = 𝜙[?̃?𝐵𝑀𝐴]/Φ[?̃?𝐵𝑀𝐴]. 
     In stage 2, the BMA approach is used again in a linear regression for only 
the observed 𝑌’s on 𝑋’s and the Inverse Mills Ratio ?̂?𝐵𝑀𝐴 derived from the first 
stage. Let 𝐿 = {𝐿1, … 𝐿𝑁} be the set of potential second-stage models. As in the 
first stage, the second-stage posterior model probabilities 𝑣𝑛 =  𝑝𝑟(𝐿𝑛|𝐷) and 
the posterior distribution of 𝛽𝑛 for each model 𝐿𝑛 ∈ 𝐿 could be used to compute 
the second-stage posterior mean and variance:  
 
     ?̂?𝐻𝑒𝑐𝑘𝑖𝑡𝐵𝑀𝐴 = ∑ 𝑣𝑛?̂?𝑛
𝑁
𝑛=1 ,                                          (16) 
     (?̂?𝐻𝑒𝑐𝑘𝑖𝑡𝐵𝑀𝐴)
2
= ∑ [𝑉𝑎?̂?(𝛽𝐻𝑒𝑐𝑘𝑖𝑡𝐵𝑀𝐴|𝐷, 𝐿𝑛, ?̂?
𝐵𝑀𝐴) + (?̂?𝑛)
2
] 𝑣𝑛
𝑁
𝑛=1    
                    −[?̂?(𝛽𝐻𝑒𝑐𝑘𝑖𝑡𝐵𝑀𝐴|𝐷, ?̂?𝐵𝑀𝐴)]
2
.                        (17) 
 
The HeckitBMA estimate is the weighted average of the second-stage estimates 
from models 𝐿𝑛’s that include ?̂?
𝐵𝑀𝐴 as an additional covariate. Finally, as in the 
first stage, the inclusion probability is calculated as: 
 
     𝜇𝐻𝑒𝑐𝑘𝑖𝑡𝐵𝑀𝐴(𝛽𝑋𝑘) = 𝑝𝑟(?̂?𝑋𝑘 ≠ 0|𝐷) = ∑ 𝑣𝑗𝑛∈𝑄𝑘 ,                        (18) 
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where 𝑄𝑘 is the set of models that contain variable 𝑋𝑘. The HeckitBMA inclusion 
probability is different from the inclusion probability in the conventional BMA 
methodology in that it is based on information that also accounts for selection 
bias. 
 
3. The Candidate Regressors 
 
     The candidate regressors in (6) are summarized in Table 1. Cavallari (2010) 
argues that the equilibrium dynamics of the start-up foreign investments is 
determined by source and host country productivity levels and current monetary 
shocks. It is found that a rise in home productivity reduces entry costs in home 
markets, which encourages foreign investments at home; whereas a rise in 
source country productivity will induce foreign firms to opt in favor of exports 
rather than direct investments, which depresses FDI at home88. What is more 
important, current monetary shocks can play a role in redirecting investments 
across countries: a home monetary expansion will discourage foreign 
investments when exchange rate pass through is not complete, whereas a 
monetary easing from the source country will boost FDI and crowd out domestic 
investments. 
     The source and host population sizes are the standard “mass” variables in 
the gravity equation of FDI, which also includes Distance. Geography/history 
                                                        
88 Razin et al. (2008) show that a positive productivity shock tends to increase FDI flow to the host country through 
the marginal profitability effect, however, it may also reduce the likelihood of new FDI from the source country 
through a total profitability effect due to the increases of the variable and setup costs. 
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variables, Language and Border are commonly used to capture country-pair 
specific effects that might affect FDI. Greater education differences between 
source and host countries, according to the knowledge-capital model, would 
promote larger vertical FDI flows into the host country89. 
  
                                                        
89 The previous FDI theories and empirical studies suggested a large set of candidate FDI determinants, which 
associate with different types of FDI theories. For example: trade agreements and the measure of market potential 
represent the horizontal or export platform FDI theories, and education differences represent the vertical FDI theories.   
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Table 1 Discriptions of the candidate FDI determinants 
 Variable name Variable description
e
 
Gravity DISTij Natural log of bilateral distance 
POPi Natural log of source population size 
POPj Natural log of host population size 
Geography/history BORDERij =1 If pair share a common border 
COM_LANGij =1 If pair share common language 
Factor endowment EDU_DIFFij Source minus host education level 
Productivity and growth PRODUCTIVITYi Source productivity (real GDP per worker) 
PRODUCTIVITYj Host productivity (real GDP per worker) 
MRKT_POTENTIALj Sum of host’s distance-weighted GDP to all other countries 
Fiscal/monetary policy Mi Source money supply 
Mj Host money supply 
TAXi Source corporate effective tax rate 
TAXj Host corporate effective tax rate 
RTAs/CUs/investment
a 
INVEST_TREATYij =1 If both countries are in an investment treaty 
Bi_RTAij =1 if both countries are in the bilateral RTA 
NAFTAij =1 if both countries are in NAFTA 
APECij =1 if both countries are in APEC 
Economic risk
b
 ECON_RISKi Source Economic risk 
ECON_RISKj Host Economic risk 
Financial risk
c 
FIN_RISKi Source financial risk 
 FIN_RISKj Host financial risk 
Political risk BUREAUi Source bureaucratic quality 
BUREAUj Host bureaucratic quality 
CORRUPTi Source corruption 
CORRUPTj Host corruption 
DEMOCRATICi Source democratic accountability 
DEMOCRATICj Host democratic accountability 
ETHNIC_TENSIONi Source ethnic tentions 
ETHNIC_TENSIONj Host ethnic tentions 
EXTERN_CONFLICTi Source external conflict 
EXTERN_CONFLICTj Host external conflict 
GOV_STABILITYi Source government stability 
GOV_STABILITYj Host government stability 
INTERN_CONFLICTi Source internal conflict 
INTERN_CONFLICTj Host internal conflict 
INV_PROFILEi Source investment profile
d
 
INV_PROFILEj Host investment profile 
LAW_ORDERi Source law and order 
LAW_ORDERj Host law and order 
MILITARYi Source military in politics 
MILITARYj Host military in politics 
RELIGIOUS_TENSIONi Source religion in politics 
RELIGIOUS_TENSIONj Host religion in politics 
SOCIO_ECONi Source socioeconomic conditions 
SOCIO_ECONj Host socioeconomic conditions 
Notes: 
a. RTAs means regional trade agreements, which includes bilateral RTAs, North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
and Asia-Pacific Economic Community (APEC) in this paper.  
b. Economic Risk Rating is the overall economic risk rating, which defined by ICRG is the total points of 5 economic risk 
indicator components: GDP per head of population, real annual GDP growth, annual inflation rate, budget balance as 
percent of GDP, current account as percent of GDP. 
c. Financial Risk Rating is the overall financial risk rating, which defined by ICRG is the total points of 5 financial risk 
indicators components: total foreign debt as percent of GDP, debt service as percent of exports of goods and services, 
current account as percent of exports of goods and services, international liquidity as months of import cover, and 
exchange rate stability as percentage change. 
d. Investment profile measures government attitude toward inward investment as determined by risk to operations, 
taxation, repatriation and labor costs. 
e. The set of variables used in this paper is based on Eicher et al. (2012), who made a comprehensive explanation of the 
importance of all the FDI determinants motivated by the previous literature. However, the variables we chose in this paper 
are different from the variables in Eicher et al. (2012) mainly due to the endogeneity problem, the differences are 
discussed in detail in section 4.  
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     Blonigen et al. (2007) find that FDI into a host country may depend on the 
FDI in proximate countries (host’s Market Potential) because it attracts more 
export-platform FDI into the host country90. However, it is also found that the 
estimated spatial interdependence is quite sensitive to the sample of countries 
one examines.  
     The effects of taxes on FDI have long been paid attention to by both 
international and public economists. Razin and Sadka (2007b, Ch 10) found 
empirically that a rise in host country tax rates reduces the quantity of local 
production by foreign multinational firms; whereas the increase of the source 
country’s corporate taxes induce MNE to establish new affiliates abroad. 
However, Blonigen (2005) discussed the effect of Corporate Tax Rates (and Tax 
Treaties) on FDI and pointed out the effects of taxes on FDI can vary 
substantially by type of taxes, measurement of FDI activity, and tax treatment in 
the host and parent countries.  
     Bilateral investment treaties (or BITs) are a set of treaties which guarantee 
that certain standards can be enforced via binding investor-to-state dispute 
settlement outside the domestic juridical system. BITs make foreign investors 
more confident about the quality of the institutions and the enforceability of the 
law in host countries. Neumayer and Spess (2005) provide the first rigorous 
quantitative evidence that a higher number of BITs increases the FDI that flows to 
a developing country. Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) are additional 
                                                        
90 A priori, the effect could go either way: positive or negative. 
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important factors which indirectly affect FDI through export platform and/or 
horizontal/vertical FDI incentives. However, RTAs might increase FDI to an 
export platform within the RTA, and reduce it to all other members of the RTA. To 
separate trade effects that arise within and between RTAs, Eicher et al. (2012) 
suggest including all possible individual RTAs rather than only one average 
catch-all RTA effect. 
     Financial risk is also a crucial determinant of FDI. Razin et al. (2008) 
include financial risk in their econometric model of FDI. Economic and Political 
Risk indexes have also featured prominently in recent empirical literatures to 
capture factors that impact the return on investment. Jinjarak (2007) provides 
cross country industry evidence on the relationship between the host country’s 
macro risks and FDI activities. It is found that US FDI in industries with a higher 
share of vertical FDI respond disproportionately more to negative effects of 
macro-level demand, supply, and sovereign risks.  
 
4. Data 
 
     The dataset in this paper is based on Eicher et al. (2012) and Razin et al. 
(2008). Eicher et al. (2012) has a panel which covers years 1988–2000 and 
includes 46 countries in their big global sample, which includes data on FDI flows, 
population, productivity, real GDP per capita, distance, common language, 
education difference, financial risk rating, market size, colony, border, GDP 
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growth rate, market potential, corporate tax rates, real exchange rate, investment 
treaties, regional trade agreements, currency unions, and political risks. Because 
the exchange rate is endogenous in our empirical model, we exclude the real 
exchange rate from the determinants for FDI, along with other variables which 
have long been suspected to be endogenous: log of real GDP, log of real GDP 
per capita and GDP growth rate. In addition, due to the assumption of the 
endogeneity of the exchange rate, it is necessary to select countries with flexible 
exchange rates in order to get a better estimation.  Therefore, from the global 
sample in Eicher et al. (2012), twelve countries are selected based on the 
commonly used de facto classification scheme developed by Levy-Yeyati and 
Sturzenegger (2005)91. They use cluster analysis techniques to group countries’ 
regimes on the basis of the volatility of the exchange rate relative to the relevant 
anchor currency92, the volatility of exchange rate changes, and the volatility of 
reserves. Finally, our dataset possesses an unbalanced panel that covers years 
1988–2000 and includes 12 countries (5 non-OECD)93, 112 unique country pairs 
with 1442 total observations, of which 62 percent FDI flows are unobservable94. 
Due to the limited countries selected, some variables are not applicable and 
excluded: colony, currency unions and some regional trade agreements such as 
                                                        
91 In this paper, based on Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005), we select a country as a country with flexible 
exchange rates if the years when its exchange rates are classified as float are more than the years when its exchange 
rates are classified as fix over the period 1988-2000. 
92 In Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005), for each country, the volatility of its exchange rate is calculated relative to 
the currency of reference for this country. For example, the US dollar is the currency of reference for Australia, 
Canada, Chile (74-89; 99-), Colombia, Japan, Pakistan, South Africa, Turkey and UK (95-); besides, German Mark is 
the currency of reference for Poland, UK (87-94) and United States. 
93 The countries in this paper are listed in Table 3 based on our classified countries with flexible exchange rates. 
94 Unobservable means the data for FDI flow is either 0 or missing. 
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EEA, EFTA and EU.  
     However, there are two important variables added into the dataset, which 
are source and host country money supplies, which are obtained from World 
Development Indicators (WDI). Broad money (current LCU95) is used here for the 
choice of the money supply variables. Broad money is defined by the World Bank 
as the sum of currency outside banks; demand deposits other than those of the 
central government; the time, savings, and foreign currency deposits of resident 
sectors96 other than the central government; bank and traveler’s checks; and 
other securities such as certificates of deposit and commercial paper. In addition, 
an index of overall economic risk rating (obtained from International Country Risk 
Guide, or ICRG) has been added into the data, which is the total points of five 
economic risk indicator components: GDP per head of population, real annual 
GDP growth, annual inflation rate, budget balance as percent of GDP, current 
account as percent of GDP97.  
     Data sources are provided in Table 2 and the frequencies of FDI 
host/source flows are provided in Table 3. FDI flows data was acquired from the 
OECD International Direct Investment Database and deflated by the US CPI. It is 
then transformed following Eicher et al. (2012) by adding a ‘‘1’’ to all FDI 
                                                        
95 LCU means data are in current local currency. 
96 Resident sectors exclude government and corporations. 
97 Economic risks matter since they affect the investors’ long term estimates of profitability. Among the five risk 
indicators, inflation is a principal concern of investors largely because it reduces the value of host-country currency, 
which lowers profits of the investments. Moreover, inflation confounds corporate attempts to produce long-term 
estimates of profitability. In addition, the aggregate debt indicator for the host country (such as budget balance as 
percent of GDP), is a measure of the country's credit risk indicating the stability of host country’s economy. Therefore 
it could affect the confidence of the international institutions in its economy. Moreover, stronger economic 
performance (such as higher GDP per capita and real annual GDP growth) is also positively associated with FDI 
inflows. (Lewandowski, 1997).  
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observations, so that the dependent variable becomes ln [𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤 + 1] instead of 
ln [𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤] , since ln [0]  is not defined, although this method might cause 
inconsistency problems on the estimates. The education difference between the 
source and the host countries was obtained from UN human development 
indicators (HDI), which provides source-host differences in average years of 
schooling for those over age 25, reported every ten years for 1980-2000. Linear 
interpolation was used for other years. Country productivities were taken from 
Penn World Tables 6.3’s data for real GDP Chain per worker (1$ per worker in 
2005 Constant Prices). Investment treaty indicators were gained from ICSID 
Database of Bilateral Investment Treaties. Market potential is constructed as the 
sum of host’s distance-weighted GDP to all other countries based on the method 
implemented by Blonigen et al. (2007). In Blonigen et al. (2007), the weight for a 
particular country is calculated using an inverse distance function where the 
shortest bilateral distance within the sample is divided by the distance between 
this particular country and the host country. So only the country with shortest 
bilateral distance to the host within the sample receives a weight of unity and all 
other distances within the sample receive a weight that declines with the increase 
of the bilateral distance.  
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Table 2 Data Source 
Variable Source 
FDI flows International Direct Investment Database (OECD) 
Money supply
a
 World Development Indicators (WDI) 
Productivity
b
 Penn World Tables 6.3 
Distance Andrew Rose’s website: www.haas.berkeley.edu/~arose 
Population World Development Indicators (WDI) 
Common Language Andrew Rose’s website: www.haas.berkeley.edu/~arose 
Common Border Andrew Rose’s website: www.haas.berkeley.edu/~arose 
Colonial Relationship Andrew Rose’s website: www.haas.berkeley.edu/~arose 
Education Attainment HDI (UN human development indicators) 
Market Potential Constructed based on Blonigen et al.(2007) 
Corporate Tax Rate World Tax Database
c
 
Investment Treaty ICSID Database of Bilateral Investment Treaties 
Regional Trade Agreement (RTA) Andrew Rose’s website: www.haas.berkeley.edu/~arose 
CU and PTA Memberships Eicher and Henn (2009) 
Economic, Financial and Political Risk Ratings International Country Risk Guide from PRS Group  
Lagged negative FDI dummy
d
 Constructed based on Razin et al. (2004) 
Notes: 
a. In this paper, broad money (current LCU) is selected as the money supply variables. Broad money is defined by the 
World Bank as the sum of currency outside banks; demand deposits other than those of the central government; the time, 
savings, and foreign currency deposits of resident sectors other than the central government; bank and traveler’s checks; 
and other securities such as certificates of deposit and commercial paper. See 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FM.LBL.BMNY.CN for reference. 
b. We use Real GDP Chain per worker (1$ per worker in 2005 Constant Prices) from PWT 6.3 for productivity. 
c. Poland’s tax rate data is not available from 1988-1990 in World Tax Database; however, according to Piotrowska and 
Vanborren (2008) the ratio of corporate tax revenues and corporate income in Poland was stable between 1980-2004 in 
the previous studies, so we estimate the tax rates from 1988-1990 based on 1991’s tax rate.    
d. As in Razin et al. (2004), this dummy variable is an instrument that proxies negative FDI lag, which is used to account 
for negative FDI flows (the liquidation of foreign subsidiaries). 
 
Table 3 Frequency of host/source observations, by country 
 FDI hosts FDI sources 
 N obs Obs≠0 N obs Obs≠0 
Australia 83 69 75 65 
Canada 39 39 39 39 
Japan 67 50 108 107 
Poland 55 53 32 23 
Turkey 36 28 15 6 
United Kingdom 96 79 116 115 
United States 99 99 118 116 
South Africa 39 29 39 37 
Chile 41 38 27 8 
Colombia 24 22 14 3 
Pakistan 1 0 4 3 
Philippines 49 48 34 23 
Total 629 554 621 545 
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5. Robust FDI Determinants 
 
     The main interest in this paper is to identify robust determinants of the 
intensive and extensive margins of FDI when exchange rates are endogenous 
within the framework of selection bias and model uncertainty. The key 
explanatory variables we examine, besides the conventional gravity variables, 
are productivities and money supplies from source and host countries. 
HeckitBMA approach is implemented, which assigns the greatest weight to more 
parsimonious models that score much better in terms of joint likelihoods or 
Bayesian Information Criteria (BIC). 
 
5.1 The Base Model Results  
     The regression results of the baseline model in (6) are listed in Table 4. The 
gravity regressors: population of the host and source and distance between them 
get high inclusion probabilities with correct signs at both margins of FDI. Money 
supplies are not shown to exert effects on FDI flows; however, host country 
money supply reveals a decisive effect on the decision to invest. A monetary 
ease in the host country lowers the probability of setting up a new affiliate abroad 
by investors. This fact coincides with Cavallari (2010)’s argument that a home 
monetary expansion discourages the start-up foreign investments when 
exchange rate pass through is not complete. 
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Table 4 Robust FDI Determinants---HeckitBMA estimatesa for both FDI flow and FDI selection equations 
 FDI flow   FDI selection 
Variable Posterior 
Inclusion 
Probability 
Posterior 
Mean 
Posterior 
Standard 
Deviation 
Posterior 
Inclusion 
Probability 
Posterior 
Mean 
Posterior 
Standard 
Deviation 
LOG.Mi. 0.003 0.000 0.001 0.003 0.000 0.001 
LOG.Mj. 0.049 -0.003 0.015 0.946 -0.096 0.038 
LOG.PRODUCTIVITYi. 1.000 1.661 0.246 1.000 1.439 0.225 
LOG.PRODUCTIVITYj. 0.843 0.676 0.345 0.029 -0.012 0.078 
LOG.POPULATIONi. 1.000 0.757 0.082 1.000 0.557 0.085 
LOG.POPULATIONj. 1.000 0.505 0.078 0.701 0.182 0.137 
LOG.DISTANCE. 0.881 -0.419 0.199 1.000 -0.576 0.120 
NEG_FDI_LAG 0.118 -0.045 0.140 1.000 1.286 0.303 
COM_LANGij 1.000 0.704 0.176 1.000 0.967 0.153 
BORDERij 0.176 0.172 0.417 0.002 0.006 61.177 
EDU_DIFFij 0.774 -0.072 0.049 0.546 -0.045 0.046 
LOG.MRKT_POTENTIALj 0.068 -0.022 0.092 0.078 -0.025 0.096 
TAXi 0.003 0.000 0.001 0.017 0.000 0.002 
TAXj 0.003 0.000 0.001 0.077 -0.002 0.007 
INVEST_TREATYij 0.003 0.000 0.011 0.011 0.002 0.025 
Bi_RTAij 0.003 0.000 0.014 0.105 -0.047 0.154 
NAFTAij 0.175 0.171 0.417 0.002 0.006 61.177 
APECij 0.003 0.000 0.008 0.002 0.000 0.007 
ECON_RISKi 0.010 0.000 0.003 0.003 0.000 0.001 
FIN_RISKi 0.006 0.000 0.001 0.004 0.000 0.001 
BUREAUi 0.003 0.000 0.009 0.050 -0.010 0.048 
CORRUPTi 0.003 0.000 0.004 0.250 -0.047 0.090 
DEMOCRATICi 0.022 0.003 0.026 0.002 0.000 0.003 
ETHNIC_TENSIONi 0.006 0.000 0.006 0.003 0.000 0.003 
EXTERN_CONFLICTi 0.003 0.000 0.002 0.004 0.000 0.004 
GOV_STABILITYi 0.003 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.001 
INTERN_CONFLICTi 0.005 0.000 0.004 0.016 -0.001 0.007 
INV_PROFILEi 0.141 0.011 0.030 0.019 0.001 0.012 
LAW_ORDERi 0.003 0.000 0.004 0.018 -0.002 0.015 
MILITARYi 0.011 -0.001 0.014 0.035 0.005 0.027 
RELIGIOUS_TENSIONi 0.012 0.002 0.018 0.003 0.000 0.005 
SOCIO_ECONi 0.003 0.000 0.002 0.066 -0.005 0.022 
ECON_RISKj 0.031 -0.001 0.009 0.114 0.007 0.021 
FIN_RISKj 0.010 0.000 0.002 0.998 0.057 0.017 
BUREAUj 0.038 -0.009 0.051 0.044 -0.008 0.041 
CORRUPTj 0.013 -0.001 0.014 0.211 -0.042 0.089 
DEMOCRATICj 0.003 0.000 0.004 0.003 0.000 0.005 
ETHNIC_TENSIONj 0.337 0.049 0.079 0.875 0.183 0.094 
EXTERN_CONFLICTj 0.074 -0.009 0.036 0.002 0.000 0.002 
GOV_STABILITYj 0.009 0.000 0.004 0.040 0.002 0.011 
INTERN_CONFLICTj 0.009 0.000 0.006 0.150 -0.016 0.043 
INV_PROFILEj 0.003 0.000 0.002 0.215 0.018 0.038 
LAW_ORDERj 0.004 0.000 0.006 0.005 0.000 0.006 
MILITARYj 0.012 -0.001 0.015 0.015 0.002 0.022 
RELIGIOUS_TENSIONj 0.201 0.059 0.127 0.765 0.212 0.138 
SOCIO_ECONj 0.398 0.039 0.055 0.009 -0.001 0.008 
PAST_FDI_DUM    1.000 1.953 0.143 
IMR  0.121a 0.158    
BIC -254.7031      
N 554   1442   
Notes: 
a. HeckitBMA statistics are based on the best models selected in the selection and flow equations.  
b. The posterior mean for the Inverse Mills Ratio is conditional on inclusion. Based on the posterior mean, posterior 
standard deviation and the sample size of the flow equation, the 95% Credible Interval for the Inverse Mills Ratio does not 
contain zero.  
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     Productivities in source and host countries show strong positive effects on 
the intensive margin of FDI, and host productivity has negative effect on the 
extensive margin of FDI (although its inclusion probability is very low). This 
confirms Razin et al. (2008)’s findings on the conflicting effects of productivity 
changes on bilateral FDI flows. However, we find a strong positive relationship 
between the source country productivity and the extensive margin of FDI, which 
is at odds with Razin et al. (2008). Whether the country-pairs share a common 
language is also an important factor affecting the likelihood and volume of FDI 
flows. Greater education differences discourage FDI at both margins. That is 
opposite to the predictions of the knowledge-capital model which addresses the 
vertical FDI motivations. Additional factors that exert a negative effect on the 
extensive margin of FDI include such country characteristics as the ethnic and 
religious tension risks in the host and an economic factor: financial risk in the 
host 98 . The dummy variable which indicates the existence of past FDI 
source-host relations is shown to exert a decisive positive effect on the decision 
to invest. This variable is used as an exclusion restriction variable in Razin et al. 
(2008), which also finds a positive coefficient and interprets the positive effect as 
an indication for a lower threshold barrier for pairs of countries that had positive 
FDI flows in the past 99 . Moreover, the estimated posterior coefficient and 
standard deviation of the Inverse Mills Ratio implies that the 95% credible interval 
                                                        
98 According to the ICRG from the PRS Group, the higher risk index is associated with less risk in the country. Table 
4 shows that higher risk index (meaning less risk in the host) is associated with larger amount of new FDI. 
99 According to Razin et al. (2008), FDI flows are actually observed only when their profitability exceeds a certain 
(unobserved) threshold, which is determined by the total profitability condition (depending on both the variable cost 
and the setup cost) for the new investment. Empirically, past FDI is used as a proxy for the lower threshold barrier. 
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for the coefficient on IMR does not contain zero. According to the Heckman 
selection methodology, it proves that selection bias is present in the data and 
pure OLS estimates are going to be downward biased. So it is necessary to first 
look into the selection (participation) stage of the FDI decision in order to avoid 
the omitted variables bias (IMR) that contaminates OLS estimates. 
 
5.2 Sensitivity Results 
     In the first sensitivity check, we eliminate the time fixed effects which have 
low inclusion probabilities in the baseline model estimation. The results are 
shown in Table 5. There is not much difference comparing to the base model 
regarding the robust determinants of the extensive and intensive margins of FDI. 
The only difference is that the host country’s socioeconomic conditions become 
effective --- that is, better economic conditions in the host attract more FDI 
inflows.  
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Table 5 Robust FDI Determinants (HeckitBMA estimates without time fixed effects) 
 FDI flow   FDI selection 
Variable Posterior 
Inclusion 
Probability 
Posterior 
Mean 
Posterior 
Standard 
Deviation 
Posterior 
Inclusion 
Probability 
Posterior 
Mean 
Posterior 
Standard 
Deviation 
LOG.Mi. 0.007 0.000 0.002 0.004 0.000 0.001 
LOG.Mj. 0.089 -0.005 0.020 0.936 -0.095 0.041 
LOG.PRODUCTIVITYi. 1.000 1.635 0.255 1.000 1.465 0.227 
LOG.PRODUCTIVITYj. 0.850 0.666 0.342 0.033 -0.013 0.083 
LOG.POPULATIONi. 1.000 0.751 0.082 1.000 0.556 0.085 
LOG.POPULATIONj. 1.000 0.499 0.079 0.636 0.161 0.138 
LOG.DISTANCE. 0.850 -0.396 0.212 1.000 -0.585 0.120 
NEG_FDI_LAG 0.170 -0.066 0.166 1.000 1.284 0.304 
COM_LANGij 0.999 0.687 0.179 1.000 0.971 0.155 
BORDERij 0.221 0.216 0.458 0.003 0.009 75.719 
EDU_DIFFij 0.759 -0.072 0.050 0.612 -0.051 0.047 
LOG.MRKT_POTENTIALj 0.128 -0.042 0.125 0.099 -0.032 0.109 
TAXi 0.006 0.000 0.001 0.021 0.000 0.002 
TAXj 0.006 0.000 0.001 0.091 -0.002 0.008 
INVEST_TREATYij 0.008 0.001 0.016 0.016 0.003 0.031 
Bi_RTAij 0.007 0.001 0.020 0.117 -0.052 0.161 
NAFTAij 0.221 NA NA 0.003 0.009 75.719 
APECij 0.009 -0.001 0.015 0.003 0.000 0.008 
ECON_RISKi 0.021 0.000 0.004 0.003 0.000 0.001 
FIN_RISKi 0.014 0.000 0.002 0.005 0.000 0.001 
BUREAUi 0.007 -0.001 0.014 0.061 -0.012 0.054 
CORRUPTi 0.007 0.000 0.007 0.270 -0.051 0.094 
DEMOCRATICi 0.032 0.005 0.032 0.003 0.000 0.004 
ETHNIC_TENSIONi 0.010 0.000 0.007 0.004 0.000 0.003 
EXTERN_CONFLICTi 0.006 0.000 0.004 0.005 0.000 0.004 
GOV_STABILITYi 0.010 0.000 0.005 0.003 0.000 0.002 
INTERN_CONFLICTi 0.011 0.000 0.006 0.018 -0.001 0.008 
INV_PROFILEi 0.164 0.012 0.032 0.026 0.002 0.014 
LAW_ORDERi 0.006 0.000 0.007 0.019 -0.002 0.016 
MILITARYi 0.020 -0.002 0.020 0.048 0.006 0.032 
RELIGIOUS_TENSIONi 0.014 0.001 0.017 0.004 0.000 0.005 
SOCIO_ECONi 0.008 0.000 0.004 0.075 -0.006 0.024 
ECON_RISKj 0.048 -0.002 0.011 0.145 0.009 0.023 
FIN_RISKj 0.020 0.000 0.003 0.997 0.059 0.017 
BUREAUj 0.053 -0.012 0.060 0.045 -0.008 0.042 
CORRUPTj 0.019 -0.002 0.017 0.240 -0.048 0.095 
DEMOCRATICj 0.006 0.000 0.007 0.004 0.000 0.007 
ETHNIC_TENSIONj 0.336 0.051 0.083 0.852 0.176 0.098 
EXTERN_CONFLICTj 0.044 -0.004 0.022 0.004 0.000 0.003 
GOV_STABILITYj 0.009 0.000 0.003 0.052 0.003 0.013 
INTERN_CONFLICTj 0.018 -0.001 0.009 0.173 -0.019 0.046 
INV_PROFILEj 0.013 0.000 0.008 0.254 0.021 0.041 
LAW_ORDERj 0.010 0.000 0.010 0.007 0.000 0.007 
MILITARYj 0.023 -0.003 0.021 0.019 0.002 0.025 
RELIGIOUS_TENSIONj 0.189 0.050 0.112 0.715 0.193 0.141 
SOCIO_ECONj 0.531 0.054 0.059 0.013 -0.001 0.010 
PAST_FDI_DUM    1.000 1.949 0.144 
IMR  0.110a 0.180    
BIC -254.63      
N 554   1442   
Note: a. The posterior mean for the Inverse Mills Ratio is conditional on inclusion. Based on the posterior mean, posterior 
standard deviation and the sample size of the flow equation, the 95% Credible Interval for the Inverse Mills Ratio does not 
contain zero.  
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Table 6 Robust FDI Determinants (HeckitBMA estimates with lagged measure of productivity) 
 FDI flow   FDI selection 
Variable Posterior 
Inclusion 
Probability 
Posterior 
Mean 
Posterior 
Standard 
Deviation 
Posterior 
Inclusion 
Probability 
Posterior 
Mean 
Posterior 
Standard 
Deviation 
LOG.Mi. 0.011 0.000 0.005 0.005 0.000 0.002 
LOG.Mj. 0.027 -0.001 0.010 0.992 -0.104 0.032 
LOG.PRODUCTIVITYi. 1.000 1.661 0.246 1.000 1.373 0.189 
LOG.PRODUCTIVITYj. 0.384 0.294 0.400 0.012 -0.002 0.031 
LOG.POPULATIONi. 1.000 0.766 0.085 1.000 0.595 0.090 
LOG.POPULATIONj. 1.000 0.566 0.087 0.922 0.258 0.108 
LOG.DISTANCE. 0.677 -0.291 0.241 1.000 -0.547 0.118 
NEG_FDI_LAG 0.036 -0.011 0.068 1.000 1.308 0.301 
COM_LANGij 0.988 0.610 0.216 1.000 0.992 0.156 
BORDERij 0.361 0.432 0.636 0.005 0.013 103.824 
EDU_DIFFij 0.829 -0.086 0.049 0.118 -0.007 0.022 
LOG.MRKT_POTENTIALj 0.012 -0.002 0.029 0.022 -0.005 0.044 
TAXi 0.012 0.000 0.003 0.030 0.000 0.003 
TAXj 0.007 0.000 0.001 0.090 -0.002 0.008 
INVEST_TREATYij 0.007 0.001 0.020 0.015 0.003 0.027 
Bi_RTAij 0.004 0.000 0.015 0.051 -0.019 0.096 
NAFTAij 0.360 NA NA 0.005 0.013 103.824 
APECij 0.003 0.000 0.008 0.006 0.000 0.013 
ECON_RISKi 0.096 -0.004 0.014 0.006 0.000 0.001 
FIN_RISKi 0.003 0.000 0.001 0.007 0.000 0.001 
BUREAUi 0.005 -0.001 0.013 0.015 -0.002 0.020 
CORRUPTi 0.004 0.000 0.006 0.265 -0.049 0.090 
DEMOCRATICi 0.015 0.002 0.024 0.006 0.000 0.006 
ETHNIC_TENSIONi 0.004 0.000 0.004 0.006 0.000 0.004 
EXTERN_CONFLICTi 0.004 0.000 0.003 0.006 0.000 0.004 
GOV_STABILITYi 0.004 0.000 0.002 0.007 0.000 0.003 
INTERN_CONFLICTi 0.020 -0.001 0.011 0.015 -0.001 0.006 
INV_PROFILEi 0.111 0.008 0.027 0.048 0.003 0.018 
LAW_ORDERi 0.003 0.000 0.005 0.037 -0.004 0.023 
MILITARYi 0.031 -0.005 0.030 0.016 0.001 0.014 
RELIGIOUS_TENSIONi 0.004 0.000 0.008 0.006 0.000 0.007 
SOCIO_ECONi 0.006 0.000 0.006 0.064 -0.005 0.023 
ECON_RISKj 0.017 -0.001 0.005 0.123 0.007 0.022 
FIN_RISKj 0.011 0.000 0.002 0.964 0.048 0.018 
BUREAUj 0.030 -0.007 0.047 0.020 -0.002 0.022 
CORRUPTj 0.014 -0.001 0.014 0.044 -0.006 0.033 
DEMOCRATICj 0.004 0.000 0.006 0.007 0.000 0.010 
ETHNIC_TENSIONj 0.340 0.051 0.081 0.998 0.248 0.067 
EXTERN_CONFLICTj 0.079 -0.010 0.037 0.015 -0.001 0.010 
GOV_STABILITYj 0.014 0.001 0.006 0.100 0.006 0.019 
INTERN_CONFLICTj 0.008 0.000 0.005 0.119 -0.012 0.036 
INV_PROFILEj 0.004 0.000 0.002 0.135 0.010 0.030 
LAW_ORDERj 0.011 0.001 0.010 0.007 0.000 0.005 
MILITARYj 0.006 0.000 0.007 0.008 0.000 0.008 
RELIGIOUS_TENSIONj 0.657 0.214 0.172 0.934 0.276 0.106 
SOCIO_ECONj 0.626 0.066 0.060 0.016 -0.001 0.010 
PAST_FDI_DUM    1.000 1.924 0.144 
IMR  0.139a 0.204    
BIC -229.6274      
N 520   1330   
Note: a. The posterior mean for the Inverse Mills Ratio is conditional on inclusion. Based on the posterior mean, posterior 
standard deviation and the sample size of the flow equation, the 95% Credible Interval for the Inverse Mills Ratio does not 
contain zero.  
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     As a further sensitivity check, the lagged productivities for source and host 
countries are used instead of the current period productivities in order to alleviate 
the suspected endogeneity problem of the productivities. The results are listed in 
Table 6. In this case, the host productivity loses its effectiveness on the FDI 
volumes. Education difference demonstrates stronger negative effect on FDI 
inflows compared to the baseline results, whereas it loses power in affecting the 
FDI participation decision. The importance of host ethnic and religious tensions is 
intensified in the FDI selection equation. In addition, another two factors --- 
religious tension and socioeconomic conditions in the host --- are added into the 
effective determinants of the intensive margin of FDI.  
 
6. Conclusion 
   
     The contributions of this paper could be summarized as follows: first, an 
empirical model of FDI decisions in a general equilibrium framework with 
endogenous exchange rate is setup, which is based on the recent growing 
literature that treats fundamental country-level macroeconomic factors as 
underlying exogenous variables affecting aggregate country-level FDI behavior. It 
is opposed to the previous empirical studies which generate conflicting results 
based on partial equilibrium models of FDI by modeling firm-level decisions and 
examine how exogenous factors, such as taxes and exchange rates, affect these 
firm-level decisions. This model employs aggregate money supplies from the 
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source and host countries as the determinants of FDI, which has policy 
implications on attracting country-level FDI. Along with the endogenous 
exchange rates, other covariates which have long been suspected to be 
endogenous in previous studies have been excluded in this model, such as real 
GDP, real per capita GDP and GDP growth rate. 
     Second, besides the endogeneity problem, this model also considers the 
possibility of model uncertainty and selection bias caused by missing data, and 
deal with those two problems simultaneously by incorporating HeckitBMA 
methodology suggested in Eicher et al. (2012). Confronting model uncertainty 
brought by variety of FDI theories and empirical approaches, HeckitBMA derives 
the posterior distribution of the estimates as the weighted average of the 
predictive distribution under each model. It assigns the greatest weight to more 
parsimonious models that score dramatically better in terms of joint likelihoods or 
Bayesian Information Criteria. As for selection bias, HeckitBMA allows to 
estimate the weighted average of different models in two separate stages of the 
FDI decisions: (a) the decision on whether to invest abroad or not and (b) how 
much to invest in a particular host country. So the gist of this paper is to deal with 
endogeneity, model uncertainty and selection bias simultaneously in FDI 
determinant studies by incorporating HeckitBMA methodology into a general 
equilibrium model of FDI, which depends on the underlying fundamental 
country-level macroeconomic factors.      
     Third, this paper provides strong evidence on the influence of host country 
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money supply to FDI participation decision. A monetary expansion in the host 
country is shown to deter new investments (extensive margin) from foreign 
countries. This fact coincides with Cavallari (2010)’s argument that a home 
monetary expansion discourages the start-up foreign investments when 
exchange rate pass through is not complete. However, there is not enough 
evidence that the money supplies would affect the FDI flows (intensive margin).  
     We find support for all gravity regressors which affect both margins of FDI. 
However, there is not much evidence for horizontal or export platform FDI 
theories. Trade agreements and Market potential do not exert robust effects on 
either the extensive or intensive margins of FDI. Vertical FDI theory is not 
strongly supported from the data either. Opposite to the predictions of the 
knowledge-capital model, greater education difference is found to discourage FDI 
at both margins. As in Razin et al. (2008), the increase of the productivities in 
source and host countries will raise the amount of the current investments, while 
lower the probability of investing. However, we find a strong positive relationship 
between the source country productivity and the extensive margin of FDI, which 
is at odds with Razin et al. (2008). Corporate tax rates and Bilateral tax treaties 
are shown to exert no impact on FDI, which confirms the empirical findings of 
Eicher et al. (2012). Socioeconomic conditions in the host country become 
effective to FDI flows in the model without time fixed effects or with lagged 
productivities. 
     The main limitation of this paper is the limited countries in the dataset due 
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to the constraint of endogenous exchange rate. However, recent empirical 
studies have found evidence on the impact of exchange rate regimes on bilateral 
FDI flows (Abbott et al., 2011, 2012). Therefore, by adding an exchange rate 
regime dummy vector to the FDI determinants might be helpful to expend the 
dataset to a global sample. Besides, the Breusch-Pagan test shows that the 
second stage FDI flow regression has heteroskedasticity problem. Silva and 
Tenreyro (2006) emphasized the importance of considering heteroskedasticity in 
the error terms in the usual log linear specification of the gravity equation. It is 
argued that under heteroskedasticity, the parameters of log linearized models 
estimated by OLS lead to biased and inconsistent estimates of the true 
elasticities. However, how to deal with heteroskedasticity in HeckitBMA setting 
needs to be studied further. 
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